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Abstract 
Amira Mohammad Abdel-Mawgoud Saleh 
Enhanced Secure Algorithm for Fingerprint Recognition 
Philosophy of Doctoral Dissertation 
(Ain Shams University - Faculty of Engineering - 2011) 
 
Recognition of persons by means of biometric characteristics is an 
emerging phenomenon in our society. It has received more and more 
attention during the last years due to the need for security in a large range 
of applications. Among the many biometric features, the fingerprint is 
considered one of the most practical ones. Fingerprint recognition 
requires a minimal effort from the user, does not capture other 
information than strictly necessary for the recognition process, and 
provides relatively good performance. Another reason for the popularity 
of fingerprints is the relatively low price of fingerprint sensors, which 
enables easy integration into PC keyboards, smart cards and wireless 
hardware. 
 
A critical step in fingerprint identification system is thinning of the 
input fingerprint image. The performance of a minutiae extraction 
algorithm relies heavily on the quality of the thinning algorithm. So, a fast 
fingerprint thinning algorithm is proposed. The algorithm works directly 
on the gray-scale image not the binarized one as binarization of 
fingerprint causes many spurious minutiae and also removes many 
important features. The performance of the thinning algorithm is 
evaluated and experimental results show that the proposed thinning 
algorithm is both fast and accurate. 
 
The next step after thinning of the fingerprint image is minutiae 
extraction. These minutiae together with the template obtained from the 
database are used in fingerprint matching. In this study, a new minutiae-
based fingerprint matching technique is proposed. The main idea is that 
each fingerprint is represented by a minutiae table of just two columns in 
the database. The number of different minutiae types (terminations and 
bifurcations) found in each track of a certain width around the core point 
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of the fingerprint is recorded in this table. Each row in the table represents 
a certain track, in the first column, the number of terminations in each 
track is recorded, in the second column, the number of bifurcations in 
each track is recorded. Since neither minutiae position nor orientation is 
considered in tables representing the fingerprints in database, the 
algorithm is rotation and translation invariant, and needs less storage size. 
Experimental results show that recognition accuracy is 98%, with Equal 
Error Rate (EER) of 2%. 
 
Finally, the integrity of the data transmission via communication 
channels must be secure all the way from the scanner to the application. 
This is typically achieved by cryptographic methods. So, a watermarking 
algorithm is proposed, to hide the minutiae data (proposed minutiae table) 
in its corresponding fingerprint using two secret keys k1, and k2 to 
increase security. The watermarking algorithm is blind i.e. it does not 
need the original fingerprint to extract the watermark. Two security 
watermarking applications are studied which can be used to guarantee 
secure transmission of acquired fingerprint images from intelligence 
agencies to a central image database and to eliminate several types of 
biometric system attacks. 
 
Experimental results show that watermark is both invisible and 
robust against Gaussian noise addition, and JPEG compression with high 
and moderate quality factors. After watermarking and without attacks, 
recognition accuracy does not change and still is 98%. After applying 
Gaussian noise addition, and JPEG compression with high and moderate 
quality factors on the watermarked fingerprint images, recognition 
accuracy decreases slightly to reach 96%. 
 
 
Keywords: 
 
Biometrics, fingerprints, segmentation, image processing, fingerprint 
recognition, Gabor filter, fingerprint enhancement, binarization, thinning 
algorithms, skeleton, direction field analysis, feature extraction, minutiae 
matching, adaptive singular point detection, core point, fingerprint 
identification, verification, secure authentication, threat model, 
watermarking, information security, Data hiding. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1. Biometric Recognition 
 
As our society have become electronically connected 
and more mobile, surrogate representations of identity such 
as passwords (prevalent in electronic access control) and 
cards (prevalent in banking and government applications) 
cannot be trusted to establish a person’s identity. Cards can 
be lost or stolen and passwords or PIN can, in most cases, 
be guessed. Further, passwords and cards can be easily 
shared and so they do not provide non-repudiation [1]. 
 
Biometric recognition (or simply biometrics) refers to the 
use of distinctive anatomical (e.g., fingerprints, face, iris) 
and behavioral (e.g., speech) characteristics, called biometric 
identifiers, traits or characteristics for automatically 
recognizing individuals. Biometrics are becoming essential 
components of effective person identification solutions 
because biometric identifiers cannot be shared or misplaced, 
and they intrinsically represent the individual’s bodily 
identity. Recognition of a person by their body, then linking 
that body to an externally established "identity", forms a 
very powerful tool of identity management with tremendous 
potential consequences, both positive and negative. 
Consequently, biometrics is not only a fascinating pattern 
recognition research problem but, if carefully used, is an 
enabling technology with the potential to make our society 
safer, reduce fraud and provide user convenience (user 
friendly man–machine interface). 
 
The word biometrics is derived from the Greek words 
bios (meaning life) and metron (meaning measurement); 
biometric identifiers are measurements from living human 
body. Perhaps all biometric identifiers are a combination of 
anatomical and behavioral characteristics and they should 
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not be exclusively classified into either anatomical or 
behavioral characteristics. For example, fingerprints are 
anatomical in nature but the usage of the input device (e.g., 
how a user presents a finger to the fingerprint scanner) 
depends on the person’s behavior. Thus, the input to the 
recognition engine is a combination of anatomical and 
behavioral characteristics. Similarly, speech is partly 
determined by the vocal tract that produces speech and 
partly by the way a person speaks. Often, a similarity can be 
noticed among parents, children, and siblings in their 
speech. The same argument applies to the face: faces of 
identical twins may be extremely similar at birth but during 
their growth and development, the faces change based on 
the person’s behavior (e.g., lifestyle differences leading to a 
difference in bodyweight, etc.). 
 
1.2. History of Fingerprinting 
 
There is archaeological evidence that fingerprints as a 
form of identification have been used at least since 7000 to 
6000 BC by the ancient Assyrians and Chinese. Clay pottery 
from these times sometimes contains fingerprint 
impressions placed to mark the potter. Chinese documents 
bore a clay seal marked by the thumbprint of the originator. 
Bricks used in houses in the ancient city of Jericho were 
sometimes imprinted by pairs of thumbprints of the 
bricklayer. However, though fingerprint individuality was 
recognized, there is no evidence this was used on a 
universal basis in any of these societies[2]. 
 
In the mid-1800’s scientific studies were begun that 
would established two critical characteristics of fingerprints 
that are true still to this day: no two fingerprints from 
different fingers have been found to have the same ridge 
pattern, and fingerprint ridge patterns are unchanging 
throughout life. These studies led to the use of fingerprints 
for criminal identification, first in Argentina in 1896, then at 
Scotland Yard in 1901, and to other countries in the early 
1900’s. 
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Computer processing of fingerprints began in the early 
1960s with the introduction of computer hardware that 
could reasonably process these images. Since then, 
automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) have 
been deployed widely among law enforcement agencies 
throughout the world. 
 
In the 1980s, innovations in two technology areas, 
personal computers and optical scanners, enabled the tools 
to make fingerprint capture practical in non-criminal 
applications such as for ID-card programs. In the late 
1990s, the introduction of inexpensive fingerprint capture 
devices and the development of fast, reliable matching 
algorithms have set the stage for the expansion of 
fingerprint matching to personal use. 
 
1.3. Organization of The Thesis 
 
This thesis is presented in six chapters. Chapter 1 is an 
introduction to fingerprinting. Chapter 2 addresses the 
concept of fingerprint analysis and matching. Chapter 3 
describes a proposed thinning algorithm for fingerprints. A 
new fingerprint matching algorithm is proposed in Chapter 
4. Chapter 5 discusses a new watermarking algorithm to 
secure Fingerprint Identification System (FIS). Chapter 6 
presents conclusions and suggests future work. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Fingerprint Analysis and Matching 
Recognition of persons by means of biometric 
characteristics is an emerging phenomenon in modern 
society. It has received more and more attention during the 
last period due to the need for security in a wide range of 
applications. Among the many biometric features, the 
fingerprint is considered one of the most practical ones. 
Fingerprint recognition requires a minimal effort from the 
user, does not capture other information than strictly 
necessary for the recognition process, and provides relatively 
good performance. Another reason for the popularity of 
fingerprints is the relatively low price of fingerprint sensors, 
which enables easy integration into PC keyboards, smart 
cards and wireless hardware [3]. 
 
Figure 2.1 presents a general framework for a general 
fingerprint identification system (FIS) [4]. 
A fingerprint-based biometric system is essentially a 
pattern recognition system that recognizes a person by 
determining the authenticity of his fingerprint [1]. 
Depending on the application context, a fingerprint-based 
biometric system may be called either a verification system 
or an identification system. 
 
Verification system: 
 
To authenticate a person’s identity by comparing the 
captured fingerprints with his own biometric template(s) 
pre-stored in the system. It conducts one-to-one comparison 
to determine whether the identity claimed by the individual 
is true. 
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Figure 2.1. General block diagram for a Fingerprint Identification System. 
 
Identification system: 
 
To recognize an individual by searching the entire 
templates database for a match. It conducts one-to-many 
comparisons to establish the identity of the individual. 
 
Block diagrams of a fingerprint-based verification 
system and an identification system are depicted in Figure 
2.2, user enrollment, which is common to both tasks, is also 
graphically illustrated. 
 
The enrollment module is responsible for registering 
individuals in the biometric system database (system DB). 
During the enrollment phase, the fingerprint of an 
individual is acquired by a fingerprint scanner to produce a 
raw digital representation. A quality check is generally 
performed to ensure that the acquired sample can be 
reliably processed by successive stages. In order to facilitate 
matching, the raw digital representation is usually further 
processed by a feature extractor to generate a compact but 
expressive representation, called a template.  
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The verification task is responsible for verifying 
individuals at the point of access. During the operation 
phase, the user’s ID is presented to the system; the 
biometric reader captures the fingerprint of the individual to 
be recognized and converts it to a digital format, which is 
further processed by the feature extractor to produce a 
compact digital representation. The resulting representation 
is fed to the feature matcher, which compares it against the 
template of a single user (retrieved from the system DB 
based on the user’s ID). 
 
In the identification task, no ID is provided and the 
system compares the representation of the input biometric 
against the templates of all the users in the system 
database; the output is either the identity of an enrolled 
user or an alert message such as "user not identified."  
 
It is evident from Figure 2.2 that the main building 
blocks of any fingerprint-based verification and 
identification system are:  
 
1) Sensing,  
2) Feature extraction, and  
3) Matching. 
 
In this thesis, only feature extraction and matching 
procedures are studied in chapter 3 and 4. Then to secure 
the fingerprint identification system, watermarking 
technique is applied in chapter 5. 
 
2.1. Feature Extraction 
 
A fingerprint is the reproduction of a fingertip 
epidermis, produced when a finger is pressed against a 
smooth surface. The most evident structural characteristic 
of a fingerprint is a pattern of interleaved ridges and valleys; 
in a fingerprint image, ridges (also called ridge lines) are 
dark whereas valleys are bright (see Figure 2.3). Ridges and 
valleys often run in parallel; sometimes they bifurcate and 
sometimes they terminate. 
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Figure 2.2. Block diagrams of enrollment, verification and identification 
tasks. 
When analyzed at the global level, the fingerprint 
pattern exhibits one or more regions where the ridge lines 
assume distinctive shapes (characterized by high curvature, 
frequent termination, etc.). These regions (called 
singularities or singular regions) may be classified into three 
typologies: loop, delta, and whorl (see Figure 2.4). Singular 
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regions belonging to loop, delta, and whorl types are 
typically characterized by ∩, ∆, and O shapes, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Ridges and Valleys in a fingerprint image 
 
Several fingerprint matching algorithms prealign 
fingerprint images according to a landmark or a center 
point, called the core. The core point corresponds to the 
center of the top most loop type singularity. For fingerprints 
that do not contain loop or whorl singularities (e.g., those 
belonging to the Arch class in Figure 2.5), it is difficult to 
define the core. In these cases, the core is usually associated 
with the point of maximum ridge line curvature. 
Unfortunately, due to the high variability of fingerprint 
patterns, it is difficult to reliably locate a registration (core) 
point in all the fingerprint images.  
 
Singular regions are commonly used for fingerprint 
classification (see Figure 2.5), that is, assigning a fingerprint 
to a class among a set of distinct classes, with the aim of 
simplifying search and retrieval. 
 
At the local level, other important features, called 
minutiae can be found in the fingerprint patterns. Minutia 
refers to various ways that the ridges can be discontinuous.  
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Figure 2.4. Singular regions (white boxes) and core points (small circles) in 
fingerprint images. 
 
Figure 2.5. One fingerprint from each of the five major classes defined by 
Henry 
For example, a ridge can suddenly come to an end 
(termination), or can divide into two ridges (bifurcation) (see 
Figure 2.6). 
 
Some preprocessing and enhancement steps are often 
performed to simplify the task of minutiae extraction. In the 
following, these steps are briefly discussed. 
core 
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Figure 2.6. a) A termination minutia: [x0, y0] are the minutia coordinates; θ 
is the angle that the minutia tangent forms with the horizontal axis; b) a 
bifurcation minutia: θ is now defined by means of the termination minutia 
corresponding to the original bifurcation that exists in the negative image. 
 
2.1.1. Local Ridge Orientation 
 
The local ridge orientation at [x, y] is the angle θxy that 
the fingerprint ridges, crossing through an arbitrary small 
neighborhood centered at [x, y], form with the horizontal 
axis; see Figure 2.6. 
 
The simplest and most natural approach for extracting 
local ridge orientation is based on computation of gradients 
in the fingerprint image I. The gradient ∇ (x, y) at point [x, y] 
of I, is a two dimensional vector [∇x(x, y), ∇y(x, y)], where ∇x 
and ∇y components are the derivatives of I at [x, y] with 
respect to the x and y directions, respectively. ∇x and ∇y 
components of the gradient can be determined using the 
classical Prewitt or Sobel convolution masks [5], then θij is 
computed as the arctangent of the ∇y/∇x ratio. It is well 
known that the gradient phase angle denotes the direction 
of the maximum intensity change. Therefore, the direction θij 
of a hypothetical edge that crosses the region centered at  
[xi, yj] is orthogonal to the gradient phase angle at [xi, yj]. 
 
This method, although simple and efficient, has some 
drawbacks: 
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 Using the classical convolution masks to determine ∇x, 
∇y, and θij presents problems due to the non-linearity 
and discontinuity around 90°. 
 A single orientation estimate reflects the ridge-valley 
orientation at too fine a scale and is generally very 
sensitive to the noise in the fingerprint image. 
 
A simple but elegant solution to the above problem, 
which allows local gradient estimates to be averaged, have 
been proposed in [6], [7], and [8]. 
 
2.1.2. Local Ridge Frequency 
 
The local ridge frequency (or density) fxy at point [x, y] is 
the inverse of the number of ridges per unit length along a 
hypothetical segment centered at [x, y] and orthogonal to 
the local ridge orientation θxy. The local ridge frequency 
varies across different fingers, and may also noticeably vary 
across different regions in the same fingerprint. The local 
ridge frequency feature is not used along the thesis. 
 
In [9], local ridge frequency is estimated by counting 
the average number of pixels between two consecutive peaks 
of gray-levels along the direction normal to the local ridge 
orientation (see Figure 2.7). The frequency fij at [xi, yj] is 
computed as follows:  
 
1. A 32  16 oriented window centered at [xi, yj] is 
defined in the ridge coordinate system (i.e., rotated to 
align the j-axis with the local ridge orientation).  
2. The x-signature of the gray-levels is obtained by 
accumulating, for each column x, the gray-levels of 
the corresponding pixels in the oriented window. This 
is a sort of averaging that makes the gray-level profile 
smoother and prevents ridge peaks from being 
obscured due to small ridge breaks or pores.  
3. fij is determined as the inverse of the average distance 
between two consecutive peaks of the x-signature. 
 
Another two-step procedure is proposed in [10]: 
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1. The average ridge distance is estimated in the Fourier 
domain for each 64 × 64 sub-block of the image that is of 
sufficient quality, and then 
2. This information is propagated, according to a diffusion 
equation, to the remaining regions. 
 
 
Figure 2.7. An oriented window centered at [xi, yj]; the dashed lines show 
the pixels whose gray-levels are accumulated for a given column of the x-
signature[9]. The x-signature on the right clearly exhibits five peaks; the 
four distances between consecutive peaks are averaged to determine the 
local ridge frequency. 
 
2.1.3. Segmentation 
 
Separating the fingerprint area from the background is 
useful to avoid extraction of features in noisy areas of the 
fingerprint and background [1]. 
 
Because fingerprint images are striated patterns, using 
a global or local thresholding technique [5] does not allow 
the fingerprint area to be effectively isolated. In fact, what 
really discriminates foreground and background is not the 
average image intensities but the presence of a striped and 
oriented pattern in the foreground and of an isotropic 
pattern (i.e., which does not have a dominant orientation) in 
the background. If the image background were always 
uniform and lighter than the fingerprint area, a simple 
approach based on local intensity could be effective for 
discriminating foreground and background; in practice, the 
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presence of noise (such as that produced by dust and grease 
on the surface of live-scan fingerprint scanners) requires 
more robust segmentation techniques [7] and [11]. 
 
In [12], foreground and background are discriminated 
by using the average magnitude of the gradient in each 
image block; in fact, because the fingerprint area is rich in 
edges due to the ridge/valley alternation, the gradient 
response is high in the fingerprint area and small in the 
background. 
 
2.1.4. Singularity and Core Detection 
 
Most of the approaches proposed in the literature for 
singularity detection operate on the fingerprint orientation 
image. The best-known method is based on Poincaré 
index[1]. 
 
Poincaré index method: 
Let G be a vector field and С be a curve immersed in G; 
then the Poincaré index PG,C is defined as the total rotation 
of the vectors of G along С (see Figure 2.8).  
 
 
Figure 2.8. The Poincaré index computed over a curve C immersed in a 
vector field G. 
Let G be the field associated with a fingerprint 
orientation image D and let [i, j] be the position of the 
element θij in the orientation image; then the Poincaré index 
PG,C (i, j) at [i, j] is computed as follows. 
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 The curve С is a closed path defined as an ordered 
sequence of some elements of D, such that [i, j] is an 
internal point;  
 PG,C(i, j) is computed by algebraically summing the 
orientation differences between adjacent elements of С. 
Summing orientation differences requires a direction 
(among the two possible) to be associated at each 
orientation. A solution to this problem is to randomly 
select the direction of the first element and assign the 
direction closest to that of the previous element to each 
successive element. It is well known and can be easily 
shown that, on closed curves, the Poincaré index 
assumes only one of the discrete values: 0°, ±180°, and 
±360°. In the case of fingerprint singularities:  
 
 








 
0° if [i, j]  any singular region. 
  
 360° if [i, j]  whorl type singular region. 
PG,C(i, j) =  
 180° if [i, j]  loop type singular region. 
  
 -180° if [i, j]  delta type singular region. 
 
Figure 2.9. Example of computation of the Poincaré index in the 8-
neighborhood of points belonging (from the left to the right) to a whorl, 
loop, and delta singularity, respectively. Note that for the loop and delta 
examples (center and right), the direction of d0 is first chosen upward (to 
compute the angle between d0 and d1) and then successively downward 
(when computing the angle between d7 and d0). 
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Figure 2.9 shows three portions of orientation images. 
The path defining С is the ordered sequence of the eight 
elements dk (k = 0...7) surrounding [i, j]. The direction of the 
elements dk is chosen as follows: d0 is directed upward; 
dk (k = 1...7) is directed so that the absolute value of the 
angle between dk and dk-1 is less than or equal to 90°. The 
Poincaré index is then computed as: 
 



7...0
8mod)1(, ),(),(
k
kkCG ddanglejiP
   
(2.1)
 
An interesting implementation of the Poincaré method 
for locating singular points was proposed in [8]: according to 
Green's theorem, a closed line integral over a vector field can 
be calculated as a surface integral over the rotation of this 
vector field; in practice, instead of summing angle 
differences along a closed path, the authors compute the 
"rotation" of the orientation image (through a further 
differentiation) and then perform a local integration (sum) in 
a small neighborhood of each element. Also, in [8], a method 
is provided for associating an orientation with each 
singularity; this is done by comparing the orientation image 
around each detected singular point with the orientation 
image of an ideal singularity of the same type. 
 
Singularity detection in noisy or low-quality fingerprints 
is difficult and the Poincaré method may lead to the 
detection of false singularities. Regularizing the orientation 
image through a local averaging is often quite effective in 
preventing the detection of false singularities. 
 
Based on the observation that only a limited number of 
singularities can be present in a fingerprint, in [13], authors 
proposed to iteratively smooth the orientation image 
(through averaging) until a valid number of singularities is 
detected by the Poincaré index. In fact, a simple analysis of 
the different fingerprint classes shows that:  
 
 Arch fingerprints do not contain singularities;  
 Left loop, right loop, and tented arch fingerprints 
contain one loop and one delta;  
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 Whorl fingerprints contain two loops (or one whorl) and 
two deltas. 
 
Once the singularities have been extracted, the core 
position may be simply defined as the location of the north 
most loop. Some problems arise with the arch type 
fingerprints that do not have singularities, and sometimes 
present a quite flat flow field where no discriminant 
positions can be located. When the core point is detected 
with the aim of registering fingerprint images (thus 
obtaining invariance with respect to x, y displacement), its 
location may be quite critical and an error at this stage often 
leads to a failure of subsequent processing (e.g., matching). 
On the other hand, if the core has to be used only for 
fingerprint registration, it is not important to find the north 
most loop exactly and any stable point in the fingerprint 
pattern is suitable. 
 
One of the first automatic methods for fingerprint 
registration was known as R92 [1], it searches for a core 
point independently of the other singularities. The core is 
searched by scanning (row by row) the orientation image to 
find wellformed arches; a well-formed arch is denoted by a 
sextet (set of six) of adjacent elements whose orientations 
comply with several rules controlled by many parameters. 
One sextet is chosen among the valid sextets by evaluating 
the orientation of the elements in adjacent rows. The exact 
core position is then located through interpolation (Figure 
2.10). Even though R92 is quite complicated and heuristic 
in nature, it usually gives good results and is able to localize 
the core point with sub-block accuracy. This algorithm was 
a fundamental component of the fingerprint identification 
systems used by the FBI and is still extensively used by 
other authors. 
 
 
Figure 2.10. The core point "+" located on the chosen sextet. 
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Several other ideas for the location of stable registration 
points have been proposed. In [14], the focal point is defined 
as the point where pairs of straight lines normal to the 
ridges intersect. Because the ridges do not draw perfect 
concentric circumferences around the core, the normal lines 
(Figure 2.11) do not exactly cross at a single point and a sort 
of average point has to be defined as the center of curvature. 
In [14], this average point is computed as the barycenter of 
the crossing between pairs of normals. 
 
Although the focal point (or the center of curvature) 
does not necessarily correspond to the core point, it has 
been experimentally demonstrated to be quite stable with 
respect to fingerprint variation (displacement, rotation, 
distortion, etc.). Therefore, it can be reliably used for 
fingerprint registration. The main problem of these methods 
is in isolating a fingerprint region characterized by a single 
center of curvature. In fact, if the selected fingerprint region 
contains more than one singularity, the result may be 
unpredictable. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. The straight lines normal to the ridges identify a valid 
registration point that corresponds to the center of curvature. 
In [15], a multi-resolution approach is proposed for 
locating the north most loop type singularity (core) based on 
integration of sine components in two adjacent regions RI 
and RII (Figure 2.12). The geometry of the two regions is 
designed to capture the maximum curvature in concave 
ridges. At each scale and for each candidate position [x, y], 
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the sine components of the orientation image are integrated 
over the two regions resulting in the values SRI and SRII. 
The points [x, y] that maximize the quantity (SRI − SRII) are 
retained as candidate positions and analyzed at a finer 
resolution. 
 
Figure 2.12. Regions of integration of the sine components in the method 
proposed in [15] 
Other approaches for singularity or core detection, 
besides those already described, have been proposed in [16], 
[17], [8], [18], [19], and [20]. Appendix A shows a MATLAB 
source code for core point detection which is used in the 
proposed matching algorithm described in Chapter 4. The 
idea of determining the core point is taken from [21], which 
is described in section 4.3.1.2. 
 
2.1.5. Enhancement 
 
The performance of minutiae extraction algorithms and 
other fingerprint recognition techniques relies heavily on the 
quality of the input fingerprint images. In an ideal 
fingerprint image, ridges and valleys alternate and flow in a 
locally constant direction. In such situations, the ridges can 
be easily detected and minutiae can be precisely located in 
the image. However, in practice, due to skin conditions (e.g., 
wet or dry, cuts, and bruises), sensor noise, incorrect finger 
pressure, and inherently low-quality fingers (e.g., elderly 
people, manual workers), a significant percentage of 
fingerprint images (approximately 10%) is of poor quality 
[22]. 
 
In many cases, a single fingerprint image contains 
regions of good, medium, and poor quality where the ridge 
pattern is very noisy and corrupted. In general, there are 
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several types of degradation associated with fingerprint 
images: 
 
1. the ridges are not strictly continuous. 
2. parallel ridges are not well separated.  
3. cuts, creases, and braises. 
 
These three types of degradation make ridge extraction 
extremely difficult in the highly corrupted regions. This 
leads to the following problems in minutiae extraction: 
 
i) a significant number of spurious minutiae are 
extracted,  
ii) a large number of genuine minutiae are missed, and 
iii) large errors in the location (position and orientation) 
of minutiae are introduced. 
 
In order to ensure good performance of the ridge and 
minutiae extraction algorithms in poor quality fingerprint 
images, an enhancement algorithm to improve the clarity of 
the ridge structure is necessary. 
 
Generally, for a given fingerprint image, the fingerprint 
areas resulting from the segmentation step may be divided 
into three categories: 
 
 Well-defined region, where ridges are clearly 
differentiated from each another;  
 Recoverable region, where ridges are corrupted by a 
small amount of gaps, creases, smudges, links, and the 
like, but they are still visible and the neighboring 
regions provide sufficient information about their true 
structure;  
 Unrecoverable region, where ridges are corrupted by 
such a severe amount of noise and distortion that no 
ridges are visible and the neighboring regions do not 
allow them to be reconstructed.  
 
Good quality regions, recoverable, and unrecoverable 
regions may be identified according to several criteria; in 
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general, image contrast, orientation consistency, ridge 
frequency, and other local features may be combined to 
define a quality index. The goal of an enhancement 
algorithm is to improve the clarity of the ridge structures in 
the recoverable regions and mark the unrecoverable regions 
as too noisy for further processing.  
 
Usually, the input of the enhancement algorithm is a 
gray-scale image. The output may either be a gray-scale or a 
binary image, depending on the algorithm. General-purpose 
image enhancement techniques do not produce satisfying 
and definitive results for fingerprint image enhancement. 
However, contrast stretching, histogram manipulation, 
normalization [9], and Wiener filtering [23] have been shown 
to be effective as initial processing steps in a more 
sophisticated fingerprint enhancement algorithm. 
 
The most widely used technique for fingerprint image 
enhancement is based on contextual filters. In conventional 
image filtering, only a single filter is used for convolution 
throughout the image. In contextual filtering, the filter 
characteristics change according to the local context. 
Usually, a set of filters is pre-computed and one of them is 
selected for each image region. In fingerprint enhancement, 
the context is often defined by the local ridge orientation and 
local ridge frequency. In fact, the sinusoidal-shaped wave of 
ridges and valleys is mainly defined by a local orientation 
and frequency that varies slowly across the fingerprint area. 
An appropriate filter that is tuned to the local ridge 
frequency and orientation can efficiently remove the 
undesired noise and preserve the true ridge and valley 
structure.  
 
Several types of contextual filters have been proposed 
in the literature for fingerprint enhancement. Although they 
have different definitions, the intended behavior is almost 
the same:  
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1) provide a low-pass (averaging) effect along the ridge 
direction with the aim of linking small gaps and filling 
impurities due to pores or noise; 
2) perform a bandpass (differentiating) effect in the direction 
orthogonal to the ridges to increase the discrimination 
between ridges and valleys and to separate parallel linked 
ridges. 
 
An effective method based on Gabor filters is proposed 
in [9]. Gabor filters have both frequency-selective and 
orientation-selective properties and have optimal joint 
resolution in both spatial and frequency domains [24]. The 
even symmetric two-dimensional Gabor filter has the 
following form. 
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where  is the orientation of the filter, and [x, y] are the 
coordinates of [x, y] after a clockwise rotation of the 
Cartesian axes by an angle of (90°-).  
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In the above expressions, f is the frequency of a 
sinusoidal plane wave, and x and y are the standard 
deviations of the Gaussian envelope along the x- and y- 
axes, respectively. 
 
To apply Gabor filters to an image, the four parameters  
( , f, x, y) must be specified. Obviously, the frequency of 
the filter is completely determined by the local ridge 
frequency and the orientation is determined by the local 
ridge orientation. The selection of the values x and y 
involves a tradeoff. The larger the values, the more robust 
the filters are to the noise in the fingerprint image, but also 
the more likely to create spurious ridges and valleys. On the 
other hand, the smaller the values, the less likely the filters 
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are to introduce spurious ridges and valleys but then they 
will be less effective in removing the noise. In fact, from the 
Modulation Transfer Function (MTF) of the Gabor filter, it 
can be shown that increasing x, y decreases the 
bandwidth of the filter and vice versa. Based on empirical 
data, x and y are set to 4 in [9]. 
 
The output of a contextual fingerprint enhancement 
can be a gray-scale, near-binary, or binary image, usually 
depending on the filter parameters chosen. When selecting 
the appropriate set of filters and tuning their parameters, 
one should keep in mind that the goal is not to produce a 
good visual appearance of the image but facilitate 
robustness of the successive feature extraction steps. If the 
filters are tuned to strongly increase the contrast and 
suppress the noise, the estimation of the local context 
(orientation and frequency) may be erroneous in poor quality 
areas and the filtering is likely to produce spurious 
structures [25]. 
 
The need of an effective enhancement is particularly 
important in poor quality fingerprints where only the 
recoverable regions carry information necessary for the 
matching. On the other hand, computing local information 
(context) with sufficient reliability in poor quality fingerprint 
images is very challenging and the risk is to make things 
worse. 
 
2.1.6. Binarization and Minutiae Extraction 
 
Although rather different from one another, most of the 
minutiae extraction methods require the fingerprint gray-
scale image to be converted into a binary image. Some 
binarization processes greatly benefit from an a priori 
enhancement; on the other hand, some enhancement 
algorithms directly produce a binary output, and therefore 
the distinction between enhancement and binarization is 
often faded. The binary images obtained by the binarization 
process are usually submitted to a thinning stage which 
allows for the ridge line thickness to be reduced to one pixel. 
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Finally, a simple image scan allows the detection of pixels 
that correspond to minutiae through the pixel-wise 
computation of crossing number [26] (see Figure 2.13).  
  a)       b)   c)       d) 
Figure 2.13. a) A fingerprint gray-scale image; b) the image obtained after 
enhancement and binarization; c) the image obtained after thinning; d) 
termination and bifurcation minutiae detected through the pixel-wise 
computation of the crossing number. 
The general problem of image binarization has been 
widely studied in the fields of image processing and pattern 
recognition. The easiest approach uses a global threshold t 
and works by setting the pixels whose gray-level is lower 
than t to 0 and the remaining pixels to 1. In general, 
different portions of an image may be characterized by 
different contrast and intensity and, consequently, a single 
threshold is not sufficient for a correct binarization. For this 
reason, the local threshold technique changes t locally, by 
adapting its value to the average local intensity. In the 
specific case of fingerprint images, which are sometimes of 
very poor quality, a local threshold method cannot always 
guarantee acceptable results and more effective fingerprint-
specific solutions are necessary. 
 
In [27], the authors introduced a binarization approach 
based on peak detection in the gray-level profiles along 
sections orthogonal to the ridge orientation (see Figure 
2.14). A 16  16 oriented window is centered around each 
pixel [x, y]. The gray-level profile is obtained by projection of 
the pixel intensities onto the central section. The profile is 
smoothed through local averaging; the peaks and the two 
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neighboring pixels on either side of each peak constitute the 
foreground of the resulting binary image. 
 
 
Figure 2.14. An example of a gray-level profile obtained through projection 
of pixel intensities on the segment centered at [x, y] and normal to the 
local ridge orientation θxy. 
Most of the enhancement algorithms based on 
contextual filtering (discussed in Section 2.1.5) may produce 
a clear binary image for appropriately chosen parameters. In 
any case, even when the output of the contextual filtering is 
a gray-scale image, a simple local thresholding technique 
often results in satisfactory binarization. 
 
Minutiae detection from binary images is usually 
performed after an intermediate thinning step that reduces 
the width of the ridges to one pixel. Unfortunately, thinning 
algorithms are rather critical and the aberrations and 
irregularity of the binary-ridge boundaries have an adverse 
effect on the skeletons (i.e., the one-pixel-width ridge 
structure), resulting in "hairy" growths (spikes) that lead to 
the detection of spurious minutiae.  
 
With the aim of improving the quality of the binary 
images, some researchers have introduced regularization 
techniques which usually work by filling holes, removing 
small breaks, eliminating bridges between ridges, and other 
artifacts. To remove the spikes that often characterize the 
thinned binary images, the authors of [27] implement a 
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morphological "open" operator [5] whose structuring element 
is a small box oriented according to the local ridge 
orientation. 
As far as thinning techniques are concerned [28], a 
large number of approaches are available in the literature 
due to the central role of this processing step in many 
pattern recognition applications: character recognition, 
document analysis, map and drawing vectorization, and so 
on [26]. 
Once a binary skeleton has been obtained, a simple 
image scan allows the pixels corresponding to minutiae to 
be detected. In fact the pixels corresponding to minutiae are 
characterized by a crossing number different from the value 
2. The crossing number cn(p) of a pixel p in a binary image 
is defined [26] as half the sum of the differences between 
pairs of adjacent pixels in the 8-neighborhood of p: 
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where p0, p1, ...p7 are the pixels belonging to an ordered 
sequence of pixels defining the eight neighborhood of p and 
val(p) ∈ {0, 1} is the pixel value. It is simple to note (Figure 
2.15) that a pixel p with val(p) = 1: 
 Is an intermediate ridge point if cn(p) = 2. 
 Corresponds to a ridge ending minutia if cn(p) = 1. 
 Corresponds to a bifurcation minutia if cn(p) = 3. 
 Defines a more complex minutia (e.g., crossover) if 
cn(p)  3. 
 
 
Figure 2.15. a) intra-ridge pixel; b) ridge ending minutia; 
c) bifurcation minutia. 
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Appendix B shows a MATLAB source code for the 
Minutiae extraction process described above, which is used 
in the proposed matching algorithm described in Chapter 4. 
 
Some authors have proposed minutiae extraction 
approaches that work directly on the gray-scale images 
without binarization and thinning [12]. The basic idea is to 
track the ridge lines in the gray-scale image, by "sailing" 
according to the local orientation of the ridge pattern. The 
ridge line extraction algorithm attempts to locate, at each 
step, a local maximum relative to a section orthogonal to the 
ridge direction. By connecting the consecutive maxima, a 
polygonal approximation of the ridge line can be obtained. 
 
2.1.7. Minutiae Filtering 
 
A post-processing stage (called minutiae filtering) is 
often useful in removing the spurious minutiae detected in 
highly corrupted regions or introduced by previous 
processing steps (e.g., thinning). In [26], two main post-
processing types have been proposed: structural post-
processing, and minutiae filtering in the gray-scale domain. 
 
 Structural post-processing 
 
Simple structural rules may be used to detect many of 
the false minutiae that usually affect thinned binary 
fingerprint images. In [29], the authors identified the most 
common false minutiae structures and introduced an ad hoc 
approach to remove them (Figure 2.16). The underlying 
algorithm is rule-based and requires some numerical 
characteristics associated with the minutiae as input:  
 
 The length of the associated ridge(s), 
 The minutia angle, and 
 The number of facing minutiae in a neighborhood. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.16, the algorithm connects facing 
endpoints (a, b), removes bifurcations facing with endpoints 
(c) or with other bifurcations (d), and removes spurs (e), 
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bridges (f), triangles (g), and ladder structures (h). This 
minutiae filtering method is used in the MATLAB source 
code of Appendix B. 
 
 
Figure 2.16. The most common false-minutiae structures (on the top row) 
and the structural changes resulting from their removal (bottom row). 
 Minutiae filtering in the gray-scale domain  
 
A direct gray-scale minutiae filtering technique 
reexamines the gray-scale image in the spatial neighborhood 
of a detected minutia with the aim of verifying the presence 
of a real minutia. 
 
Maio and Maltoni used a shared-weights neural 
network to verify the minutiae detected by their gray-scale 
algorithm [12]. The minutiae neighborhoods in the original 
gray-scale image are normalized, with respect to their angle 
and the local ridge frequency, before passing them to a 
neural network classifier, which classifies them as 
termination, bifurcation, and non-minutia. 
 
2.2. Fingerprint Verification Competition FVC 
 
The database (Fingerprint Verification Competition) 
FVC2000 [30] is used during experiments. FVC consists of 
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four different databases (DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4) which 
were collected by using the following sensors/technologies: 
  
 DB1: low-cost optical sensor "Secure Desktop 
Scanner" by KeyTronic  
 DB2: low-cost capacitive sensor "TouchChip" by ST 
Microelectronics  
 DB3: optical sensor "DF-90" by Identicator Technology  
 DB4: synthetic fingerprint generation.  
 
Each database is 110 fingers wide (w) and 8 
impressions per finger deep (d) (see Table 2.1) (880 
fingerprints in all); fingers from 101 to 110 (set B) have been 
made available to the participants to allow parameter tuning 
before the submission of the algorithms; the benchmark is 
then constituted by fingers numbered from 1 to 100 (set A). 
 
 Image Size Set A (wd) Set B (wd) Resolution 
DB1 300300 1008 108 500 dpi 
DB2 256364 1008 108 500 dpi 
DB3 448478 1008 108 500 dpi 
DB4 240320 1008 108 about 500 dpi 
Table 2.1. Specifications of each database [30]. 
Figure 2.17 shows a sample image from each database:  
 
Figure 2.17. Sample images taken from DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4. In 
order to show the different image sizes of each database, the four images 
are displayed at the same scale factor [30]. 
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2.3. Fingerprint Matching 
 
A fingerprint matching algorithm compares two given 
fingerprints and returns either a degree of similarity 
(without loss of generality, a score between 0 and 1) or a 
binary decision (mated/non-mated). Only a few matching 
algorithms operate directly on grayscale fingerprint images; 
most of them require that an intermediate fingerprint 
representation be derived through a feature extraction 
stage[26]. 
 
The fingerprint feature extraction and matching 
algorithms are usually quite similar for both fingerprint 
verification and identification problems. This is because the 
fingerprint identification problem (i.e., searching for an 
input fingerprint in a database of N fingerprints) can be 
implemented as a sequential execution of N one-to-one 
comparisons (verifications) between pairs of fingerprints. 
The fingerprint classification and indexing techniques are 
usually exploited to speed up the search in fingerprint 
identification problems [1]. 
 
Matching fingerprint images is an extremely difficult 
problem, mainly due to the large variability in different 
impressions of the same finger (i.e., large intra-class 
variations). The main factors responsible for intra-class 
variations are: 
 
 Displacement, 
 Rotation, 
 Partial overlap, 
 Non-linear distortion, 
 Pressure and skin condition, 
 Noise, and 
 Feature extraction errors. 
 
A large number of automatic fingerprint matching 
algorithms have been proposed in the pattern recognition 
literature. Most of these algorithms have no difficulty in 
matching good quality fingerprint images. However, 
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fingerprint matching remains a challenging pattern 
recognition problem to date due to the difficulty in matching 
low-quality and partial fingerprints. 
 
The large number of approaches to fingerprint 
matching can be coarsely classified into three families.  
 
 Correlation-based matching: Two fingerprint images are 
superimposed and the correlation between corresponding 
pixels is computed for different alignments (e.g., various 
displacements and rotations).  
 Minutiae-based matching: This is the most popular and 
widely used technique, being the basis of the fingerprint 
comparison made by fingerprint examiners. Minutiae are 
extracted from the two fingerprints and stored as sets of 
points in the two-dimensional plane. Minutiae-based 
matching essentially consists of finding the alignment 
between the template and the input minutiae sets that 
results in the maximum number of minutiae pairings.  
 Ridge feature-based matching: Minutiae extraction is 
difficult in very low-quality fingerprint images. However, 
whereas other features of the fingerprint ridge pattern 
(e.g., local orientation and frequency, ridge shape, texture 
information) may be extracted more reliably than 
minutiae, their distinctiveness is generally lower. The 
approaches belonging to this family compare fingerprints 
in term of features extracted from the ridge pattern. 
 
2.3.1. Correlation-Based Techniques 
 
Let T and I be the two fingerprint images corresponding 
to the template and the input fingerprint, respectively. Then 
an intuitive measure of their diversity is the sum of squared 
differences (SSD) between the intensities of the 
corresponding pixels: 
 
SSD(Т,I) = Т-I 2 =(T-I )T(T-I ) = T 2 +I 2 - 2TTI   (2.5) 
 
where the superscript "T" denotes the transpose of a vector. 
If the terms T2 and I2 are constant, the diversity between 
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the two images is minimized when the cross-correlation (CC) 
between T and I is maximized:  
 
CC(T,I) = TTI       (2.6) 
 
Note that the quantity (-2.CC(T,I)) appears as the third 
term in Equation (2.5). The cross-correlation (or simply 
correlation) is then a measure of image similarity. Due to the 
displacement and rotation that unavoidably characterize two 
impressions of a given finger, their similarity cannot be 
simply computed by superimposing T and I and applying 
Equation (2.6).  
 
Let I(∆x, ∆у, θ) represent a rotation of the input image I by 
an angle θ around the origin (usually the image center) and 
shifted by ∆x, ∆y pixels in directions x and y, respectively; 
then the similarity between the two fingerprint images T and 
I can be measured as 
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The direct application of Equation (2.7) rarely leads to 
acceptable results mainly due to the following problems: 
 
1. Non-linear distortion makes impressions of the same 
finger significantly different in terms of global structure, 
2. Skin condition and finger pressure cause image 
brightness, contrast, and ridge thickness to vary 
significantly across different impressions, and 
3. A direct application of Equation (2.7) is computationally 
very expensive. 
 
The fingerprint distortion problem (point 1 in the above 
list) is usually addressed by computing the correlation 
locally instead of globally. 
 
As to the computational complexity of the correlation 
technique, smart approaches may be exploited to achieve 
efficient implementations. 
 
Chapter 2  Fingerprint Analysis and Matching 
32 
2.3.2. Minutiae-based Methods  
 
Minutiae matching is certainly the most well-known 
and widely used method for fingerprint matching, thanks to 
its strict analogy with the way forensic experts compare 
fingerprints and its acceptance as a proof of identity in the 
courts of law in almost all countries. 
 
2.3.2.1. Problem formulation 
 
Let T and I be the representation of the template and 
input fingerprint, respectively. Unlike in correlation-based 
techniques, where the fingerprint representation coincides 
with the fingerprint image, here the representation is a 
feature vector (of variable length) whose elements are the 
fingerprint minutiae. Each minutia may be described by a 
number of attributes, including its location in the fingerprint 
image, orientation, type (e.g., ridge termination or ridge 
bifurcation), a weight based on the quality of the fingerprint 
image in the neighborhood of the minutia, and so on. Most 
common minutiae matching algorithms consider each 
minutia as a triplet m = {x, y, θ} that indicates the x,y 
minutia location coordinates and the minutia angle θ:  
Т = {m1,m2,...,mm}, mi={xi,yi,..., θi} i =1..m 
I = {m'1,m'2,...,m'm}, m'i={x'i,y'i,..., θ'i} j =1..n 
where m and n denote the number of minutiae in T and I, 
respectively.  
 
A minutia m'j in I and a minutia m'i in T are considered 
"matching," if the spatial distance (sd) between them is 
smaller than a given tolerance r0 and the direction difference 
(dd) between them is smaller than an angular tolerance θ0:  
,)()(),( 0
2'2'' ryyxxmmsd ijijij 
and          (2.8) 
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            (2.9) 
Equation (2.9) takes the minimum of |θ'j - θi| and 360° 
-|θ'j - θi|  because of the circularity of angles (the difference 
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between angles of 2° and 358° is only 4°). The tolerance 
boxes (or hyper-spheres) defined by r0 and θ0 are necessary 
to compensate for the unavoidable errors made by feature 
extraction algorithms and to account for the small plastic 
distortions that cause the minutiae positions to change.  
 
Aligning the two fingerprints is a mandatory step in 
order to maximize the number of matching minutiae. 
Correctly aligning two fingerprints certainly requires 
displacement (in x and y) and rotation (θ) to be recovered, 
and likely involves other geometrical transformations:  
 
 Scale has to be considered when the resolution of the 
two fingerprints may vary (e.g., the two fingerprint images 
have been taken by scanners operating at different 
resolutions);  
 Other distortion-tolerant geometrical transformations 
could be useful to match minutiae in case one or both of 
the fingerprints is affected by severe distortions. 
 
Let map(.) be the function that maps a minutia m'j 
(from I) into m"j according to a given geometrical 
transformation; for example, by considering a displacement 
of [∆x, ∆y] and a counterclockwise rotation around the 
origin: 
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Let mm(.) be an indicator function that returns 1 in the 
case where the minutiae m"j and mi match according to 
Equations (2.8) and (2.9): 
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Then, the matching problem can be formulated as  
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where P(i) is an unknown function that determines the 
pairing between I and T minutiae; in particular, each 
minutia has either exactly one mate in the other fingerprint 
or has no mate at all: 
 
1. P(i) =j indicates that the mate of the mi in T is the 
minutia m'j in I;  
2. P(i) = null indicates that minutia mi in T has no mate 
in I;  
3. a minutia m'j in I, such that i = l..m, P(i)  j has no 
mate in T;  
4. i = 1..m, k=1..m, i  k P(i)  P(k) or P(i) = P(k) = 
null (this requires that each minutia in I is 
associated with a maximum of one minutia in T).  
 
Note that, in general, P(i) =j does not necessarily mean 
that minutiae m'j and mi, match in the sense of Equations 
(2.8) and (2.9) but only that they are the most likely pair 
under the current transformation. 
 
Solving the minutiae matching problem (Equation 
(2.13)) is trivial when the correct alignment (∆x, ∆y, θ) is 
known; in fact, the pairing (i.e., the function P) can be 
determined by setting for each i = l..m:  
 
 P(i)=j if m"j = mар∆x, ∆y, θ(m'j) is closest to mi among the 
minutiae:  
{m"k= mар∆x, ∆y, θ(m'k) | k=1..n, mm(m"k, mi)=1}; 
 P(i) = null if  k=l..n, mm(mар∆x, ∆y, θ(m'k),mi)=0  
 
To comply with constraint 4 above, each minutia m"j 
already mated has to be marked, to avoid mating it twice or 
more. 
 
To achieve the optimum pairing (according to Equation 
(2.13)), a slightly more complicated scheme should be 
adopted: in fact, in the case when a minutia of I falls within 
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the tolerance hyper-sphere of more than one minutia of T, 
the optimum assignment is that which maximizes the 
number of mates. 
 
The maximization in Equation (2.13) can be easily 
solved if the function P (minutiae correspondence) is known; 
in this case, the unknown alignment (∆x, ∆y, θ) can be 
determined in the least square sense [31] and [32]. 
 
In the pattern recognition literature, the minutiae 
matching problem has been generally addressed as a point 
pattern matching problem. Even though a small difference 
exists due to the presence of a direction associated with 
each minutia point, the two problems may be approached 
analogously. Because of its central role in many pattern 
recognition and computer vision tasks (e.g., object 
matching, remote sensing, camera calibration, motion 
estimation), point pattern matching has been extensively 
studied yielding families of approaches known as relaxation 
methods, algebraic and operational research solutions, tree-
pruning approaches, energy-minimization methods, Hough 
transform, and so on. 
 
2.3.2.2. Minutiae matching with pre-alignment  
 
Embedding fingerprint alignment into the minutiae 
matching stage, certainly leads to the design of robust 
algorithms, which are often able to operate with noisy and 
incomplete data. On the other hand, the computational 
complexity of such methods does not provide a high 
matching throughput (e.g., 10,000 matches per second), as 
required by AFIS or civil systems.  
 
Storing pre-aligned templates in the database and pre-
aligning the input fingerprint before the minutiae matching 
can be a valid solution to speed up the 1 :N identification. In 
theory, if a perfect pre-alignment could be achieved, the 
minutiae matching could be reduced to a simple pairing. 
Two main approaches for pre-alignment have been 
investigated. 
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Absolute pre-alignment: Each fingerprint template is 
pre-aligned, independently of the others, before storing it in 
the database. Matching an input fingerprint I with a set of 
templates requires I to be independently registered just 
once, and the resulting aligned representation to be 
matched with all the templates. 
 
Relative pre-alignment: The input fingerprint I has to be 
pre-aligned with respect to each template T in the database; 
l:N identification requires N independent pre-alignments. 
Relative pre-alignment may determine a significant speed up 
with respect to the algorithms that do not perform any pre-
alignment, but cannot compete in terms of efficiency with 
absolute pre-alignment. However, relative pre-alignment is 
in general more effective (in terms of accuracy) than 
absolute pre-alignment, because the features of the template 
T may be used to drive the registration process. 
 
Relative pre-alignment may be performed in several 
ways; for example:  
 by superimposing the singularities,  
 by correlating the orientation images (template 
matching), or  
 by correlating ridge features (e.g., length and 
orientation of the ridges). 
 
2.3.2.3. Avoiding alignment  
 
Fingerprint alignment is certainly a critical and time-
consuming step. To overcome problems involved in 
alignment, and to better cope with local distortions, some 
authors perform minutiae matching locally. A few other 
attempts have been proposed that try to globally match 
minutiae without requiring explicit recovery of the 
parameters of the transformation. In [33], an intrinsic 
coordinate system (ICS) is introduced whose axes run along 
hypothetical lines defined by the local orientation of the 
fingerprint pattern. First, the fingerprint is partitioned in 
regular regions (i.e., regions that do not contain singular 
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points). In each regular region, the ICS is defined by the 
orientation field.  
 
When using intrinsic coordinates instead of pixel 
coordinates, minutiae are defined with respect to their 
position in the orientation field. Translation, displacement, 
and distortion move minutiae with the orientation field they 
are immersed in and therefore do not change their intrinsic 
coordinates. On the other hand, some practical problems 
such as reliably partitioning the fingerprint in regular 
regions and unambiguously defining intrinsic coordinate 
axes in low-quality fingerprints still remain to be solved. 
 
2.3.2.4. Global versus Local Minutiae Matching  
 
Local minutiae matching consists of comparing two 
fingerprints according to local minutiae structures; local 
structures are characterized by attributes that are invariant 
with respect to global transformation (e.g., translation, 
rotation, etc.) and therefore are suitable for matching 
without any a priori global alignment. Matching fingerprints 
based only on local minutiae arrangements relaxes global 
spatial relationships which are highly distinctive and 
therefore reduce the amount of information available for 
discriminating fingerprints. Global versus local matching is 
a tradeoff among simplicity, low computational complexity, 
and high distortion-tolerance (local matching), and high 
distinctiveness on the other hand (global matching). 
Interesting approaches have been proposed where the 
advantages of both methods are exploited ([34] and [35]), a 
fast local matching is initially carried out for recovering 
alignment or an early rejection of very different fingerprints; 
a consolidation step is then performed to check whether the 
postulated coincidence hypotheses hold at global level. 
 
2.3.3. Ridge Feature-based Matching Techniques  
 
Three main reasons induce designers of fingerprint 
recognition techniques to search for other fingerprint 
distinguishing features, beyond minutiae: 
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 reliably extracting minutiae from poor quality fingerprints 
is very difficult. Although minutiae may carry most of the 
fingerprint discriminatory information, they do not always 
constitute the best tradeoff between accuracy and 
robustness;  
 minutiae extraction is time consuming. This was a serious 
problem in the past, when the computational power of 
desktop computers was limited. Although computers are 
much faster now, matching speed remains a concern 
because of the increasing interest in embedding 
fingerprint recognition algorithms in low-cost, standalone 
(embedded) systems. Furthermore, registering minutiae 
representation is very challenging; minutiae-based 
matching algorithms are rather slow, especially for large-
scale identification tasks;  
 
Additional features may be used in conjunction with 
minutiae (and not as an alternative) to increase system 
accuracy and robustness.  
 
The more commonly used alternative features are:  
1. size of the fingerprint and shape of the external 
fingerprint silhouette;  
2. number, type, and position of singularities;  
3. spatial relationship and geometrical attributes of the 
ridge lines; 
4. shape features;  
5. global and local texture information;  
6. sweat pores;  
7. fractal features.  
 
Features listed in 1) and 2) above are, in general, very 
unstable, and they vary depending on which part of the 
finger touches the sensor. Sweat pores are undoubtedly 
highly discriminant but their detection requires high-
resolution expensive scanners. 
 
Local texture analysis has proved to be more effective 
than global feature analysis; although most of the local 
texture information is carried by the orientation and 
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frequency images, most of the proposed approaches extract 
texture by using a specialized bank of filters. 
 
2.3.4. Minutiae vs. pattern based fingerprint 
templates 
In the following two subsections, the difference between 
pattern-based and minutiae-based fingerprint templates is 
summarized [36]. 
 
2.3.4.1. Pattern-Based Templates 
 
A capture device is used to take a graphical image of a 
fingerprint, typically captured as a TIFF (Tagged Image File 
Format) image. The graphical image obtained from the 
capture device is commonly referred to as a live scan to 
distinguish it from a template or print stored in a database. 
Processing software examines the fingerprint image and 
locates the image center, which may be off-center from the 
fingerprint core. The image is then cropped a fixed distance 
around this graphical center. The rectangle in Figure 2.18 
details this cropped region. The cropped region is then 
compressed and stored for subsequent matches. 
Fingerprint matching with pattern-based templates 
involves making a graphical comparison of the two 
templates and determining a measure of the difference. The 
greater the difference the less likely the prints match. 
 
Figure 2.18. Pattern-based template 
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2.3.4.2. Minutia-based Templates 
 
As in a pattern-based system, a capture device is used 
to take a graphical image of a fingerprint (live scan). Special 
software then analyzes the fingerprint image and determines 
if the image actually contains a fingerprint, determines the 
location of the core, the pattern type (e.g. right loop, left 
arch, etc.), estimates the quality of the ridge lines, and 
finally extracts minutia. Minutiae, from a simple 
perspective, indicate where a significant change in the 
fingerprint occurs. These changes are shown in Figure 2.19. 
 
Understanding that dark lines in the image represent 
ridges and light lines represent valleys, Arrow A shows a 
region where one ridge splits into two ridges (called a 
bifurcation) and Arrow B shows where a ridge ends. 
 
 
Figure 2.19. Fingerprint Changes 
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Figure 2.20. Extracted minutiae and axes 
After locating these features in the fingerprint, the 
minutia extraction software determines a significant 
direction of the change (using Arrow B as an example, the 
significant direction starts at the end of the ridge and moves 
downward. The resultant minutia, in their simplest form are 
then the collection of all reasonable bifurcations and ridge 
endings, their location and their significant direction. 
Minutiae are also assigned a measure of their strength. A 
set of minutiae is shown in Figure 2.20. 
 
In Table 2.2, a technical comparison is shown between 
minutia and pattern based fingerprint templates. 
 
 Minutia Pattern 
Definition 
 
Analyzes the 
points at which 
the ridges on the 
Graphical 
comparison of 
fingerprint image. 
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fingerprints split, 
intersect or end. 
How it works 
 
Capture device 
analyzes the 
fingerprint image 
to determine the 
location of the 
fingerprint core, 
the pattern type 
(i.e., right loop, left 
arch, etc.), 
estimates the 
quality of the 
ridgelines and 
extracts the points 
in which the 
ridges split, 
intersect or end. 
These points are 
called minutiae. 
Graphical center of 
fingerprint image 
(not necessarily 
defined by the 
fingerprint core) is 
cropped a fixed 
distance and 
compressed for 
subsequent match. 
The greater the 
difference between 
the stored template 
and the live 
comparison, the 
less likely the 
match. 
Template size 
 
• Small template 
size (can be as 
small as 120 
bytes; average size 
is 350 bytes) 
• Template size 
can be controlled 
by specifying the 
number of minutia 
to be analyzed. 
• Relatively large 
template size (500-
700 bytes when 
compressed) 
• Cannot easily 
control template 
size without 
compromising 
accuracy 
 
Search speed 
 
Directly related to template size; the 
smaller the template, the faster the 
search speed. 
Sensitivity to 
Physical Changes 
 
• Less sensitive 
due to the fact 
that only 30% of 
the available 
minutia are 
required for 
matching. Cuts 
• If the scar or 
blemish affects the 
region of the 
fingerprint image 
that was scarred, a 
new template may 
be required. 
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and scars usually 
will not affect all 
the minutiae on 
the fingerprint. 
 
Template Efficacy 
 
Can extract 
minutia from 
partial prints (as 
often found in 
crime scenes), 
making it more 
feasible to criminal 
related 
applications 
• Requires the 
same central region 
to be patterned for 
the match to occur. 
• Not suitable for 
criminal 
applications where 
partial prints are 
often used as the 
basis for 
investigation. 
Sensitivity to 
Time 
 
• Less sensitive to 
changes over time 
 
• More sensitive to 
physical changes 
and differences in 
the fingerprint 
placement on the 
sensor – both 
which become 
greater over time. 
Standards 
 
X.509 
AAMVA B10.8 
None 
 
Leading vendors 
 
Identix 
 
BioScrypt, Precise 
Biometrics, Digital 
Persona, Sony 
Table 2.2. Minutiae vs. Pattern based fingerprint templates. 
 
2.3.5. Comparing the Performance of Matching 
Algorithms  
 
An explicit answer has not been provided to the 
question: what is the best algorithm for matching 
fingerprints? The two main reasons why it is difficult to 
assess the relative performance of the various matching 
algorithms are as follows [26]: 
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 The performance of a fingerprint recognition method 
involves a tradeoff among different performance 
measures: accuracy (e.g., False Match Rate (FMR) and 
False Non-Match Rate (FNMR), refer to Section 2.3.6), 
efficiency (enrollment time, verification time), scalability to 
1:N identification, template size, and so on. Different 
applications have different performance requirements. For 
example, an application may prefer a fingerprint matching 
algorithm that is lower in accuracy but has a small 
template size over an algorithm that is more accurate but 
uses a large template size; 
 Most of the scientific work published in the literature 
includes experimental results carried out on proprietary 
databases using different protocols, which are usually not 
shared with the research community. This makes it 
difficult to compare the results of different methods; the 
performance measured is related to the "difficulty" of the 
benchmark.  
 
Before the fingerprint verification competitions 
FVC2000[30], the only large public domain fingerprint 
datasets were the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) databases [37]; although these databases 
constitute an excellent benchmark for AFIS development 
[38] and fingerprint classification studies, they are not well 
suited for the evaluation of algorithms operating with live-
scan (dab) images. 
 
FVC2000 were organized with the aim of providing 
fingerprint databases to any interested researcher and to 
track performance of the state-of-the-art fingerprint 
matching algorithms. Fortunately, several authors now 
report the results of their experiments on these databases 
according to the proposed protocol, thus producing results 
that can be compared across the whole scientific 
community. It is hoped that this will become a common 
practice for scientists and practitioners in the field. 
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2.3.6. Recognition Rate 
 
2.3.6.1. Terminology and Measurement 
 
The ultimate measure of utility of a fingerprint system 
for a particular application is recognition rate. This can be 
described by two values[2]: 
 The false acceptance rate (FAR) is the ratio of the number 
of instances of pairs of different fingerprints found to 
(erroneously) match to the total number of match 
attempts. 
 The false rejection rate (FRR) is the ratio of the number of 
instances of pairs of the same fingerprint found not to 
match to the total number of match attempts.  
 
FAR and FRR trade off against one another. That is, a 
system can usually be adjusted to vary these two results for 
the particular application, however decreasing one increases 
the other and vice versa. FAR is also called, false match rate 
or Type II error, and FRR is also called false non-match rate 
or Type I error. These are expressed as values in [0, 1] 
interval or as percentage values. 
 
Some other "compact" indices are also used to 
summarize the accuracy of a verification system[1]: 
 
 Equal-Error Rate (EER) denotes the error rate at the 
threshold t for which false match rate and false non-
match rate are identical: FMR(t) = FNMR(t) (see Figure 
2.21). In practice, because the matching score 
distributions are not continuous (due to the finite number 
of matched pairs and the quantization of the output 
scores), an exact EER point might not exist: In this case, 
instead of a single value, an interval should be reported 
[30]. Although EER is an important indicator, in practice, 
a fingerprint-based biometric system is rarely used at the 
operating point corresponding to EER, and often a more 
stringent threshold is set to reduce FMR in spite of a rise 
in FNMR.  
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 ZeroFNMR is the lowest FMR at which no false non-
matches occur (see Figure 2.21). 
 
 
Figure 2.21.An example of FMR(t) and FNMR(t) curves, where the points 
corresponding to EER, ZeroFNMR, and ZeroFMR are highlighted. 
 ZeroFMR is the lowest FNMR at which no false matches 
occur (see Figure 2.21).  
 Failure To Capture (FTC) rate is associated with the 
automatic capture function of a biometric device and 
denotes the percentage of times the device fails to 
automatically capture the biometric when it is presented 
to a sensor. A high failure to capture rate makes the 
biometric device difficult to use.  
 Failure To Enroll (FTE) rate denotes the percentage of 
times users are not able to enroll in the recognition 
system. There is a tradeoff between the FTE rate and the 
accuracy (FMR and FNMR) of a system. FTE errors 
typically occur when the recognition system performs a 
quality check to ensure that only good quality templates 
are stored in the database and rejects poor quality 
templates. As a result, the database contains only good 
quality templates and the system accuracy (FMR and 
FNMR) improves.  
 Failure To Match (FTM) rate is the percentage of times the 
input cannot be processed or matched against a valid 
template because of insufficient quality. This is different 
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from a false non-match error; in fact, in a failure to match 
error, the system is not able to make a decision, whereas 
in false non-match error, the system wrongly decides that 
the two inputs do not come from the same finger. 
 
The ROC-curve plots FAR versus FRR for a system [2]. 
(ROC stands for Receiver Operating Curve for historical 
reasons. Yes, "ROC-curve" is redundant, but this is the 
common usage.) ROC-curves are shown in Figure 2.22. The 
FAR is usually plotted on the horizontal axis as the 
independent variable. The FRR is plotted on the vertical axis 
as the dependent variable. Because of the range of FAR 
values, this axis is often on a logarithmic scale. Figure 2.22 
contains two solid curves. The solid curves do not represent 
any particular data; they are included for illustrative 
purposes to show better and worse curve placements. The 
typical ROC-curve has a shape whose "elbow" points toward 
(0, 0) and whose asymptotes are the positive x-and y-axes. 
The sharper the elbow and (equivalently) the closer is the 
ROC-curve to the x- and y-axes, the lower is the recognition 
error and the more desirable is the result. 
 
The procedure for using the ROC-curve is as follows. 
Choose an acceptable level of FAR. In Figure 2.22, a dashed 
line is shown at 0.01% FAR. The FRR corresponding to this 
choice is the attainable FRR, in this example about 4%. 
 
Alternatively, the FRR can be specified and the FAR 
found on the curve. There is no single set of FAR and FRR 
specifications useful for all different applications. If the 
fingerprint system is specified for very high security 
situations such as for military installations, then the FAR 
will be chosen to be very low (e.g.,<0.001%). However, this 
results in higher FRR, sometimes in the range from 5% to 
20%. Typical customer applications such as for automatic 
teller machines cannot afford to alienate users with such a 
high FRR. Therefore, the choice in these applications is low 
FRR (e.g., <0.5%), at the sacrifice of higher FAR. (An FRR 
specification that is sometimes quoted for automatic teller 
machines is less than 1 per 100,000 false rejections.) 
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Figure 2.22. ROC-curves. The 2 solid curves are of hypothetical data 
illustrating desirable and less desirable recognition performance. 
 
2.3.6.2. Specifying and Evaluating Recognition Rate 
Statistics 
 
For statistical results to be properly evaluated, they 
must be accompanied by the following information: 
 
 Sample size: it should contain the following 
information: the number of subjects (people), the number of 
fingers, the number of images per finger, and the total 
number of fingerprint images. In addition, the image 
number should be broken out into number of match and 
non-match images. For example, a test might consist of 100 
subjects, 2 fingers per subject and 4 images per finger. The 
total number of images is 10024=800. If each finger (200) 
is compared against each of the other images from the same 
finger (4 choose 2 = 6 pairs per unique finger), there are 
2006=1200 matching pairs. If one image from each finger 
(200) is compared against all images from different subjects 
(9942=792), there are 200792=158,400 non-match pairs. 
 
 Description of population: it states the type of subjects 
included in the sample. Of particular importance in judging 
fingerprint statistics is the type of work engaged in by the 
subjects. A study involving masons will have different 
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statistical results than those involving white-collar workers 
whose hands are subject to less abuse. The age statistics 
should be described, at least stating a relative breakdown on 
the number of children, adults, and elderly people included 
in the sample. The proportion of males and females should 
also be stated. 
 
 Test design: should be described. Of particular 
interest is who performed the tests. The strong preference is 
that a reputable third-party conducts and reports the test. 
Was the capture procedure supervised or not? Were the 
subjects given training or visual feedback to place the finger 
correctly on the fingerprint capture device? Was the sample 
manually filtered in any way to remove "goats" (people whose 
fingerprints are very difficult to capture and match with 
reliable quality)? Was the procedure adjusted using a 
practice sample of fingerprints, then tested separately on 
different images to yield the published results? What was 
the range of rotational and translational variance allowed, or 
were the fingerprints manually centered in the image? What 
were the make and specifications of the capture device? 
Where and when were the tests conducted (e.g., Florida 
humid summer or Minnesota dry winter)? What components 
of the system were involved in the test: just matching 
algorithms, just sensor, full system? Most test results do not 
list all these conditions, but the most possible information 
enables more valid evaluation. 
 
It is important to emphasize that results cannot be 
compared if determined under different test conditions. It is 
a misrepresentation of test data to state that a matcher 
achieved certain results for test design A, so it can be 
compared against the results from test design B. Valid 
comparisons between results can be done only for the same 
database under the same conditions. 
 
2.4. Industrial Fingerprint Matching System 
 
SAN JOSE, Calif. and EMERYVILLE, Calif. – October 
11, 2006 – Cypress Semiconductor Corp. (NYSE: CY) and 
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UPEK®, Inc. today introduced a reference design to protect 
data on external hard disk drives (HDDs) by adding 
biometric security via fingerprint recognition technology. 
The reference design delivers the industry’s strongest 
security by authenticating fingerprint matches on-board the 
external HDD system instead of on the PC, ensuring no data 
is passed between the HDD and PC until a match has 
occurred. The new CY4661 reference design uses UPEK’s 
TouchStrip™ Fingerprint High Security Authentication 
Solution along with Cypress’s EZ-USB FX2LP™ USB 
controller to address the growing need for secure personal 
information and enterprise data on portable drives.  
 
The reference design enables manufacturers of HDDs to 
add biometric security that only allows those with a 
registered fingerprint to access data on the drives. It 
features match-on-chip, hardware-based authentication for 
the strongest data and privacy protection available. All 
fingerprint matching functions (template extraction, storage 
and matching) are conducted in the secure UPEK fingerprint 
hardware-based architecture on the external drive, providing 
true portability and security from PC security risks. UPEK’s 
hardware-based security architecture, capable of encrypting 
communications, can also enable future online 
authentication services. The CY4661 is bundled with 
UPEK’s industry leading Protector Suite™ Token application 
software, which simplifies access to data, applications and 
websites. The software includes a password bank to securely 
register and access password-protected websites and 
applications. The end-to-end solution ensures plug-and-play 
ease of use and eliminates the need to download software on 
a host PC. 
 
“The Cypress/UPEK reference design delivers 
maximum protection for the sensitive data that consumers 
increasingly store on their portable drives, and it does so 
with the ease and convenience of the swipe of a finger,” said 
Rajiv Nema, product marketing manager for Cypress’s High 
Speed Peripherals Business Unit. “The flexibility and 
performance of the EZ-USB FX2LP controller is a perfect fit 
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for the needs of the rapidly growing biometric security 
market.” 
 
“UPEK’s complete hardware-based fingerprint solution 
offers the highest level of biometric security and convenience 
in the market today,” said Vito Fabbrizio, Director of 
Portable Storage Solutions for UPEK, Inc. “This unparalleled 
protection is enhanced by the performance of Cypress’s 
industry-leading USB technology and is an essential product 
for individuals on the go.” 
 
The UPEK/Cypress CY4661 biometric reference design 
enables fast time-to-market and reduced integration costs 
with its hardware and software solution for secure portable 
hard disk drives. The reference design includes a field-
proven integrated UPEK enrollment tutorial that offers 
consumers an “easy to start” video training and practice 
session with performance feedback to ensure an excellent 
user experience. This results in a satisfying end user 
experience and greater security due to high-quality matches, 
leading to fewer support calls, product returns, and 
improved customer satisfaction. 
 
2.4.1. About UPEK’s TouchStrip™ Fingerprint 
Authentication Solution 
 
The TouchStrip Fingerprint Authentication Solution is 
an end-to-end solution combining a high image quality 
silicon sensor, a secure companion processor for biometric 
processes, and easy-to-use software for protection and 
convenient access to digital assets. Integrated in the world’s 
largest brand PCs and portable storage devices, the 
TouchStrip Fingerprint Authentication Solution leverages 
hardware-based security to protect sensitive data, access to 
websites and applications, and future online services.  
 
2.4.2. About EZ-USB FX2LP 
 
The EZ-USB FX2LP is the world’s lowest power fully 
integrated programmable peripheral controller, including an 
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8051 microprocessor, a serial interface engine, a high-speed 
USB 2.0 transceiver, on-chip RAM and FIFO and a General 
Programmable Interface (GPIF). It handles all basic USB 
functions, enabling the host system's microprocessor to 
focus on application-specific functions and ensuring 
sustained high-speed data transfer rates. Featuring a data 
rate of 480 Mbps, 16 Kbytes of on-chip memory, and up to 
40 programmable I/Os, the EZ-USB FX2LP solution 
provides complete design flexibility. There are several 
package options, including a 5mm x 5mm VFBGA package, 
ideal for use in small form-factor mobile applications. The 
CY3684 EZ-USB FX2LP Development Kit is available to 
facilitate the design process and speed time-to-market.  
 
2.4.3. About UPEK 
 
UPEK, Inc., a global leader in biometric fingerprint 
security solutions, offers integrated end-to-end solutions 
including comprehensive design & integration services to the 
world’s leading consumer and industrial products 
companies. UPEK solutions enable the strongest fingerprint 
authentication security available, packaged for high user 
convenience and rapid integration into existing products 
and network architectures. The company has been 
pioneering biometric fingerprint technology since 1996 and 
shipping product in volume since 1999. UPEK is 
headquartered in Emeryville, California, with offices in 
Prague, Singapore, Taipei and Tokyo. UPEK and the UPEK 
logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of UPEK, Inc. 
in the United States and other countries. All other 
trademarks or registered trademarks are the property of 
their respective owners. 
 
2.4.4. About Cypress 
 
Cypress solutions perform: consumer, computation, 
data communications, automotive, industrial, and solar. 
Leveraging proprietary silicon processes, Cypress's product 
portfolio includes a broad selection of wired and wireless 
USB devices, CMOS image sensors, timing solutions, 
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specialty memories, high-bandwidth synchronous and 
micropower memory products, optical solutions and 
reconfigurable mixed-signal arrays. Cypress trades on the 
NYSE under the ticker symbol CY. Cypress and the Cypress 
logo are registered trademarks and EZ-USB FX2LP is a 
trademark of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. UPEK 
and the UPEK logo are registered trademarks and 
TouchStrip and Protector Suite are trademarks of UPEK, 
Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective 
owners. 
 
As always the case, all these fingerprint systems are 
not available for analysis and are trade secret. In the 
following section limitations and motivation are enumerated. 
 
2.5. Limitations in conventional fingerprint matching 
system and motivation 
 
2.5.1. Limitations 
 
a. Storage  
The data size to be stored in conventional fingerprint 
matching system database for all fingerprints is relatively 
large where the common approach for matching is 
comparing the tuples of x, y coordinates and orientation θ of 
each minutiae in the fingerprint. 
 
b. Performance 
The time needed until the system responds is relatively 
large because of many matching stages that consumes more 
computational power or needs special hardware. 
 
c. Sensitivity to noise and rotation  
Any translation or rotation to a fingerprint having a 
template stored in the system database may increase the 
false match and false non-match rates. 
 
d. Vulnerability of the whole systems to attacks  
The communication channels between different parts of 
a fingerprint identification system and the parts themselves 
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are vulnerable to different types of attacks. Also, the system 
database can be tampered by deleting, inserting, or editing 
in the fingerprint template records. 
 
2.5.2. Motivation 
 
From the above limitations, there is a need for an 
improved fingerprint identification system with the following 
requirements: 
 
a. Storage  
The data size to be stored in the database needs to be 
less to be able to be inserted on-chip and to make search 
faster. 
 
b. Performance 
The time needed until the system responds have to be 
low by using less computational power. 
 
c. Sensitivity to noise and rotation 
A fingerprint matching system that is invariant to 
translation and rotation is needed so that it can lessen the 
false match and false non-match rates. A new matching 
algorithm is proposed that achieve requirements a, b and c 
in chapter 4. 
 
d. Vulnerability of the whole systems to attacks  
Many scenarios can be applied to secure the whole 
database or different parts of fingerprint identification 
systems and communication channels between those 
different parts. In chapter 5, watermarking is applied on the 
fingerprint identification system to secure communication 
channels. 
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Chapter 3  
Proposed Fingerprint Thinning 
Algorithm 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Thinning is a critical pre-
processing step to obtain skeletons for pattern analysis in 
fingerprint recognition[39]. Thinning is the process of 
reducing the thickness of each line of patterns to a single 
pixel[40].  
 
Most of the current thinning algorithms used in 
fingerprint preprocessing operations need the step of 
binarization before thinning as in [3], [4], [41], [42], [43],[44], 
[45], and [46]. 
 
Binarization step causes the following problems: 
 
1. A significant amount of information may be lost 
during the binarization process; 
2. Binarization is time consuming and may introduce a 
large number of spurious minutiae; 
3. In the absence of an a priori enhancement step, 
most of the binarization techniques do not provide 
satisfactory results when applied to low-quality 
images. 
 
The effect of these mistaken minutiae is to decrease 
recognition accuracy and hence increase the false match 
and false non match rates. 
 
Motivated by this analysis, a new thinning algorithm is 
proposed in this chapter. This novel thinning algorithm 
works directly on the gray-scale images without needing the 
binarization step. The proposed thinning algorithm is 
described in section 3.1, Experimental results are drawn in 
section 3.2, and finally performance evaluation is shown in 
section 3.3. 
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3.1. The proposed thinning algorithm 
 
The main idea is that the gray values of pixels of ridges 
in the fingerprint image gradually decrease going from an 
edge towards the center of the ridge line and increase again 
going towards the other edge. This is the definition of a local 
minimum. This local minimum is the line we want to reach 
to convert the ridge of (e.g. 5) pixels wide into one pixel wide. 
 
There is a difference in the procedure of searching for a 
local minimum between a horizontal (or near horizontal) 
ridge (referred to as type1) and a vertical (or near vertical) 
ridge (referred to as type2),see Figure 3.1, where the 
fingerprint image (Figure 3.1.a) is taken from the standard 
fingerprint image database FVC2000[30]. 
Figure 3.1. a) The fingerprint image, b) a type1 (horizontal) zoomed block 
of size 8x8, c) a type2 (vertical) zoomed block of size 8x8  
b) c) 
a) 
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For type1 ridges, the block is scanned column by 
column, during this scan, the local minimum is searched for 
in each column, and in a new block initialized by zeros, all 
local minima in those columns will be replaced with ones. 
 
For type2 ridges, the block is scanned row by row, 
during this scan, the local minimum is searched for in each 
row, and in a new block initialized by zeros, all local minima 
in those rows will be replaced with ones. 
 
3.1.1. Algorithm steps 
 
3.1.1.1. Divide the fingerprint image into type1 and 
type2 blocks 
 
1. Divide the fingerprint image into blocks of size 88, 
2. Read the gray values of the block, and then 
3. Discriminate between type1 and type2 blocks.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the discrimination process steps. To 
discriminate between type1 and type2 blocks: 
 
For each block of size 88 
{If the block is in the fingerprint image area (not the 
background) 
{ 
Sum_of_columns = sum of the gray values of 
each column in the block; 
Sum_of_rows = sum of the gray values of each 
row in the block; 
Min1 = minimum value of the vector 
"sum_of_columns"; 
Min2 = minimum value of the vector 
"sum_of_rows"; 
} 
If min1>min2 
This block is identified as type1; 
Else 
This block is identified as type2; 
    } 
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Figure 3.2. The steps of discrimination between type1 and type2 blocks. 
Start 
Read the original fingerprint 
Divide the image into blocks of size 88 
Scan the image using zigzag and 
determine the type of each block  
End of blocks? 
Calculate the sum of the columns of block to 
result in a row vector, and determine the min 
value of the row vector (min1) 
Calculate the sum of the rows of block to 
result in a column vector, and determine the 
min value of the column vector (min2) 
min1 > min2 ? 
yes 
No 
No yes 
Block is type2 Block is type1  
Stop 
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Figure 3.3 presents the flowchart of the proposed 
algorithm, which is divided into the following steps: 
 
1. Divide the fingerprint image into blocks (of size 88) of 
two types (near horizontal ridge (type1), or near 
vertical ridge (type2)). After this step, each block is 
reduced from a gray-scale block (the values are from 0 
(black) to 255 (white)) of size 88 into a single value 
block (1 for type1, 2 for type2, and 0 for background) 
of size 11. 
2. Segment the image to deal only with blocks of type1 
and type2 containing the fingerprint area without 
background. 
3. Determine the indices of blocks (coordinates of blocks 
in the image) of horizontal type alone and that of 
vertical type alone. 
4. Initialize a new array of the same size of the original 
fingerprint with zeros to represent the thin fingerprint. 
5. Scan each group of consecutive blocks of type1 
vertically column by column to find the local 
minimum values and set these pixels to one in the 
new image. 
6. Scan each group of consecutive blocks of type2 
horizontally row by row to find the local minimum 
values and set these pixels to one in the new image. 
 
The proposed algorithm is implemented and tested at 
[47]. Appendix C shows the MATLAB source code 
implementation for the proposed thinning algorithm. 
 
Consider the fingerprint image shown in Figure 3.1.a, 
the size of the image is 480640 and after segmentation, 
size is 376208. As an example, consider the block (of size 
88) located at the intersection of rows (57-64) and columns 
(65-72), the bold rectangle shown in Figure 3.1.b, the gray 
values obtained from the fingerprint image in this bold 
rectangle are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.3. A flowchart of the proposed algorithm. 
Start 
Stop 
Divide the fingerprint into two 
types blocks: type1 and type2 
Segment the fingerprint 
image 
Determine the indices of 
each type alone 
Initialize a new array 
with zeros 
Scan each group of consecutive blocks of 
type1 vertically to find local minima 
Scan each group of consecutive blocks of 
type2 horizontally to find local minima 
Update the new array with 
ones at these locations 
Update the new array with 
ones at these locations 
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Table 3.1. The gray values of a type1 block. 
As seen from Table 3.1, the center line of the ridge is 
shaded and this is what the proposed thinning algorithm 
should reach. When sum_of_columns and sum_of_rows 
vectors (vectors are of size 18) are calculated and the 
minimum value of each vector (min1 and min2 respectively) 
is determined, it is found that min1>min2 so that we can 
identify the block as a horizontal one (i.e. type1) and this is 
clear from Figure 3.1.b. 
 
As another example, taking another block (of size 88) 
located at the intersection of rows (225-232) and columns 
(193-200), the rectangle shown in Figure 3.1.c, the values 
obtained are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
As seen from Table, the center line of the ridge is 
shaded and this is what we want the thinning algorithm to 
reach. Calculating the sum_of_columns and sum_of_rows 
vectors and getting the minimum value of each vector (min1 
and min2 respectively), it is found that min1<min2 so the 
block can be identified as a vertical one (i.e. type2) and this 
is clear from Figure 3.1.c. 
 
The result of this step is shown in Figure 3.4, where 
type1 blocks are drawn with gray and type2 blocks are 
drawn with black. 
 
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
Sum_of 
_rows 
57 201 224 227 248 247 241 233 218 1839 
58 231 239 238 213 175 152 132 112 1492 
59 179 161 143 112 89 69 60 50 863 
60 105 79 58 52 64 67 46 60 531(min2) 
61 59 52 38 41 84 108 116 143 641 
62 74 93 85 111 151 183 204 221 1122 
63 138 168 175 202 223 240 247 251 1644 
64 203 227 238 245 252 253 251 241 1910 
Sum_of 
_columns 
1190 1243 1202 1224 1285 1313 1289 1296  
min1         
col 
row 
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193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 
Sum_of 
_rows 
57 174 84 60 77 189 247 255 249 1335(min2) 
58 192 101 75 78 164 238 255 254 1357 
59 226 139 91 75 120 193 243 255 1342 
60 251 200 120 75 97 142 213 250 1348 
61 255 244 169 98 127 154 208 247 1502 
62 255 255 220 137 133 150 215 251 1616 
63 255 255 248 179 119 138 221 254 1669 
64 255 255 255 209 129 149 228 255 1735 
Sum_of 
_columns 
1863 1533 1238 928 1078 1411 1838 2015  
   min1      
Table 3.2. The gray values of a type2 block 
 
Figure 3.4. The resulted discrimination between type1 blocks (drawn with 
gray) and type2 blocks (drawn with black). 
 
3.1.1.2. Fingerprint Segmentation 
 
Step 2 in the algorithm is for segmentation of 
fingerprint image, the steps are as follows: 
 
After step1, we have for each block of size 88 a 
corresponding block of size 11 with a value of 0, 1 or 2. A 
closing operation is performed (dilation followed by erosion) 
col 
row 
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followed by an opening operation (erosion followed by 
dilation) [5]. After that, the perimeter of the fingerprint area 
is detected where we will have a binary image of ones in the 
perimeter and zeros elsewhere.  
 
So, now we can find the left most and right most blocks 
indices with value 1, also we can find the top most and 
bottom most blocks indices with value 1. These four blocks 
indices will guide us to determine the rectangle location 
containing the fingerprint area without background, and the 
segmentation result was an image of size 376208 after the 
original size 480640. 
 
3.1.1.3. Find local minima in each block 
 
Step3 in the algorithm is implemented to deal 
separately with each type alone. During recording the 
indices, consecutive blocks of a certain type is tagged with a 
zero to separate it from the next consecutive blocks of the 
same type. 
 
After implementing remaining steps, the thin fingerprint 
is obtained as shown in Figure 3.5. As seen, the ridges are 
one pixel wide. 
 
Considering the same 2 blocks shown before in Table 
3.1 and Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 respectively show 
the results of the thinning algorithm. 
 
3.1.1.4. Correcting errors 
 
After implementing the thinning algorithm, it is found 
that most bifurcations are separated with one or two pixels, 
i.e. not connected. So, a complete scan on the resulted 
thinned image must be performed to search for these cases 
and update their values as follows: 
 
For each pixel in the thinned image 
{ 
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If pixel_value = 1 (pixel is in the skeleton of the thinned 
image) 
{Get the number of ones in the 33 neighbors of this 
pixel (n1); 
If n1=1 
{Get the 33 neighbors of this pixel in the gray-scale 
version of the fingerprint; 
Get the location c of the minimum value among the 
8 neighbors of this pixel; 
If this pixel at location c in the thinned image = 0 
{ 
Get the 33 neighbors of this pixel in the thinned 
image; 
If there are three or more of the neighbor pixels = 
1 
Update the value of this pixel to be 1 and keep 
only three "1" neighbors unchanged to be a 
valid bifurcation  
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
 
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
60 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
61 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 3.3. The result of thinning of block of Table 3.1. 
After applying these steps on Figure 3.5, the result is 
shown in Figure 3.6, where all bifurcations are connected 
correctly. 
col 
row 
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Figure 3.5. The thinned fingerprint image. 
 
 
193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 
225 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
226 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
227 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
228 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
229 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
230 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
231 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
232 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Table 3.4. The result of thinning of block of Table 3.2. 
 
 
 
col 
row 
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Figure 3.6. The thinned fingerprint after fixing the bifurcation problems. 
 
3.2. Wuzhili Thinning Method 
 
Before thinning, wuzhili program [48] apply the 
following pre-processing steps to the fingerprint: 
 
1. Subtract all pixel values from 255. 
2. Histogram equalization. 
3. Fast Fourier Transformation FFT. 
4. Adaptive thresholding to binarize the image. 
5. Estimate the orientation image of the fingerprint. 
6. Determine the fingerprint area and remove all 
background. 
 
Then, the Algorithm used to thin the fingerprint uses 
the method described in [28]: 
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1. Divide the image into two distinct subfields in a 
checkerboard pattern. 
2. In the first subiteration, delete pixel p from the first 
subfield if and only if the conditions G1, G2, and G3 are 
all satisfied.  
3. In the second subiteration, delete pixel p from the 
second subfield if and only if the conditions G1, G2, 
and G3' are all satisfied. 
 
Where: 
 
Condition G1 is: 
XH(p)=1  
where 

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x1, x2, ..., x8 are the values of the eight neighbors of p, 
starting with the east neighbor and numbered in counter-
clockwise order. 
 
Condition G2 is: 
2  min {n1(p), n2(p)}  3 
where 
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Condition G3 is: 
0)( 1832  xxxx  
Condition G3' is: 
0)( 5476  xxxx  
The two subiterations together make up one iteration of 
the thinning algorithm. The iterations can be repeated until 
the image stops changing. 
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3.3. Experimental Results 
 
As shown, the proposed thinning algorithm does not 
apply any pre-processing operations (including binarization) 
on the fingerprint image before thinning. 
 
The execution time of the proposed thinning algorithm 
is found to be 0.52 s. Comparing the proposed algorithm 
with Wuzhili method implemented using MATLAB in [48] 
with the same fingerprint, the result of thinning of this 
method is shown in Figure 3.7 where the execution time was 
1.1 s. Then, the result of the proposed thinning algorithm is 
better than that in Figure 3.7 and consumes less time. The 
above results was implemented using MATLAB version 
7.0.1.24704 (R14) Service Pack1 September 13, 2004 as the 
programming platform. The program was tested on a 
2.00GHz personal computer with 1.99 GB of RAM. 
 
3.4. Performance Evaluation 
 
Most of the algorithms performing binarization before 
thinning of the image, so if the image is of size NN, the step 
of binarization alone needs O(N2) comparison operations 
because the main step in binarization is comparing the gray 
value of each pixel under consideration with a predefined 
threshold. The proposed algorithm does not need the 
binarization process during thinning so it does not have 
these O(N2) comparison operations. This and the 
segmentation process are the main cause of the fastness of 
the proposed algorithm. 
 
Putting Figure 3.6 beside Figure 3.7 in Figure 3.8 to be 
easy to be compared, it is seen that the fingerprint in the left 
side (which is the result of the proposed thinning method) is 
clearer than the fingerprint in the right side (which is the 
result of Whuzhili method) due to lower number of H breaks 
and spikes. So, it is expected that both false positive rate 
and false negative rate will be lowered because the 
performance of a minutiae extraction algorithm relies 
heavily on the quality of the thinning algorithm. 
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Figure 3.7. The thinning step of the program implemented in [48] 
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Figure 3.8. comparing both thinning results for the same fingerprint
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Chapter 4  
Proposed Fingerprint Matching 
Algorithm 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, fingerprint matching is the 
last step in Automatic Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS). Fingerprint matching techniques can be classified 
into three types: 
 
 Correlation-based matching, 
 Minutiae-based matching, and 
 Non-Minutiae feature-based matching. 
 
Minutiae-based matching is the most popular and 
widely used technique, being the basis of the fingerprint 
comparison. 
 
In [3], a novel minutiae matching method is presented 
that describes elastic distortions in fingerprints by means of 
a thin-plate spline model, which is estimated using a local 
and a global matching stage. After registration of the 
fingerprints according to the estimated model, the number 
of matching minutiae can be counted using very tight 
matching thresholds. For deformed fingerprints, the 
algorithm gives considerably higher matching scores 
compared to rigid matching algorithms, while only taking 
100 ms on a 1 GHz P-III machine. Furthermore, it is shown 
that the observed deformations are different from those 
described by theoretical models proposed in the literature. 
 
In [49], minutia polygons are used to match distorted 
fingerprints. A minutia polygon describes not only the 
minutia type and orientation but also the minutia shape. 
This allows the minutia polygon to be bigger than the 
conventional tolerance box without losing matching 
accuracy. In other words, a minutia polygon has a higher 
ability to tolerate distortion. Furthermore, the proposed 
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matching method employs an improved distortion model 
using a Multi-quadric basis function with parameters. 
Adjustable parameters make this model more suitable for 
fingerprint distortion. Experimental results show that the 
proposed method is two times faster and more accurate 
(especially, on fingerprints with heavy distortion) than the 
method in [3]. 
 
In[34], a new fingerprint minutia matching technique is 
proposed, which matches the fingerprint minutiae by using 
both the local and global structures of minutiae. The local 
structure of a minutia describes a rotation and translation 
invariant feature of the minutia in its neighborhood. It is 
used to find the correspondence of two minutiae sets and 
increase the reliability of the global matching. The global 
structure of minutiae reliably determines the uniqueness of 
fingerprint. Therefore, the local and global structures of 
minutiae together provide a solid basis for reliable and 
robust minutiae matching. The proposed minutiae matching 
scheme is suitable for an on line processing due to its high 
processing speed. Experimental results show the 
performance of the proposed technique. 
 
In [50], a hybrid matching algorithm that uses both 
minutiae (point) information and texture (region) information 
is presented for matching the fingerprints. Results obtained 
shows that a combination of the texture-based and 
minutiae-based matching scores leads to a substantial 
improvement in the overall matching performance. This 
work was motivated by the small contact area sensors 
provide for the fingertip and, therefore, sense only a limited 
portion of the fingerprint. Thus multiple impressions of the 
same fingerprint may have only a small region of overlap. 
Minutiae-based matching algorithms, which consider ridge 
activity only in the vicinity of minutiae points, are not likely 
to perform well on these images due to the insufficient 
number of corresponding points in the input and template 
images. 
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In [51], a new and efficient method for minutiae-based 
fingerprint matching is proposed, which is invariant to 
translation, rotation and distortion effects of fingerprint 
patterns. The algorithm is separated from a prior feature 
extraction and uses a compact description of minutiae 
features in fingerprints. The matching process consists of 
three major steps:  
 Finding pairs of possibly corresponding minutiae in 
both fingerprint patterns, 
 Combining these pairs to valid tuples of four minutiae 
each, containing two minutiae from each pattern. 
 The third step is the matching itself.  
It is realized by a monotonous tree search that finds 
consistent combinations of tuples with a maximum 
number of different minutiae pairs. The approach has 
low and scalable memory requirements and it is 
computationally inexpensive. 
 
In [45], three ideas are introduced along the following 
three aspects:  
 Introduction of ridge information into the minutiae 
matching process in a simple but effective way, which 
solves the problem of reference point pair selection with 
low computational cost; 
 Use of a variable sized bounding box to make our 
algorithm more robust to non-linear deformation 
between fingerprint images;  
 Use of a simpler alignment method in our algorithm. 
Experiments using the Fingerprint Verification 
Competition 2000 (FVC2000) databases with the FVC2000 
performance evaluation show that these ideas are effective. 
 
In [52], a novel minutiae indexing method is proposed 
to speed up fingerprint matching, which narrows down the 
searching space of minutiae to reduce the expense of 
computation. An orderly sequence of features is extracted to 
describe each minutia and the indexing score is defined to 
select minutiae candidates from the query fingerprint for 
each minutia in the input fingerprint. The proposed method 
can be applied in both minutiae structure-based verification 
Chapter 4 Proposed Fingerprint Matching Algorithm 
74 
and fingerprint identification. Experiments are performed on 
a large-distorted fingerprint database (FVC2004 DB1) to 
approve the validity of the proposed method. 
 
In most existing minutiae-based matching methods, a 
reference minutia is chosen from the template fingerprint 
and the query fingerprint, respectively. When matching the 
two sets of minutiae, the template and the query, firstly 
reference minutiae pair is aligned coordinately and 
directionally, and secondly the matching score of the rest 
minutiae is evaluated. This method guarantees satisfactory 
alignments of regions adjacent to the reference minutiae. 
However, the alignments of regions far away from the 
reference minutiae are usually not so satisfactory. In [53], a 
minutia matching method based on global alignment of 
multiple pairs of reference minutiae is proposed. These 
reference minutiae are commonly distributed in various 
fingerprint regions. When matching, these pairs of reference 
minutiae are to be globally aligned, and those region pairs 
far away from the original reference minutiae will be aligned 
more satisfactorily. Experiment shows that this method 
leads to improvement in system identification performance. 
 
In [54], the design and implementation of an on-line 
fingerprint verification system is described. This system 
operates in two stages: minutia extraction and minutia 
matching. An improved version of the minutia extraction 
algorithm proposed by Ratha et al. [7], which is much faster 
and more reliable, is implemented for extracting features 
from an input fingerprint image captured with an on-line 
inkless scanner. For minutia matching, an alignment-based 
elastic matching algorithm has been developed. This 
algorithm is capable of finding the correspondences between 
minutiae in the input image and the stored template without 
resorting to exhaustive search and has the ability of 
adaptively compensating for the nonlinear deformations and 
inexact pose transformations between fingerprints. The 
system has been tested on two sets of fingerprint images 
captured with inkless scanners. The verification accuracy is 
found to be acceptable. Typically, a complete fingerprint 
verification procedure takes, on an average, about eight 
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seconds on a SPARC 20 workstation. These experimental 
results show that our system meets the response time 
requirements of on-line verification with high accuracy. 
 
In [55], a minutia matching algorithm which modified 
Jain et al.’s [54] algorithm is proposed The algorithm can 
better distinguish two images from different fingers and is 
more robust to nonlinear deformation. Experiments done on 
a set of fingerprint images captured with an inkless scanner 
shows that the algorithm is fast and has high accuracy. 
 
In [56], a new fingerprint minutiae matching algorithm 
is proposed, which is fast, accurate and suitable for the real 
time fingerprint identification system. In this algorithm, the 
core point is used to determine the reference point and a 
round bounding box is used for matching. Experiments 
done on a set of fingerprint images captured with a scanner 
showed that the algorithm is faster and more accurate than 
Xiping Luo’s [55] algorithm. 
 
There are two major shortcomings of the traditional 
approaches to fingerprint representation[15]: 
1. For a considerable fraction of population, the 
representations based on explicit detection of complete 
ridge structures in the fingerprint are difficult to extract 
automatically. The widely used minutiae-based 
representation does not utilize a significant component 
of the rich discriminatory information available in the 
fingerprints. Local ridge structures cannot be 
completely characterized by minutiae. 
2. Further, minutiae-based matching has difficulty in 
quickly matching two fingerprint images containing 
different number of unregistered minutiae points. 
 
The filter-based algorithm in [15] uses a bank of Gabor 
filters, explained in section 2.1.5, to capture both local and 
global details in a fingerprint as a compact fixed length 
FingerCode. The fingerprint matching is based on the 
Euclidean distance between the two corresponding 
FingerCodes and hence is extremely fast. Verification 
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accuracy achieved is only marginally inferior to the best 
results of minutiae-based algorithms published in the open 
literature [57]. Proposed system performs better than a 
state-of-the-art minutiae-based system when the 
performance requirement of the application system does not 
demand a very low false acceptance rate. Finally, it is shown 
that the matching performance can be improved by 
combining the decisions of the matchers based on 
complementary (minutiae-based and filter-based) fingerprint 
information.  
 
Motivated by this analysis, a new algorithm is proposed 
in this chapter. This novel algorithm is minutiae-based 
matching algorithm. The proposed matching algorithm is 
described in section 4.1, the advantages are drawn in 
section 4.2, and finally, implementation, performance 
evaluation of the algorithm and conclusion are explained in 
section 4.3. 
 
4.1. Formal description of fingerprint 
identification system: 
 
If we define: 
 
X=fingerprint image 
T= fingerprint template 
PID= person identity 
R=result of matching 
 
We can define: 
 
True match as: 
matchTrueRTXPIDimageX  )(   
 
False match as: 
matchfalseRTXPIDimageX  )(   
 
True nonmatch as: 
matchnontrueRTXPIDimageX    )(   
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False nonmatch as: 
matchnonfalseRTXPIDimageX   )(   
 
4.2. The proposed matching algorithm 
 
Any Fingerprint Identification System (FIS) has two 
phases, fingerprint enrollment and fingerprint matching 
(identification or verification), as shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
4.2.1. Enrollment phase 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the steps of the enrollment phase of 
the proposed matching algorithm, which is divided into the 
following steps: 
 
1. Get the core point location of the fingerprint to be 
enrolled after applying enhancement process. 
2. Extract all minutiae from the fingerprint image. 
3. From output data of step2, get the minutiae locations 
(x, y coordinates) together with their type: type1 for 
termination minutiae and type2 for bifurcation 
minutiae. 
4. Construct tracks of 10 pixels wide centered at the 
core point. 
5. In each track, count the number of minutiae of type1 
and the number of minutiae of type2. 
6. Construct a table of two columns, column 1 for type1 
minutiae and column 2 for type2 minutiae, having 
number of rows equal number of found tracks. 
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Figure 4.1. Flowchart of the enrollment phase of the proposed matching 
algorithm. 
7. In the first row, record the number of minutiae of 
type1 found in the first track in the first column, and 
the number of minutiae of type2 found in the first 
track in the second column. 
Start 
Stop 
Extract all minutiae from 
the fingerprint image 
Determine x, y locations of  
each minutiae and its type: 
1 for termination, 2 for bifurcation 
Construct tracks of 10 pixels 
wide around the core point 
Count the number of each type of 
minutiae found in each track 
Record minutiae numbers 
in a table of two columns. 
Get the core point location 
of the enhanced fingerprint 
Store the table in the 
database  
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8. Repeat step 7 for the remaining tracks of the 
fingerprint, and then store the table in the database. 
 
This enrollment phase will be repeated for all prints of 
the same user's fingerprint. Number of prints depends on 
the application requirements at which the user registration 
takes place. For FVC2000 [30], described in section 2.1.6, 
there are 8 prints for each fingerprint. So, eight enrollments 
will be required for each user to be registered in the 
application. Finally, eight tables will be available in the 
database for each user. 
 
4.2.2. Verification phase 
 
For authenticating a user, verification phase should be 
applied on the user's fingerprint to be verified at the 
application. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the steps of the verification phase of 
the proposed matching algorithm, which is divided into the 
following steps: 
 
1. Capture the fingerprint of the user to be verified. 
2. Apply the steps of enrollment phase, described in 
section 4.1.1, on the captured fingerprint to obtain 
its minutiae table T. 
3. Get all the minutiae tables corresponding to the 
different prints of the claimed fingerprint from the 
database. 
4. Get the absolute differences cell by cell between 
minutiae table T and all minutiae tables of the 
claimed fingerprint taken from the database, now we 
have eight difference tables. 
5. Get the summations of all cells in each of column1 
(type1) and column2 (type2) for each difference table, 
now we have sixteen summations. 
6. Get the geometric mean of the eight summations of 
type1 columns (gm1), and the geometric mean of the 
eight summations of type2 columns (gm2). 
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7. Check: if gm1<= threshold1 and gm2<=threshold2 
then the user is genuine and accept him; else the 
user is imposter and reject him. 
 
4.3. Advantages of the proposed matching 
algorithm 
 
The proposed minutiae-based matching algorithm has 
the following advantages: 
 
1. Since all cells in each minutiae table, representing 
the fingerprint in database, contain just the number 
of minutiae of type1 or type2 in each track around 
the core point of the fingerprint, neither position (x or 
y) nor orientation (θ) of the minutiae is considered, 
the algorithm is rotation and translation invariant. 
 
2. The numbers of minutiae to be stored in the 
database need less storage than traditional minutiae-
based matching algorithms which store position and 
orientation of each minutia. Experiments show that 
nearly 50% reduction in storage size is obtained. 
 
3. Matching phase itself takes less time which as will be 
shown in section 4.3.3.8 reaches 0.00134 sec. 
 
4.4. Implementation of the proposed matching 
algorithm 
 
Using MATLAB Version 7.9.0.529 (R2009b), both 
proposed enrollment and verification phases are 
implemented in Appendix B, as described in next two 
subsections: 
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Figure 4.2. Flowchart of the proposed verification phase. 
Start 
Stop 
Read all tables of different 
impressions of the claimed 
fingerprint from the database 
Get the geometric mean of summations of type1 
columns (gm1) and that of type2 columns (gm2) 
Read fingerprint of the user 
Get the absolute differences cell 
by cell between T and all tables 
gm1<=thr1 & 
gm2<=thr2? 
No Yes 
Reject user Accept user 
Get the summation of each 
column in each difference table 
Construct its minutiae table T 
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4.4.1. Enrollment phase 
 
4.4.1.1. Enhancement of the fingerprint image 
  
The first step is to enhance the fingerprint image using 
Short Time Fourier Transform STFT analysis [2]. The 
performance of a fingerprint matching algorithm depends 
critically upon the quality of the input fingerprint image. 
While the quality of a fingerprint image may not be 
objectively measured, it roughly corresponds to the clarity of 
the ridge structure in the fingerprint image, and hence it is 
necessary to enhance the fingerprint image. Since the 
fingerprint image may be thought of as a system of oriented 
texture with non-stationary properties, traditional Fourier 
analysis is not adequate to analyze the image completely as 
the STFT analysis does [21]. 
 
Fingerprint enhancement MATLAB code is available at 
[58]. 
 
The algorithm for image enhancement consists of two 
stages as summarized below: 
 
Stage 1: STFT analysis 
1. For each overlapping block in an image, generate and 
reconstruct a ridge orientation image by computing 
gradients of pixels in a block, and a ridge frequency 
image through obtaining the FFT value of the block, and 
an energy image by summing the power of FFT value; 
2. Smoothen the orientation image using vector average to 
yield a smoothed orientation image, and generate a 
coherence image using the smoothed orientation image; 
3. Generate a region mask by thresholding the energy 
image; 
 
Stage 2: Apply Enhancement 
For each overlapping block in the image, the next five sub-
steps are applied. 
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4. Generate an angular filter Fa centered on the orientation 
in the smoothed orientation image with a bandwidth 
inversely proportional to coherence image; 
5. Generate a radial filter Fr centered on frequency image; 
6. Filter a block in the FFT domain, F=F×Fa×Fr; 
7. Generate the enhanced block by inverse Fourier 
transform IFFT(F); 
8. Reconstruct the enhanced image by composing 
enhanced blocks, and yield the final enhanced image 
with the region mask. 
 
The result of the enhancement process is shown in 
Figure 4.3, where Figure 4.3.a is taken from FVC2000 
DB1_B (108_5) and Figure 4.3.b is the enhanced version of 
Figure 4.3.a. 
 
 
   a)        b) 
Figure 4.3. a) Fingerprint image 108_5 from DB1_B in FVC2000, 
b) Enhanced version of fingerprint image 108_5. 
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4.4.1.2. Get core point of the enhanced fingerprint 
  
Core point MATLAB code is available at [58] and 
translated from Italian to English in (Appendix A), where the 
idea of determining the reference point is taken from [21], 
which is described as follows: 
The reference point is defined as "the point of the 
maximum curvature on the convex ridge [59]" which is 
usually located in the central area of fingerprint. The reliable 
detection of the position of a reference point can be 
accomplished by detecting the maximum curvature using 
complex filtering methods [60]. 
 
They apply complex filters to ridge orientation field 
image generated from original fingerprint image. The reliable 
detection of reference point with the complex filtering 
methods is summarized below: 
 
1. For each overlapping block in an image; 
a) Generate a ridge orientation image with the 
same method in STFT analysis; 
b) Apply the corresponding complex filter  
h = (x + iy)m g(x, y) centered at the pixel 
orientation in the orientation image, where m 
and g (x, y) = exp{-((x2 + y2)/22))} indicate the 
order of the complex filter and a Gaussian 
window, respectively; 
c) For m =1 , the filter response of each block can 
be obtained by a convolution, 
h  O(x, y) = g(y)  ((xg(x))t  O(x,y))+ig(x)t  ((yg(y)  O(x, y)))  
where O(x, y) represents the pixel orientation 
image; 
2. Reconstruct the filtered image by composing filtered 
blocks. 
 
The maximum response of the complex filter in the 
filtered image can be considered as the reference point. 
Since there is only one output, the unique output point is 
taken as the reference point (core point). 
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4.4.1.3. Minutiae extraction 
 
To extract minutiae from the enhanced fingerprint 
image, the minutiae extraction method [26], explained in 
section 2.1.6, is used. Hence we have three information for 
each minutia: x and y coordinates of its location, type of 
minutia (type1 if it is a termination, type2 if it is a 
bifurcation).   
 
The result of this minutiae extraction stage is shown in 
Figure 4.4, where Figure 4.4.a is the same as Figure 4.3.b. 
Figure 4.4.b shows the termination minutiae in circles and 
the bifurcation minutiae in diamonds together with the core 
point of the fingerprint with an asterisk. 
 
  
   a)        b) 
Figure 4.4. a) Enhanced Fingerprint image 108_5 from DB1_B in 
FVC2000, b) core point (asterisk), terminations (circles) and bifurcations 
(diamonds) 
4.4.1.4. Construct the minutiae table 
 
From the output of the minutiae extraction step, the 
proposed minutiae table is constructed as following: 
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a. Get all minutiae locations together with their types. 
b. Using Euclidean distances, get the distances between 
all the minutiae and the core point of the fingerprint: 
if the core location is at (xc, yc) and a minutia location 
is at (x, y), the Euclidean distance between them will 
be: 
22 )()( cc yyxx   
c. Construct tracks of 10n pixels wide (where 
n=1…max_distance/10) centered at the core point 
until all minutiae are exhausted, the track width is 
chosen to be 10 as the average distance (in pixels) 
between two consecutive ridges is 10 pixels, this is 
achieved in the fingerprint 108_5 in Figure 4.4.a. 
where it is of 96dpi resolution. 
d. In each track, count the number of existed minutiae 
of type1 and the number of existed minutiae of 
type2. 
e. Construct a table of two columns, column 1 for type1 
minutiae and column 2 for type2 minutiae, having 
number of rows equal number of found tracks. 
f. In the first row, record the number of minutiae of 
type1 found in the first track in the first column, and 
record the number of minutiae of type2 found in the 
first track in the second column. 
g. Repeat last step for the remaining tracks of the 
fingerprint until all tracks are processed, and then 
store the minutiae table in the database. 
 
The resulted minutiae table from Figure 4.4.b is as 
shown in Table 4.1. The first column is for illustration only 
but in MATLAB, it is not existed and it is used as the index 
for each row of the minutiae table consisting of just two 
columns. 
 
To validate the table's data, the total number of the 
minutiae of both types: termination and bifurcation, in 
Figure 4.4.b is found to be the total summation of both 
columns of minutiae table which is equal to 51 minutiae. 
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Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 0 0 
2 1 2 
3 0 0 
4 0 1 
5 0 1 
6 0 2 
7 0 3 
8 2 2 
9 0 2 
10 1 2 
11 6 1 
12 3 1 
13 3 0 
14 4 1 
15 1 2 
16 0 1 
17 0 0 
18 1 0 
19 1 0 
20 0 0 
21 0 0 
22 1 0 
23 1 4 
24 0 1 
Table 4.1. The minutiae table of fingerprint 108_5 from DB1_B in 
FVC2000 
4.4.2. Verification phase 
 
4.4.2.1. Capture the fingerprint to be verified 
 
The user who is claiming that he is (e.g. M) will put his 
finger on the scanner to be captured at the application he 
wants to access. Now, a fingerprint will be available to be 
verified to check if he is actually M so that he will be 
accepted or he is not so that he will be rejected. 
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4.4.2.2. Construct the minutiae table of that fingerprint 
 
The same steps of the enrollment explained in section 
4.4.1 will be applied on the fingerprint obtained from the 
previous step. Now, a minutiae table T corresponding to the 
fingerprint under test will be built. 
 
4.4.2.3. Get all corresponding minutiae tables from the 
database 
 
In FVC2000 [30], each fingerprint has eight prints, so 
to verify a certain input fingerprint, all the corresponding 
minutiae tables of different prints of that claimed fingerprint 
stored in the database must be fetched. 
 
Taking as an example the fingerprint 108_7 (see Figure 
4.5.a) taken from DB1_B in FVC2000 to be verified and 
applying the same steps of enrollment, the results are 
shown in (Figure 4.5) where Figure 4.5.b shows the 
enhanced version of Figure 4.5.a, and Figure 4.5.c shows its 
thinned version together with the terminations in circles, the 
bifurcations in diamonds and finally the core point in 
asterisk. As can be shown, because the image is of poor 
quality, the number of minutiae is so different. 
 
Now the minutiae table is ready to be constructed as 
shown in Table 4.2. Summing all the minutiae of both types 
in Table 4.2, it results in 73 minutiae which is different from 
the number before for fingerprint 108_5 which was 51 
minutiae. 
 
Fingerprints 108_1, 108_2, 108_3, 108_4, 108_6, and 
108_8 taken from DB1_B in FVC2000 are shown in Figure 
4.6, and their corresponding minutiae tables are shown in 
Table 4.3, Table 4.4, Table 4.5, Table 4.6, Table 4.7, and 
Table 4.8 respectively. Fingerprint 108_5 is already shown 
in Figure 4.3.a and its corresponding minutiae table is 
shown in Table 4.1. 
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4.4.2.4. Calculate the absolute differences between 
minutiae table of the input fingerprint and all minutiae 
tables of the claimed fingerprint 
 
Now, the absolute differences between minutiae table 
corresponding to fingerprint 108_7 and all minutiae tables 
corresponding to fingerprints 108_1, 108_2, 108_3, 108_4, 
108_5, 108_6, and 108_8 are calculated. Because the sizes 
(number of rows) of minutiae tables are not equal, the 
minimum size must be determined to be able to perform the 
absolute subtraction on the same size for different tables. 
The minimum number of tracks found in DB1_B is 14. 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 1 0 
2 1 2 
3 1 0 
4 0 0 
5 1 2 
6 1 1 
7 6 1 
8 5 1 
9 2 1 
10 4 0 
11 3 1 
12 2 0 
13 5 1 
14 1 1 
15 3 1 
16 2 1 
17 0 2 
18 2 0 
19 4 1 
20 4 1 
21 3 2 
22 1 0 
23 1 1 
Table 4.2. The minutiae table of fingerprint 108_7 from DB1_B in 
FVC2000 
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So, only the first 14 rows of each minutiae table will be 
considered during the absolute differences calculation. Table 
4.9, Table 4.10, Table 4.11, and Table 4.12 shows the 
absolute differences between the minutiae table of 
fingerprint 108_7 and the minutiae tables of fingerprints 
108_1, 108_2, 108_3, 108_4, 108_5, 108_6 and 108_8. 
 
4.4.2.5. Get the summation of each column in each 
difference table 
 
At the bottom of each of Table 4.9, Table 4.10, Table 
4.11, and Table 4.12, in the rows titled "sum", the 
summation of each column in each difference table is 
drawn, now we have seven summations for type1 columns, 
and other seven summations for type2 columns. 
 
4.4.2.6. Get  the geometric mean of the resulted 
summations for both of type1 and type2 
 
Get the geometric mean of the summations of type1 
columns in all difference tables: Table 4.9, Table 4.10, Table 
4.11, and Table 4.12. 
 
The geometric mean, in mathematics, is a type of mean 
or average, which indicates the central tendency or typical 
value of a set of numbers [61]. It is similar to the arithmetic 
mean, which is what most people think of with the word 
"average", except that the numbers are multiplied and then 
the nth root (where n is the count of numbers in the set) of 
the resulting product is taken. 
 
488.27691727262424251 7 gm  
Get the geometric mean of the summations of type2 
columns in all difference tables. 
2082.967111510992 7 gm  
Check the values of gm1 and gm2: 
If gm1 <= threshold1 and gm2 <= threshold2 then 
the user is genuine and accept him 
else  
the user is imposter and reject him  
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a) 
 
                      b)     c) 
Figure 4.5. a) Fingerprint image 108_7 from DB1_B in FVC2000, 
b) Enhanced version of fingerprint image 108_7, c) core point (asterisk), 
terminations (circles) and bifurcations (diamonds). 
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     a)     b) 
  
   c)     d) 
  
e)     f) 
Figure 4.6. Fingerprints taken from DB1_B in FVC2000: a) 108_1, 
b)108_2, c)108_3, d)108_4, e)108_6, and f)108_8 
 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 1 0 
2 1 0 
3 1 0 
4 0 1 
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5 3 1 
6 3 0 
7 4 0 
8 0 1 
9 0 1 
10 0 0 
11 1 0 
12 1 1 
13 1 0 
14 2 1 
15 1 0 
16 2 0 
Table 4.3. Minutiae table corresponding to the fingerprint 108_1. 
 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 0 0 
2 2 1 
3 1 0 
4 2 0 
5 1 1 
6 0 0 
7 3 0 
8 1 0 
9 1 0 
10 2 0 
11 0 0 
12 1 0 
13 1 0 
14 2 0 
15 1 0 
16 1 0 
17 0 1 
18 0 0 
Table 4.4. Minutiae table corresponding to the fingerprint 108_2. 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
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1 3 0 
2 1 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 1 
5 1 3 
6 1 1 
7 2 0 
8 2 1 
9 3 2 
10 0 0 
11 0 0 
12 0 2 
13 2 1 
14 2 0 
15 0 0 
16 0 0 
17 0 0 
18 0 1 
19 1 0 
20 0 0 
21 0 0 
22 4 0 
23 1 0 
24 0 0 
25 1 1 
26 1 1 
27 3 1 
28 1 1 
Table 4.5. Minutiae table corresponding to the fingerprint 108_3. 
 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 0 0 
2 3 0 
3 3 0 
4 2 0 
5 3 1 
6 5 2 
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7 3 0 
8 3 0 
9 4 2 
10 5 2 
11 5 2 
12 2 1 
13 2 3 
14 1 3 
15 0 2 
16 1 1 
17 1 0 
Table 4.6. Minutiae table corresponding to the fingerprint 108_4. 
 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 1 0 
2 1 1 
3 0 0 
4 2 1 
5 2 1 
6 1 1 
7 2 0 
8 8 1 
9 3 0 
10 3 0 
11 1 0 
12 3 1 
13 4 1 
14 1 1 
15 4 0 
16 1 1 
17 2 1 
18 3 0 
19 0 1 
20 0 0 
21 1 0 
22 1 1 
Table 4.7. Minutiae table corresponding to the fingerprint 108_6. 
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Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 2 0 
2 3 2 
3 0 0 
4 2 0 
5 5 0 
6 7 1 
7 6 0 
8 6 0 
9 7 1 
10 10 0 
11 12 1 
12 18 2 
13 15 1 
14 7 1 
15 13 2 
16 9 5 
17 6 3 
18 7 0 
19 4 2 
20 2 3 
21 6 1 
22 1 0 
23 0 1 
24 0 1 
Table 4.8. Minutiae table corresponding to the fingerprint 108_8. 
 
 abs(108_7-108_1) abs(108_7-108_2) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 0 0 1 0 
2 0 2 1 1 
3 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 2 0 
5 2 1 0 1 
6 2 1 1 1 
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7 2 1 3 1 
8 5 0 4 1 
9 2 0 1 1 
10 4 0 2 0 
11 2 1 3 1 
12 1 1 1 0 
13 4 1 4 1 
14 1 0 1 1 
Sum 25 9 24 9 
Table 4.9. Absolute differences between minutiae table of fingerprint 
108_7 and both minutiae tables of fingerprints 108_1, 108_2. 
 
 abs(108_7-108_3) abs(108_7-108_4) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 2 0 1 0 
2 0 2 2 2 
3 1 0 2 0 
4 0 1 2 0 
5 0 1 2 1 
6 0 0 4 1 
7 4 1 3 1 
8 3 0 2 1 
9 1 1 2 1 
10 4 0 1 2 
11 3 1 2 1 
12 2 2 0 1 
13 3 0 3 2 
14 1 1 0 2 
Sum 24 10 26 15 
Table 4.10. Absolute differences between minutiae table of fingerprint 
108_7 and both minutiae tables of fingerprints 108_3, 108_4. 
 
 abs(108_7-108_5) abs(108_7-108_6) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 1 0 0 0 
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2 0 0 0 1 
3 1 0 1 0 
4 0 1 2 1 
5 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 0 0 
7 6 2 4 1 
8 3 1 3 0 
9 2 1 1 1 
10 3 2 1 0 
11 3 0 2 1 
12 1 1 1 1 
13 2 1 1 0 
14 3 0 0 0 
Sum 27 11 17 7 
Table 4.11. Absolute differences between minutiae table of fingerprint 
108_7 and both minutiae tables of fingerprints 108_5, 108_6. 
 
 abs(108_7-108_8) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 1 0 
2 2 0 
3 1 0 
4 2 0 
5 4 2 
6 6 0 
7 0 1 
8 1 1 
9 5 0 
10 6 0 
11 9 0 
12 16 2 
13 10 0 
14 6 0 
Sum 69 6 
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Table 4.12. Absolute differences between minutiae table of fingerprint 
108_7 and minutiae table of fingerprint 108_8. 
 
4.4.3. Performance Evaluation  
 
In section 2.3.6, the recognition rate is briefly analyzed, 
where to evaluate any matching algorithm performance, 
some important quantities have to be measured such as 
[30]: 
 False NonMatch Rate (FNMR) often referred to as 
False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
 False Match Rate (FMR) often referred to as False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
 Equal Error Rate (EER) 
 ZeroFNMR  
 ZeroFMR 
 Average enroll time 
 Average match time 
 
Because the presence of the fingerprint cores and 
deltas is not guaranteed in FVC2000 since no attention was 
paid on checking the correct finger position on the sensor 
[30], and the core point detection is the first step in the 
proposed matching algorithm, another group of fingerprints 
have been captured experimentally; this group contains the 
right forefinger of 20 different persons, each is captured 
three times, having 60 different fingerprint images. They are 
numbered as follows: 101_1, 101_2, 101_3, 102_1, …., 
120_1, 120_2, 120_3.  All these fingerprints have a core 
point. This group will be tested first and then the four 
databases DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 (from FVC2000) will be 
tested afterwards. All steps used to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed algorithm are implemented and 
shown in the last M-file in Appendix B. 
 
4.4.3.1. Calculate False NonMatch Rate (FNMR) or False 
Rejection Rate (FRR) 
 
Each fingerprint template (minutiae table) Tij, i=1…20, 
j=1…3, is matched against the fingerprint images (minutiae 
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tables) of Fi, and the corresponding Genuine Matching 
Scores (GMS) are stored. The number of matches (denoted 
as NGRA – Number of Genuine Recognition Attempts [30]) is 
20  3 = 60. 
 
Now FRR(t) curve will be easily computed from GMS 
distribution for different threshold values. Given a threshold 
t, FRR(t) denotes the percentage of GMS  t. Here, because 
the input fingerprint is verified if it gives less difference 
values between corresponding minutiae tables, lower scores 
are associated with more closely matching images. This is 
the opposite of most fingerprint matching algorithms in 
fingerprint verification, where higher scores are associated 
with more closely matching images. So, the FRR(t) (or 
FNMR(t)) curve will start from the left not from the right as 
seen in Figure 2.21. Also, it is worth to be noted that the 
curve of FRR(t) will be a 2D surface (FRR(t1, t2)) because 
there are two thresholds as mentioned in previous section. 
 
For example, consider the fingerprint 101_1, or any 
slightly different version of it, is to be matched with its other 
prints 101_2, 101_3, this is considered as a genuine 
recognition attempt because they are all from the same 
fingerprint. Figure 4.7 shows the fingerprint 101_1 together 
with its enhanced thinned version where core point is shown 
in a solid circle, terminations are shown with circles, and 
bifurcations are shown with diamonds. 
 
Also, Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show fingerprints 101_2 
and 101_3 respectively together with their enhanced thinned 
versions. As an example, some noise is applied on the 
minutiae table of fingerprint 101_1, to act as a new user's 
fingerprint. Noise is a sequence of Pseudorandom integers 
from a uniform discrete distribution used to randomly select 
tracks from the minutiae table that will be changed by 
adding '1' to values under termination (or bifurcation) 
column and subtracting '1' to values under bifurcation (or 
termination) column in each selected track. The sequence of 
numbers, produced using Matlab function called "randi", is 
determined by the internal state of the uniform 
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pseudorandom number generator. The number of random 
selected tracks is a constant ratio (30%) from the overall 
number of tracks in each database. 
 
As described in Section 4.3.2, minutiae tables of 
fingerprints 101_1, 101_2, and 101_3 will be fetched from 
the database. The minimum number of rows (tracks) in all 
the minutiae tables in the database under study is found to 
be 13, so only the first 13 rows of any minutiae table are 
considered during calculations. Table 4.13 shows the first 
13 rows of minutiae table of fingerprint 101_1 together with 
the noisy version of this fingerprint.  
 
  
Figure 4.7. Fingerprint 101_1 and its enhanced thinned version. 
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Figure 4.8. Fingerprint 101_2 and its enhanced thinned version. 
  
Figure 4.9. Fingerprint 101_3 and its enhanced thinned version. 
 
Fgp 101_1 
Noisy version of Fgp 
101_1 (NFGP 101_1) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 1 2 1 2 
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2 0 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 2 
4 1 0 1 0 
5 1 1 1 1 
6 2 0 2 0 
7 1 1 0 2 
8 2 1 2 1 
9 0 0 0 0 
10 5 3 6 2 
11 2 0 2 0 
12 1 2 1 2 
13 0 1 0 1 
Table 4.13. The minutiae table of fingerprint 101_1and its noisy version. 
Table 4.14 shows the minutiae tables of fingerprints 
101_2, and 101_3. 
 
 Fgp 101_2 Fgp 101_3 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 0 0 
3 0 1 1 1 
4 1 0 0 0 
5 1 2 1 1 
6 6 0 0 0 
7 4 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0 0 
9 0 0 1 0 
10 2 1 0 1 
11 0 0 0 0 
12 0 1 0 1 
13 0 1 0 1 
Table 4.14. The minutiae tables of fgps 101_2 and 101_3. 
 
Now, the absolute differences tables are calculated and 
shown in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16. Summations of all cells 
of each column are shown in the last row. 
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 abs(N101_1-101_1) abs(N101_1-101_2) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 1 0 
3 0 1 0 1 
4 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 1 
6 0 0 4 0 
7 1 1 4 2 
8 0 0 1 1 
9 0 0 0 0 
10 1 1 4 1 
11 0 0 2 0 
12 0 0 1 1 
13 0 0 0 0 
Sum 2 3 17 8 
Table 4.15. Absolute differences between noisy version of minutiae table 
of fingerprint 101_1 and both minutiae tables of fingerprints 101_1, and 
101_2. 
 abs(N101_1-101_3) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 0 1 
2 0 0 
3 1 1 
4 1 0 
5 0 0 
6 2 0 
7 1 2 
8 2 1 
9 1 0 
10 6 1 
11 2 0 
12 1 1 
13 0 0 
Sum 17 7 
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Table 4.16. Absolute difference between noisy version of minutiae table of 
fingerprint 101_1 and minutiae table of fingerprint 101_3. 
The second step is to calculate the geometric mean of 
the sum of each of type1 and type2 absolute differences: 
 
gm1= 33.8171723  ,   
gm2= 52.57833   
 
Then, because a user is accepted if the two geometric 
means satisfy that: 
 
gm1<=threshold1(t1)  gm2<=threshold2(t2) 
 
Using Demorgan's law, the (FNMR) or false rejection 
rate will be computed as follows: 
 
NGRA
  NGMS2s  NGMS1s
),(FNMR 2121
tt
tt

  
 
Where NGMS1s is the number of genuine matching 
scores computed from gm1 values, NGMS2s is the number 
of genuine matching scores computed from gm2 values, and 
NGRA is the number of genuine recognition attempts which 
is 60. The threshold values, t1 and t2, vary from 1 to 100. 
 
The same steps are performed for the remaining 
fingerprints, all 60 instances. The previous example is 
considered as a genuine recognition attempt as the 
comparison is held between a noisy version of the first of the 
three prints and the three true versions of them fetched 
from the database.  
 
4.4.3.2. Calculate False Match Rate (FMR) or False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
 
Each fingerprint template (minutiae table) Tij, i = 1…20,  
j = 1…3 in the database is matched against the other 
fingerprint images (minutiae tables) Fk, k  i from different 
fingers and the corresponding Imposter Matching Scores ims 
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are stored. Number of Impostor Recognition Attempts is  
(20  3)  (20 - 1) = 60  19 = 1140.  
Now FAR(t1, t2) surface will be easily computed from 
IMS distribution for different threshold values. Given 
thresholds t1 and t2, FAR(t1, t2) denotes the percentage of 
IMS1s <= t1 and IMS2s<=t2. Here, because the input 
fingerprint is rejected if it gives high difference values 
between corresponding minutiae tables; higher scores are 
associated with mismatching images. This is the opposite of 
most fingerprint matching algorithms in fingerprint 
verification, where lower scores are associated with 
mismatching images. So, the FAR(t1, t2) (or FMR(t1, t2)) 
surface will start from the right not from the left as seen in 
Figure 2.21. 
 
For example, consider the noisy version of fingerprint 
101_1 is to be matched with another fingerprint like 103, 
this is considered as an imposter recognition attempt 
because they are from different fingers. Figure 4.7 shows the 
fingerprint 101_1 together with its enhanced thinned 
version. Also, Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11, and Figure 4.12 
show fingerprints 103_1, 103_2 and 103_3 respectively 
together with their enhanced thinned versions. 
 
As described in Section 4.3.2, all minutiae tables of 
fingerprints 103_1, 103_2, and 103_3 have to be fetched 
from the database. As before, because the minimum number 
of rows is 13, so only the first 13 rows of any minutiae table 
are considered during calculations. Table 4.17 shows the 
first 13 rows of minutiae table of fingerprint 103_1. 
 
Table 4.18 shows the minutiae tables of fingerprints 
103_2, 103_3. 
 
Now, the absolute differences tables are calculated and 
shown in Table 4.19 and Table 4.20, where the noisy 
minutiae table of fgp 101_1 is shown in Table 4.13.  
 
Geometric mean gm1 and gm2 are calculated as 
follows: 
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gm1= 23.211623263  ,   
gm2= 33.131313143   
  
Figure 4.10. Fingerprint 103_1 and its enhanced thinned version 
  
Figure 4.11. Fingerprint 103_2 and its enhanced thinned version. 
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Figure 4.12. Fingerprint 103_3 and its enhanced thinned version. 
Table 4.17. The minutiae tables of fgp 103_1. 
 Fgp 103_2 Fgp 103_3 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 4 1 5 0 
2 6 0 0 1 
3 2 1 0 0 
4 1 0 1 0 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 0 0 
2 2 1 
3 4 0 
4 2 3 
5 0 1 
6 0 0 
7 2 0 
8 0 0 
9 3 0 
10 1 1 
11 4 0 
12 1 1 
13 1 0 
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5 1 0 2 0 
6 1 0 5 0 
7 0 2 1 1 
8 2 0 2 0 
9 5 2 1 0 
10 3 0 3 1 
11 2 1 1 1 
12 0 4 0 0 
13 2 3 1 0 
Table 4.18. The minutiae tables of fgp 103_2 and 103_3. 
 abs(N101_1-103_1) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 minutiae # of type2 minutiae 
1 1 2 
2 2 1 
3 4 2 
4 1 3 
5 1 0 
6 2 0 
7 2 2 
8 2 1 
9 3 0 
10 5 1 
11 2 0 
12 0 1 
13 1 1 
Sum 26 14 
Table 4.19. Absolute differences between noisy minutiae table of 
fingerprint 101_1 and minutiae table of fingerprint 103_1. 
 
 abs(N101_1-103_2) abs(N101_1-103_3) 
Track 
number 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
# of type1 
minutiae 
# of type2 
minutiae 
1 3 1 4 2 
2 6 0 0 1 
3 2 1 0 2 
4 0 0 0 0 
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5 0 1 1 1 
6 1 0 3 0 
7 0 0 1 1 
8 0 1 0 1 
9 5 2 1 0 
10 3 2 3 1 
11 0 1 1 1 
12 1 2 1 2 
13 2 2 1 1 
Sum 23 13 16 13 
Table 4.20. Absolute differences between noisy minutiae table of 
fingerprint 101_1 and both minutiae tables of fingerprints 103_2, 103_3. 
The same steps are performed for the remaining 
fingerprints; all 60 instances (20 fingerprints, each having 3 
impressions) will be matched against the other 19 
fingerprints, so a total of 1140 IMSs. 
FMR(t1, t2) will be calculated as follows: 
 
NIRA
 NIMS2s NIMS1s
),FMR( 2121
tt
tt

  
 
Where NIMS1s is the number of imposter matching 
scores computed from gm1 values, NIMS2s is the number of 
imposter matching scores computed from gm2 values, and 
NIRA is the number of imposter recognition attempts which 
is 1140. The threshold values, t1 and t2, vary from 1 to 70. 
 
Both surfaces FRR(t1, t2) and FAR(t1, t2) are drawn in 
Figure 4.13. with blue and red colors respectively. The 
intersection between the two surfaces is drawn with a solid 
line used in the next section. 
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Figure 4.13. FRR and FAR surfaces where the intersection between the 
two surfaces is drawn with a solid line. 
 
 
 
4.4.3.3. Equal Error Rate EER 
 
The Equal Error Rate is computed as the point where  
FMR(t) = FNMR(t). From Figure 4.13., to determine the equal 
error rate, the intersection line between the two surfaces is 
drawn and then the minimum value of error rates along this 
line is the EER from where the values of thresholds t1 and t2 
can be determined. 
 
In Figure 4.13., it is shown that EER = 0.0179, where it 
corresponds to the threshold values of t1 = 16.92 and t2 = 
8.21, values of thresholds are not always integers because it 
is not necessary for the two surfaces to intersect at integer 
values of thresholds. 
 
EER=0.0179 
at t1=16.9, 
t2=8.2 
FRR(t1, t2) 
FAR(t1, t2) 
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Now to determine the integer values of thresholds that 
corresponds to error rates FRR and FAR, the four possible 
combinations of thresholds around the two given before are 
tested and the two values combination that gives the 
minimum difference between FRR and FAR (because EER is 
defined as the point where FRR and FAR are equal) are 
considered as the thresholds t1 and t2 that will be used for 
that database for any later fingerprint recognition operation. 
 
So, the four possible combinations that threshold 
values t1 and t2 can take are: (16, 8), (16, 9), (17, 8), and 
(17, 9). It is found by experiment that the combination (17, 
8) gives the minimum difference between FAR and FRR. So, 
when these thresholds are used in the proposed matching 
algorithm, the result is that FRR = 0.0167 and FAR = 
0.0184. 
 
True Acceptance Rate is 
TAR = 1-FAR = 1-0.0184 = 0.9816 
 
And the True Rejection Rate is 
TRR = 1-FRR = 1-0.0167 = 0.9833 
 
So, the recognition accuracy is  98% when thresholds 
values are t1 = 17 and t2 = 8. 
4.4.3.4. Chi-square Quality test 
 
Because EER is the error where false match rate equal 
false nonmatch rate chi-square test is  
X2=FMR2+FNMR2=2(EER)2 
So from Figure 4.13: 
X2=2*(0.0179)2=0.00064 
 
4.4.3.5. ZeroFMR and ZeroFNMR 
 
ZeroFMR is defined as the lowest FNMR at which no 
False Matches occur and ZeroFNMR as the lowest FMR at 
which no False Non-Matches occur[30]: 
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}.0)(FNMR  )(FMR{min)(ZeroFNMR
},0)(FMR  )(FNMR{min)ZeroFMR(


ttt
ttt
t
t
 
 
Because now the FRR(FNMR) and FAR(FMR) are drawn 
as 2D surfaces, all locations of FAR points having zero 
values are determined and the minimum value of the 
corresponding FRR values at these locations is the ZeroFAR. 
Also, to calculate the ZeroFAR value, all locations of FRR 
points having zero values are determined and the minimum 
value of the corresponding FAR values at these locations is 
the ZeroFRR. 
 
From Figure 4.13., following values are drawn: 
ZeroFMR = 0.3167 at t1 = 14 and t2 = 5, 
ZeroFRR = 0.0316  at t1 = 16 and t2 = 10. 
 
4.4.3.6. Drawing ROC curve 
 
A ROC (Receiving Operating Curve) is given where 
FNMR is plotted as a function of FMR; the curve is drawn in 
log-log scales for better comprehension[30]. 
 
To draw the curve in the positive portions of x- and y-
axis, FMR and FNMR values are multiplied by 100 before 
applying the logarithm on them. Figure 4.14 shows the ROC 
curve of the proposed matching algorithm. To get one curve, 
only one column of the FAR matrix is drawn against one 
column of the FRR matrix, after multiplying with 100 and 
applying the logarithmic on both. As can be shown, the 
recognition performance is good by comparison with the 
curve of a good recognition performance system seen in 
Figure 2.22. It is noted that the curve in Figure 4.14 is going 
to the top right portion of the plotting area whereas the good 
recognition performance curve of Figure 2.22 is going to the 
bottom left portion of the plotting area, this is because in 
the proposed matching algorithm, lower scores are 
associated with matching fingerprints and higher scores are 
associated with mismatching fingerprints. This is the 
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opposite of most fingerprint matching algorithms in 
fingerprint verification. 
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Figure 4.14. ROC curve 
 
4.4.3.7. Applying the proposed matching algorithm on 
FVC2000 
 
Applying the proposed matching algorithm and all above 
steps in previous sections on the database FVC2000, it is 
not expected to get good results comparing with the results 
obtained in the previous section. This is due to the reasons 
mentioned in section 4.3.3.  
 
Table 4.21 and Table 4.22 show the results of the 
proposed matching algorithm on FVC2000.  
 
As shown, the recognition accuracy ranges from (1-
0.2315 for DB2_B) 77% to (1 – 0.0882 for DB3_B) 91%. 
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Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 show the FRR and FAR 
surfaces at the left side and the ROC curves at the right side 
for databases DB1_A, DB1_B, DB2_A, DB2_B, DB3_A, 
DB3_B, DB4_A, and DB4_B respectively. 
Database EER t1 t2 
DB1_A 0.2109 18 6.99 
DB1_B 0.1988 31.68 10 
DB2_A 0.1649 18.48 8 
DB2_B 0.2315 24.096 14 
DB3_A 0.1454 28 12.55 
DB3_B 0.0882 28 12.85 
DB4_A 0.1815 10 4.88998 
DB4_B 0.1206 14.35 9 
Table 4.21. Results of EER and its corresponding thresholds after 
applying the proposed matching algorithm on FVC2000 
Table 4.22. Results of FAR and FRR and their corresponding thresholds 
after applying the proposed matching algorithm on FVC2000 
Database FAR FRR t1 t2 
DB1_A 0.2113 0.2105 18 7 
DB1_B 0.2049 0.1944 32 10 
DB2_A 0.1835 0.15 18 9 
DB2_B 0.2403 0.2375 24 15 
DB3_A 0.1325 0.1525 29 12 
DB3_B 0.0944 0.075 28 13 
DB4_A 0.1844 0.1788 10 5 
DB4_B 0.1153 0.125 14 10 
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Figure 4.15. FAR, FRR and ROC curves for DB1_A, DB1_B, DB2_A, and 
DB2_B respectively. 
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Figure 4.16. FAR, FRR and ROC curves for DB3_A, DB3_B, DB4_A, and 
DB4_B respectively. 
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4.4.3.8. Calculating average enroll time 
 
The average enroll time is calculated as the average 
CPU time taken by a single enrollment operation [30]. 
 
The steps of enrollment are discussed in section 4.3.1. 
Table 4.23 shows a detailed timing for each step in the 
enrollment phase. These results were implemented using 
MATLAB version 7.9.0529 (R2009b) as the programming 
platform. Programs were tested on a 2.00GHz personal 
computer with 1.99 GB of RAM. 
 
Total enroll time is found to be 6.043 sec 
  
Step Average time taken (sec) 
Enhancement of the fingerprint 3.7 
Core point detection 0.54 
Thinning and minutiae extraction 1.8 
Minutiae table construction 0.003 
Total enroll time 6.043 
Table 4.23. Enroll timing details 
 
4.4.3.9. Calculating average match time 
 
The average match time is calculated as the average 
CPU time taken by a single match operation between a 
template and a fingerprint image [30]. 
 
The steps of matching are discussed in section 4.3.2. 
Table 4.24 shows a detailed timing for each step in the 
matching phase after the construction of the minutiae table 
corresponding to the input fingerprint, which has been 
already estimated to be 6.043sec from section 4.3.3.7. 
 
Total match time is found to be 0.00134 sec 
  
Step Average time taken (sec) 
Get all minutiae tables of the 
claimed fingerprint stored in the 
0.0011 
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database 
Calculate absolute differences 
between the input fgp minutiae 
table and all minutiae tables 
obtained from the previous step 
and get the two geometric means 
0.0002 
Compare the resulting means 
with the two thresholds and 
decide if the user is accepted or 
rejected 
0.00004 
Total match time 0.00134 
Table 4.24. Match timing details 
 
4.4.4. Comparison with Whuzhili method 
 
Comparing the results obtained from the proposed 
matching method with whuzhili matching method 
(reference), shows that the proposed method is more 
efficient. 
 
 Proposed Whuzhili 
EER 0.0179 0.25 
X2 0.00064 0.125 
Match time 0.00134sec 1.17sec 
Data storage 21bytes 85bytes 
Translation and 
rotation invariant 
Yes No 
Comparison between proposed and whuzhili matching 
methods 
 
4.4.5. Conclusion 
 
As shown, the time for matching is extremely small as 
all the process is taking geometric mean of absolute 
differences. 
 
There is no need for any pre-alignment which is a very 
complicated and time consuming process. As a result, it is 
translation and rotation invariant. 
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Also, the space needed to store any minutiae table is in 
the average = 21(as the average number of tracks in all 
database)  2  4 = 168bits = 168/8bytes = 21bytes which is 
small in comparison with the size of 85 bytes as in [62] 
where the tradition method is storing locations and 
orientation for each minutia as a tuple <x, y, >. 
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Chapter 5  
Securing Fingerprint Systems 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Consider that a facility is secured with a lock. Usually, 
the sturdier the lock, the higher is the perceived level of 
security. However, even if a facility is equipped with the 
strongest possible lock, it is not absolutely certain that the 
facility cannot be broken into [26]. 
 
This is not to say that a system designer should not try 
her best to guard against all possible security threats. What 
it implies is that the type of security needed depends upon 
the requirements of the application. A threat model for an 
application can be defined based on what needs to be 
protected and from whom. 
 
The typical threats in an application may include the 
following [26]: 
  
 Denial of service (DoS): An adversary damages the system 
such that legitimate users can no longer access the 
system.  
 Circumvention: An unauthorized user illegitimately gains 
access to the system and data. Circumvention could 
either be a privacy attack or a subversive attack. In a 
privacy attack, the intruder gets access to data that he 
may not be authorized to access. In a subversive attack, 
an intruder may manipulate the system to use it for 
illegal activities. For example, an intruder may break into 
a person's bank account and withdraw/transfer all the 
money.  
 Repudiation: A legitimate user denies having accessed 
the system. 
 Contamination or covert acquisition: It is possible that 
the means of recognition could be compromised without 
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the knowledge of a legitimate user and be subsequently 
abused. 
 Collusion: In any application, some users of the system 
will have a super-user status that allows them to bypass 
the recognition component and to overrule the decision 
made by the system. This facility is incorporated in the 
system workflow to permit handling of exceptional 
situations, for example, processing of individuals with no 
fingers in a fingerprint-based recognition system. This 
could potentially lead to an abuse of the system by way of 
collusion between the super-users and the other users.  
 Coercion: The genuine users could be potentially coerced 
(forced) to identify themselves to the system. The 
recognition measurements could be forcibly extracted 
from a genuine user to gain access to the system with 
concomitant privileges.  
 
5.2. Points of Attack  
 
Many of the possible attacks in fingerprint recognition 
systems were identified and systematically documented by 
Bolle, Connell, and Ratha [63]. A number of other types of 
attack points have been documented by Anderson [64] and 
Schneier [65]. Anderson studied the technical aspect of 
fraud involved in using ATMs and found that most of the 
failures were due to poor design and administration. 
Schneier pointed out a number of system vulnerabilities due 
to errors in design, implementation, and installation. Figure 
5.1 shows the major modules and the dataflow paths in a 
fingerprint verification system. The eight potential attack 
points are also marked in Figure 5.1 and are elaborated 
below. 
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Figure 5.1. The design of a fingerprint verification system is shown to 
illustrate the possible security attack points which are marked with 
numbers from 1 to 8. 
 
1. Attack at the scanner, 
2. Attack on the channel between the scanner and the 
feature extractor, 
3. Attack on the feature extraction module, 
4. Attack on the channel between the scanner and the 
feature extractor and the matcher module, 
5. Attack on the matcher module, 
6. Attack on the system database, 
7. Attack on the channel between the system database 
and matcher module, and 
8. Attack on the channel between the matcher module 
and the application requesting verification. 
 
Attacks 2, 4, 7, and 8 are launched against 
communication channels; they are similar in nature and can 
be collectively called "replay" attacks. The attacks 1, 3, 5, 
and 6 are launched against system modules; they are also 
similar in nature and can be collectively called "Trojan 
horse" attacks. Furthermore, the replay attacks are similar 
to those present in token- and knowledge-based 
authentication systems whereas the fake finger attack is 
unique to the fingerprint recognition system. 
 
5.3. Trojan Horse Attacks 
 
A Trojan horse attack can be launched at the scanner 
(e.g., a sensor emulator), feature extractor, matcher, or the 
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system database. These attacks are launched against 
"entities." A Trojan horse program can disguise itself as one 
or more of these modules and generate false results (such as 
a fingerprint image, a fingerprint template, or a matching 
score). A Trojan horse attack at the feature extractor (see 
Figure 5.2) is almost the same as the attack on the system 
database and very similar to the attacks at the scanner and 
matcher. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. A Trojan horse attack against the feature extraction module is 
shown.  
 
First of all, it is extremely important that the feature 
extraction, matcher, and system database reside at a secure 
and trusted location. Furthermore, the fingerprint scanner 
should be trustworthy and have some security capability 
(such as encryption) built into it. The trust between the 
scanner and the server should be established both ways 
(i.e., server trusts the scanner and the scanner trusts the 
server). In a remote recognition application, a client cannot 
always be trusted and it only acts as a medium that passes 
the encrypted fingerprint image from the scanner to the 
server for feature extraction and matching. A two-way 
mutual trust is established when the scanner authenticates 
the server and the server authenticates the scanner that is 
necessary in a network environment. 
 
Smartcards have received much attention from 
developers/integrators of fingerprint recognition systems 
because of their internally protected storage and 
computational resources. In fact, embedding a fingerprint 
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recognition system inside a smartcard is an effective way to 
prevent unauthorized users from installing Trojan horses 
and to avoid eavesdropping of critical information in transit. 
Although an entire fingerprint recognition system can be 
implemented onto a smartcard (including sensing element, 
feature extraction, matching and template database), most 
of the solutions proposed to date implement only some parts 
of the recognition system "on-card," due to the limited 
computational power of the onboard CPU. 
 
5.4. Replay Attacks  
 
In addition to safeguarding a fingerprint recognition 
system against fake finger attacks and Trojan horse attacks, 
protection against any replay attack is required to ensure 
data integrity and non-repudiation. The integrity of the data 
transmission must be secure all the way from the scanner to 
the application. This is typically achieved by cryptographic 
methods. In particular, encryption, digital signature, and 
challenge-response provide sufficient security for data 
integrity, non-repudiation, and replay attacks, respectively. 
Appendix D gives a brief description of both encryption, 
digital signatures, timestamp and challenge-response. In the 
next section, an introduction to digital watermarking is 
given. 
 
5.4.1. Digitally watermarking fingerprint 
images/features 
 
A few image-based techniques similar to digital 
signatures (where the key is constant) and challenge-
response (when a different key is sent by the server before 
each verification) have also been proposed specifically for 
fingerprints. Digital watermarking [66] is a technique that 
hides a secret digital pattern (called a digital watermark) in a 
digital image or data. A digital watermark may be visible or 
invisible. In a visible watermark, a visible pattern or image is 
embedded in the original image, but the invisible watermark 
does not change the visual appearance of the image. The 
existence of an invisible watermark can be determined only 
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through a watermark extraction or detection algorithm. 
Furthermore, a digital watermarking algorithm may be 
robust (the watermark can withstand attacks such as 
compression and enhancement of an image) or fragile (the 
watermark is "broken" under the slightest change to the 
image). Typically, robust watermarking is used for copyright 
protection and fragile watermarking is used for data 
integrity. 
 
Many watermarking techniques for gray scale and color 
images are studied and implemented in [67], also two 
different watermarking algorithms are proposed and 
implemented using MATLAB. 
 
A general watermarking algorithm includes the 
following two parts: one is watermark embedding, the other 
is watermark extraction [67]. 
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the general embedding process. 
Given the code function, we can get the watermarked image. 
The general detection process is depicted in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. General watermark embedding process. 
 
 
 
Watermark 
Original 
Image 
User Key 
Embedding 
Algorithm 
Watermarked 
Image 
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Figure 5.4. General watermark detection process. 
 
Given the original image or watermark, the questioned 
image and the key, the watermark or some confidence 
measure can be obtained which indicates how likely it is for 
a given mark at the input to be present in the image under 
inspection. This kind of scheme is the simplest and most 
popular frame. Some other techniques do not need the 
original image to extract the watermark; these are called 
"blind" methods. 
 
5.5. Previous work 
 
Many watermarking techniques are applied to secure 
communication channels in fingerprint recognition systems, 
attacks number 2, 4, 7, and 8 in Figure 5.1. 
 
In [68], the inherent strengths of biometrics-based 
authentication are outlined, the weak links in systems 
employing biometrics-based authentication are identified, 
and new solutions for eliminating some of these weak links 
are presented. 
 
In  [62],  an application of steganography and 
watermarking is introduced to enable secure biometric data 
(e.g., fingerprints) exchange. They hide fingerprint minutiae 
data in a host image, which can be a synthetic fingerprint 
image, a face image or an arbitrary image. It is this carrier 
Watermark or 
Original Image 
Test Image 
User Key 
Detection 
Algorithm 
Watermark 
or 
Confidence 
Measure 
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image that is transferred to the receiving party in this 
exchange, instead of the actual minutiae data. The hidden 
biometric data are extracted accurately from the carrier 
image using a secret key. Furthermore, when the host is a 
face image, this method provides an additional cue in 
authenticating the user. Data are hidden in the host image 
in an adaptive way to minimize possible degradations to that 
image. The proposed method can also tolerate several 
attacks on the carrier image. 
 
In [69], two spatial methods are introduced in order to 
embed watermark data into fingerprint images, without 
corrupting their features. The first method inserts 
watermark data after feature extraction, thus preventing 
watermarking of regions used for fingerprint classification. 
The method utilizes an image adaptive strength adjustment 
technique which results in watermarks with low visibility. 
The second method introduces a feature adaptive 
watermarking technique for fingerprints, thus applicable 
before feature extraction. For both of the methods, decoding 
does not require original fingerprint image. Unlike most of 
the published spatial watermarking methods, the proposed 
methods provide high decoding accuracy for fingerprint 
images. High data hiding and decoding performance for 
color images is also observed. 
 
In [70], an application of wavelet-based watermarking 
method to hide the fingerprint minutiae data in fingerprint 
images is introduced. The application provides a high 
security to both hidden data (i.e. fingerprint minutiae) that 
have to be transmitted and the host image (i.e. fingerprint). 
The original unmarked fingerprint image is not required to 
extract the minutiae data. The method is essentially 
introduced to increase the security of fingerprint minutiae 
transmission and can also used to protect the original 
fingerprint image. 
 
In [71], a scheme based on the fingerprint watermark is 
proposed, and they tried to introduce biometrics in the 
watermark system. They integrated the digital watermarking 
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technology with the fingerprint identification technology. 
The scheme depends upon the spatial domain, and DCT 
domain of multi-bits embedded watermark methods to 
embed and extract the information of the fingerprint 
characteristic. The experiment has showed that their 
scheme is feasible and effective. 
 
In [72], two techniques that protects fingerprint 
biometric data are considered using digital watermarking 
techniques. Both techniques discussed are based on 
Discrete Wavelet Transformation (DWT). From experimental 
results, it can be concluded that both techniques provide 
adequate security to the fingerprint data without degrading 
visual quality. Further, the verification performance after 
dewatermarking is also analyzed. 
 
Most of the above approaches are based on the 
secrecy/obscurity of the algorithms; security based on 
obscurity is weak and often unsustainable. While standard 
cryptographic techniques have been proven to be secure in 
an information-theoretic sense, the security of 
watermarking, obfuscation, and other similar techniques 
that have been specifically designed for fingerprint images 
have not been shown to possess proven security. So it is 
debatable whether they provide any benefits over standard 
cryptographic techniques in preventing injection of 
fingerprint data into the communication channel [1].  
 
5.6. Application of watermarking on fingerprint 
recognition systems 
 
In this section, the watermarking technique used in 
[62] will be described and enhanced. 
 
5.6.1. Data hiding method 
 
The amplitude modulation-based watermarking method 
described in [62] is an extension of the blue channel 
watermarking method of Kutter et al. [73]. The used method 
includes image adaptivity and watermark strength controller 
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along with the basic method in [73]. An earlier version of the 
method is presented in [16], in which the increase in data 
decoding accuracy related to these extensions is analyzed. 
 
For watermark embedding, the minutiae data to be 
hidden is first converted into a bit stream. Every field of 
individual minutia is converted to a 9-bit binary 
representation. Such a representation can code integers 
between [0, 511] and this range is adequate for x-coordinate 
([0, #rows-1]), y-coordinate ([0, #columns-1]) and orientation 
([0, 359]) of a minutia. A random number generator 
initialized with the secret key generates locations of the host 
image pixels to be watermarked. 
 
These pixels are changed according to the following 
equation: 
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where PWM(i, j) and P(i, j) are values of the watermarked and 
original pixels at location (i, j), respectively. The value of 
watermark bit is denoted as s and watermark embedding 
strength is denoted as q, s ∈  [0, 1], q >0. PAV(i, j) and PSD(i, j) 
denote the average and standard deviation of pixel values in 
a neighborhood of location (i, j) and PGM denotes the gradient 
magnitude at (i, j). A and B are weights for the standard 
deviation and gradient magnitude, respectively. 
 
PAV is calculated in a 55 square neighborhood and PSD 
is calculated in a 55 cross-shaped neighborhood. The 
gradient magnitude is computed via the 33 Sobel operator 
[5]. These image adaptivity terms adjust the magnitude of 
watermarking, by utilizing several properties of the human 
visual system (HVS). Using PAV(i, j) in modulating watermark 
magnitude conforms to amplitude nonlinearity of HVS. As 
Equation (5.1) shows, the magnitude of the change in the 
value of pixel (i, j) caused by watermarking is higher when 
the PAV(i, j) value is high. Standard deviation and gradient 
magnitude terms utilize contrast/texture masking 
properties of HVS. Masking is the reduction of the visibility 
of an image component (masked signal) due to the presence 
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of another component [74]. The changes in pixel values in 
highly textured and high contrast image areas are masked 
more strongly than changes in smooth image areas. These 
image adaptivity terms increase the magnitude of 
watermarking in image areas where such an increase does 
not become very visible to a human observer. This leads to 
more accurate decoding of the hidden data, especially in the 
case of attacks on host images. 
 
Every watermark bit with value s in Equation (5.1) is 
embedded at multiple locations (depends on no. of 
embedding locations and the size of the watermark) in the 
host image. This redundancy increases the correct decoding 
rate of the embedded information. The amount of this 
redundancy is limited by image capacity (size) and visibility 
of the changes in pixel values. 
 
In addition to the binary minutiae data, two reference 
bits, 0 and 1, are also embedded in the image. These 
reference bits help in calculating an adaptive threshold to 
determine the minutiae bit values during extraction. 
 
Watermark extraction starts with finding the data 
embedding locations in the watermarked image, via the 
secret key used during the watermark encoding stage. For 
every bit embedding location, (i, j), its value is estimated as 
the linear combination of pixel values in a 55 cross-shaped 
neighborhood of the watermarked pixels as in Equation 
(5.2). 
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The difference between the estimated and watermarked 
pixel values is calculated by Equation (5.3) as 
 
),(ˆ),( jiPjiPW M       (5.3) 
 
These differences are averaged over all the embedding 
locations associated with the same bit, to yield . For 
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finding an adaptive threshold, these averages are calculated 
separately for the reference bits, 0 and 1, as 
0R  and 1R , 
respectively. Finally, the watermark bit value sˆ  is estimated 
as 
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The watermark extraction process can produce 
erroneous bits since extraction is based on an estimation 
procedure, which may fail to find the exact original pixel 
values. In order to increase the extraction accuracy, the 
embedding uses a controller block. This block adjusts the 
strength of watermarking, q, on a pixel-by-pixel basis, if 
there is a possibility of incorrect bit extraction. From 
extracted watermark bits, the minutiae data hidden in the 
host image is extracted. In the second application scenario, 
which typically includes a smart card containing a digital 
fingerprint image marked with the minutiae data of the 
fingerprint depicted in this image, an estimate of the original 
fingerprint image is also found via replacing the 
watermarked pixel values with the ),(ˆ jiP estimate calculated 
by Equation (5.2). 
 
As shown, the watermark extraction method did not 
refer to the original image, i.e. it is a blind watermarking 
algorithm. 
 
5.6.2. The proposed watermarking method 
 
Some modifications have been applied on the data 
hiding method used in [62] and described in section 5.6.1 
above. These modifications are as follows: 
 
1. Instead of using one key for determining embedding 
locations in the host image, two keys are used to 
increase the security level: the first key is used for the 
same purpose, i.e. for determining the embedding 
locations; the second key is used to permutate the 
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watermark before using it for embedding. Both keys are 
used as a seed for a random number generator. 
2. The host image used for embedding was the face of the 
user in the method in [62], whereas the host image in 
the proposed method will be the fingerprint of the user. 
3. The watermark in the previous method was the 
minutiae data tuples; i.e. <x, y, θ> of each minutia, now 
the watermark will be the minutiae table, which have 
been described in the proposed matching algorithm in 
Chapter 4, where the minutiae table was a table of two 
columns: the number of terminations minutiae existed 
in each track around the core point is recorded in the 
first column and the number of bifurcation minutiae 
existed in each track around the core point is recorded 
in the second column. 
 
5.6.2.1. Watermark embedding algorithm 
 
Figure 5.5 shows a flowchart of the proposed 
watermark embedding algorithm. In the following, a detailed 
explanation of the steps of the algorithm is given. The 
database used in matching in Chapter 4 is the same used in 
this section also. 
 
First of all, the watermark signal must be ready to be 
embedded in the fingerprint image. As mentioned, the 
minutiae table will be used as the watermark signal. So, the 
minutiae table is converted to a bit stream. By seeking the 
maximum value of minutiae number at any cell in the table 
to know how many binary digits are needed for representing 
it, it is found to be "12" in the database under study. So, 4 
binary digits are enough to represent any number in the 
minutiae table. Now watermark embedding steps can start 
as follows: 
1. Every field in the minutiae table is converted to a 4-bit 
binary representation.  
2. In addition to the binary minutiae table, two reference 
bits, 0 and 1, are appended to the watermark data to 
be embedded in the image. 
3. Permute the watermark bits using a secret key k1. 
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Figure 5.5. Proposed watermark embedding algorithm 
Convert the minutiae table 
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Get the fingerprint 
image  
Determine the locations of 
embedding by a PRNG using 
a secret key k2 as a seed   
 
For each pixels of the image, 
compute PAV, PSD, and PGM 
 
Compute the number of repetitions of 
each bit s of the watermark 
Obtain the watermarked 
image 
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4. A random number generator initialized with secret key 
k2 generates locations of the fingerprint image pixels 
to be watermarked. 
5. These pixels are changed according to Equation (5.1). 
6. Every watermark bit with value s in Equation (5.1) is 
embedded at multiple locations in the fingerprint 
image. 
 
5.6.2.2. Watermark extraction algorithm 
 
Figure 5.6 shows a flowchart of the watermark 
extraction algorithm. In the following, the steps of the 
algorithm are given. 
 
1. Extraction starts with finding the data embedding 
locations in the watermarked image, via the secret key 
k2 used during the watermark embedding stage. 
2. For every bit embedding location, (i, j), its value is 
estimated as the linear combination of pixel values in 
a 55 cross-shaped neighborhood of the watermarked 
pixels as in Equation (5.2). 
3. The difference between the estimated and 
watermarked pixel values is calculated by Equation 
(5.3). 
4. These differences are averaged over all the embedding 
locations associated with the same bit, to yield  . 
5. For finding an adaptive threshold, these averages are 
calculated separately for the reference bits, 0 and 1, 
as 0R  and 1R , respectively. 
6. Finally, the watermark bit value sˆ  is estimated as 
Equation (5.4). 
7. Inverse permute the resulted watermark bits to obtain 
the true watermark bits using the secret key k1.  
 
Both watermark embedding and extraction algorithms 
are implemented using MATLAB as shown in Appendix E. 
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Figure 5.6. Watermark extraction algorithm 
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5.6.3. Implementation of the proposed 
watermarking algorithm 
 
Using the database used before for matching in 
Chapter 4, fingerprint 101_1, shown in Figure 5.7, will be 
watermarked by its minutiae table, and then the watermark 
will be extracted from the watermarked fingerprint again 
without the need of the original fingerprint. 
 
5.6.3.1. Implementation of watermark embedding 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.6.2, the first step is to 
convert the minutiae table into a bit stream. Because the 
max number is "12" in all minutiae tables in the database 
under study, 4 binary digits are adequate to represent these 
numbers. So, minutiae table of fingerprint 101_1, shown in 
Table 5.1, will be converted into its binary representation as 
shown in Table 5.2.  
 
Append two bits 0, and 1 to the watermark signal to be 
used as a reference bits helping in calculating an adaptive 
threshold in determining the minutiae bit values during 
watermark extraction. 
 
The secret key K1 is used as a seed to initialize a 
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) to generate a 
random range of numbers (where its minimum value is one 
and maximum value is the length of watermark signal) to 
scramble (permute) the watermark bits. The hidden data 
size is approximately 238=23 bytes, whereas in the method 
in [62], it was 85 bytes (25 minutiae in average for each 
fingerprint times 9-bit for each of x, y, and θ fields per 
minutia = 25  9  3 = 675, so the size is 675/8  85 bytes). 
 
Now, the watermark signal is ready to be used. Then 
taking the fingerprint having this minutiae table to be 
watermarked, the second secret key k2 is used as a seed to 
initialize a PRNG to generate locations of the fingerprint 
image to be watermarked. The exact value of the keys does 
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not affect the performance of the method. This is to enhance 
the security issue of the watermarking method.  
 
By using a density parameter , the probability of any 
single pixel being used for embedding can be given. This 
value thus lies between 0 and 1, where 0 means that no 
information is embedded and 1 means that information is 
embedded in every pixel. If the number of pixels used for 
embedding is N, we have: 
 
N=   total number of pixels in the image [73]. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Fingerprint image 101_1 
 
Track no. #Type1 #Type2 
1 1 2 
2 0 0 
3 0 1 
4 1 0 
5 1 1 
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6 2 0 
7 1 1 
8 2 1 
9 0 0 
10 5 3 
11 2 0 
12 1 2 
13 0 1 
14 0 0 
15 1 0 
16 0 1 
17 0 0 
18 0 0 
19 1 1 
20 1 0 
21 1 0 
22 0 1 
23 1 1 
Table 5.1. Minutiae table of fingerprint 101_1 
 
#Type1 #Type2 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Table 5.2. Binary representation of minutiae table of fingerprint 101_1. 
 
The locations for embedding are determined as follows: 
for each pixel of the image, a pseudo-random number x is 
generated. If x is smaller than , then information is 
embedded into the pixel. Otherwise the pixel is left intact. 
The value of  used is 0.18 in experiments [62], as this value 
is limited by visibility of the changes in pixel values. 
 
These pixels are changed using Equation (5.1), where 
the values of q, A, and B are as follows [62]: q=0.1, A=100, 
and B=1000. A higher q value increases the visibility of the 
hidden data. Increasing A or B decreases the effect of 
standard deviation and gradient magnitude in modulating 
watermark embedding strength, respectively. 
 
Every watermark bit will be embedded at multiple 
locations in the fingerprint image.  This repetition of each bit 
in the watermark signal increases the correct extraction rate 
of the embedded information. The repetition number of each 
watermark bit depends on the image capacity (size) and the 
size of the watermark and is calculated as follows: 
No. of repetitions = N / watermark length  80. 
 
A post-processing step includes eliminating the 
dominance of white background, and replacing this 
background with a uniform gray level distribution between 
[225, 235], with a mean of 230. This background 
transformation helps in hiding the minutiae data more 
invisibly. 
 
The result of the watermark embedding algorithm is 
shown in Figure 5.8, where as shown, the watermark 
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invisibility requirement is achieved. The time taken to 
perform the watermark embedding algorithm was 12.5 sec. 
 
Using the following similarity equation to compare 
between two vectors X and X* [75]: 
**
*
*),(
XXXX
XX
XXSim


   (5.5) 
where X and X* can represent the original and the 
watermarked fingerprint images respectively, and the 
operator (.) means the dot product. It is used as when both 
X and X* are typical the value estimated will reach 1, then 
the result value is multiplied by 100, which gives a good 
indication of how both  X and X* are similar to each other. 
 
It is found that the similarity between the original and 
the watermarked image is equal to 99.81%. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Fingerprint 101_1 after watermarking 
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5.6.3.2. Implementation of watermark extraction 
 
The same secret key k2 used during watermark 
embedding is now used to find the data embedding locations 
in the watermarked image.  
 
For every bit embedding location, (i, j), its value is 
predicted as the linear combination of pixel values in a 5  5 
neighborhood of the watermarked pixels as in Equation 
(5.2). 
 
The difference between the estimated and watermarked 
pixel values is calculated by Equation (5.3). These 
differences are averaged over all embedding locations 
associated with the same bit, to yield  . 
 
Using the secret key k1 used in watermark embedding, 
to generate the same sequence of permutation numbers to 
know the locations of previously appended two bits 0 and 1. 
Now, separately calculate the averages 
0R  and 1R  for the 
reference bits, 0 and 1 respectively to find an adaptive 
threshold  
2
10 RRth
 
 =0.0035 in our experiment 
Finally, the watermark bit value sˆ  is estimated as 
Equation (5.4). Then, inverse permute the resulted 
watermark bits to obtain the true watermark bits using the 
secret key k1.  
 
The time taken to perform extraction was 0.9 sec. The 
similarity between the extracted watermark and the original 
watermark is 100%, i.e. the extracted minutiae table is 
identical to the embedded data. 
 
To see how well the adaptive threshold can separate 
zero bits from one bits, Figure 5.9 shows the extracted 
watermark signal, where bits having  above the adaptive 
threshold are considered one bits, and bits having  below 
the adaptive threshold are considered zero bits. 
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Figure 5.9. Extracted Watermark representing the minutiae table of fgp 
101_1.  
 
Also, an estimate of the original fingerprint image is 
also found by replacing the watermarked pixel values with 
the ),(ˆ jiP  estimate calculated by Equation (5.2). The 
similarity between the reconstructed fingerprint image and 
the original fingerprint image was= 98.96%. Figure 5.10 
shows the reconstructed fingerprint image from its 
watermarked version. 
 
Watermark embedding is implemented on the entire 
database and Table 5.3 shows a sample of the results of 
these experiments, where EmbT stands for the embedding 
time, ExtT stands for the extraction time, OW stands for 
original watermark, EW stands for Extracted watermark, WI 
stands for watermarked image, OI stands for original image, 
and RCI stands for reconstructed image. 
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Fgp No.of 
Tracks 
EmbT 
sec 
ExtT 
sec 
Similarity 
WI and 
OI 
Similarity 
EW and 
OW 
Similarity 
RCI and 
OI 
101_1 23 12.12 1.77 99.81 100 98.96 
101_2 27 12.98 1.3 99.83 100 99.09 
101_3 30 12.77 1.3 99.82 100 99 
102_1 19 15.4 1.48 99.85 100 99.52 
Table 5.3. The results of applying watermarking algorithm on fingerprints 
101_1, 101_2, 101_3, and 102_1. 
 
5.6.4. Applications of fingerprint watermarking 
 
Two applications are considered in this section, the 
basic watermarking method is the same in both of 
applications, but it differs in the characteristics of the host 
image carrying the minutiae table and the medium of data 
transfer. Each application will be described in the following 
two subsections. 
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Figure 5.10. Reconstructed fingerprint image from its watermarked 
version using Equation (5.2). 
5.6.4.1. Application #1: Steganography based minutiae 
hiding 
 
The first application scenario involves a steganography-
based application (see Figure 5.11): the data (fingerprint 
minutiae table) that need to be transmitted (possibly via a 
non-secure communication channel) is hidden in a host 
(i.e., cover) image, whose only function is to carry the data. 
The host image is the fingerprint having this minutiae table. 
Using such a fingerprint image to carry fingerprint minutiae 
table provides an increased level of security since a person 
who intercepts the communication channel and obtains the 
carrier image (fingerprint image) would treat this image as if 
it does not contain any hidden data. 
 
This application can be used to counter the attack on 
the communication channel between the database and the 
fingerprint matcher. An attacker will most probably not 
suspect that a cover image is carrying the minutiae 
information. 
 
Two secret keys are utilized in watermark embedding to 
increase the security of the hidden data (see Figure 5.11). 
The image with embedded data (watermarked image) is sent 
through the channel that may be subject to interceptions. At 
the extraction site, using the same keys that were used by 
the embedding method (which can be delivered to the 
decoder using a secure channel prior to watermarked image 
transfer), the hidden data is recovered from the 
watermarked image. 
 
So, this application can be used to guarantee secure 
transmission of acquired fingerprint images from 
intelligence agencies to a central image database. 
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Figure 5.11. Steganography-based minutiae hiding. 
 
Also, it can be used to eliminate several types of 
biometric system attacks described in [76] such as: 
 
 A user who succeeds in inserting a new template into 
the database will not be authenticated at the access 
site since this new template will not contain the 
minutiae data. 
 
 Fraud detection in fingerprint images by means of 
fragile watermarks (which do not resist to any 
operations on the data and get lost, thus indicating 
possible tampering of the data) [70]. 
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5.6.4.2. Application #2: Minutiae hiding for fingerprint 
verification 
 
The second application scenario aims at increasing the 
security of fingerprint images. In this scenario, a person’s 
fingerprint image, which also carries that person’s 
fingerprint minutiae data, is encoded in a smart card (see 
Figure 5.12). At a controlled access site, this image will be 
read from the smart card and the original fingerprint image 
will be reconstructed. The extracted minutiae table will be 
compared to the minutiae obtained from the user at the 
access site. These two minutiae data sets and the 
reconstructed fingerprint image will be used to accept or 
reject the user.  
 
This application can be used to eliminate other types of 
biometric system attacks such as: 
 
 Fake biometric submission via a smart card that 
contains a non-authentic image will be useless since 
that image will not contain the true minutiae data. 
 
 Resubmission of digitally stored biometrics data (e.g., 
via a stolen but authentic smart card) will not be 
feasible since the system authenticates every user by 
using this data along with the minutiae data obtained 
online at a controlled access site. 
 
5.6.5. Watermark robustness analysis 
 
Watermarked fingerprints are susceptible to other types of 
unintentional attacks such as Gaussian noise addition, 
JPEG compression,  and different types of filtering such as 
median filtering, trimmed mean filtering, and Wiener 
filtering. A brief discussion of some of these attacks is given 
in the following subsections. To apply these attacks and 
many other types, a MATLAB source code is available at 
[77]. 
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Figure 5.12. Minutiae hiding for fingerprint verification 
JPEG Compression 
 
JPEG (pronounced "jay-peg") is a standardized image 
compression mechanism. JPEG stands for Joint 
Photographic Experts Group, the original name of the 
committee that wrote the standard [78]. 
 
JPEG is designed for compressing full-color or gray-
scale images of natural, real-world scenes. It works well on 
photographs, naturalistic artwork, and similar material, and 
not so well on lettering, simple cartoons, or line drawings.  
JPEG handles only still images, but there is a related 
standard called MPEG for motion pictures. 
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JPEG is "lossy", meaning that the decompressed image 
isn't quite the same as the original one. There are lossless 
image compression algorithms, but JPEG achieves much 
greater compression than is possible with lossless methods. 
JPEG is designed to exploit known limitations of the human 
eye, notably the fact that small color changes are perceived 
less accurately than small changes in brightness.   
 
Median filtering 
 
Smoothing filters are used for blurring and for noise 
reduction. Blurring is used in preprocessing steps, such as 
removal of small details from an image prior to (large) object 
extraction, and bridging of small gaps in lines or curves. 
Noise reduction can be accomplished by blurring with a 
linear filter and also by nonlinear filtering [5]. 
 
When the objective is to achieve noise reduction rather 
than blurring, an approach called median filters is used. 
That is, the gray level of each pixel is replaced by the 
median of the gray levels in a neighborhood of that pixel. 
This method is particularly effective when the noise pattern 
consists of strong, spikelike components and the 
characteristic to be preserved is edge sharpness. The 
median m of a set of values is such that half the values in 
the set are less than m and half are greater than m. In order 
to perform median filtering in a neighborhood of a pixel, the 
values of the pixel and its neighbors are first sort, the 
median is determined, and this value is assigned to the 
pixel. 
 
Trimmed Mean Filtering 
 
It is both an order and a mean filter because it relies on 
ordering the pixel values, but then is calculated by an 
averaging process. The trimmed mean filter is the average of 
the pixel values within the window, but with some of the 
endpoint-ranked values excluded. This filter is useful for 
images containing multiple types of noise, such as gaussian 
and salt-and-pepper noise. So, the trimmed mean filter uses 
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order statistics such as the median filter but produces the 
trimmed version of the mean centered about the median 
point [79]. 
 
Wiener Filtering 
 
The Wiener filter is the MSE-optimal stationary linear 
filter for images degraded by additive noise and blurring. 
Calculation of the Wiener filter requires the assumption that 
the signal and noise processes are second-order stationary. 
Wiener filters are usually applied in the frequency domain 
[5]. 
To study the effect of these image processing 
techniques, the watermarked images are to be processed 
with those techniques, and then the extracted watermarks 
are to be tested if they are robust (still valuable) or not 
against those attacks. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the similarity values between the 
original watermarks (minutiae tables) and the extracted 
watermarks from the watermarked fingerprint images 
101_1, 101_2, and 101_3 after applying the previous 
attacks. As shown from Table 5.4, the watermark is robust 
against Gaussian noise addition, JPEG compression, and 
Wiener filtering, whereas it is not robust against median and 
trimmed mean filtering. 
Table 5.4. Similarity values between original and extracted watermarks 
for different fingerprint images. 
Applied attack Fgp101_1 Fgp101_2 Fgp101_3 
No Attack 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Gaussian noise 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Jpegcompression_100 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Jpegcompression_80 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Jpegcompression_60 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Jpegcompression_40 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Jpegcompression_25 95.20 100.00 96.08 
Median filter 56.45 79.24 48.18 
Trimmed mean filter 61.71 82.75 47.62 
Wiener filter 100.00 97.80 100.00 
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Figure 5.14 till Figure 5.23 show the attacked versions 
of watermarked fingerprint image 101_1 together with their 
extracted watermarks from each of them. 
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Figure 5.13. Similarity values between original and extracted watermarks 
after applying different attacks for different images. 
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Figure 5.14. a) The watermarked fingerprint without any attack, b) The 
extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.15. a) The watermarked fingerprint after gaussian noise addition, 
b) The extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.16. a) The watermarked fingerprint after JPEG compression with 
Q=100, b) The extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.17. a) The watermarked fingerprint after JPEG compression with 
Q=80, b) The extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.18. a) The watermarked fingerprint after JPEG compression with 
Q=60, b) The extracted watermark signal. 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
bit index
d
e
lt
a
 b
a
r
 
Figure 5.19. a) The watermarked fingerprint after JPEG compression with 
Q=40, b) The extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.20. a) The watermarked fingerprint after JPEG compression with 
Q=25, b) The extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.21. a) The watermarked fingerprint after median filtering, b) The 
extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.22. a) The watermarked fingerprint after trimmed mean filtering, 
b) The extracted watermark signal. 
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Figure 5.23. a) The watermarked fingerprint after Wiener filtering, b) The 
extracted watermark signal. 
 
As can be shown from Figure 5.13, the watermark is 
robust against Gaussian noise addition, JPEG compression 
with quality factors Q =100, 80, 60, 40, and Wiener filtering. 
 
5.6.6. Recognition accuracy analysis 
 
To study the effect of watermarking on recognition 
accuracy, there are two cases: 
 
 Without applying any attacks on the watermarked 
image: 
 
After watermarking all the fingerprints in the database 
(20 fingerprints each having 3 impressions for a total of 60 
images), the watermarks (minutiae tables) extracted from all 
these watermarked images are all the same as the 
embedded watermarks. So, the recognition accuracy will be 
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the same without any changes which was 98% from results 
drawn in Chapter 4. 
 
 After applying different attacks on the watermarked 
image: 
 
After having 60 different watermarked images, applying 
the nine different attacks described above, together with 
their unattacked version, we will have 600 different images. 
It is hoped that all attacked versions of a certain 
watermarked fingerprint will give the same matching score 
as if they do not have been attacked.  
 
Extracting the watermark (minutiae table) from the 
above 600 different watermarked images, and applying the 
verification algorithm between each extracted watermark 
and its corresponding minutiae tables stored in the 
database, two numbers will be obtained. These numbers are 
compared with the two estimated thresholds before in 
Chapter 4 which were t1=17 and t2=8. Table 5.5 shows the 
results of recognition accuracy. 
 
 All 
attacks 
on DB 
remove 
median 
and 
trimmed 
mean 
filters 
remove 
all 
filters 
remove 
all 
filters 
+ 
JPEG 
25 
remove 
all 
filters  
+ 
JPEG 
25,40 
remove 
all 
filters+ 
JPEG 
25,40,60 
FRR 24.43 12.62 7.29 4.54 3.75 3.63 
100-
FRR 
75.57 87.38 92.71 95.5 96.25 96.37 
Table 5.5. Recognition accuracy after applying different attacks on 
watermarked images. 
 
As shown from Table 5.5, the recognition accuracy felt 
down to 75.57% when all attacks are considered on all 
watermarked fingerprints of database. 
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By removing the two filters attacks: median and 
trimmed mean filters applied, the recognition accuracy rose 
again to reach 87.38%. 
 
If all the three types of filters are removed, the 
recognition accuracy reaches 92.71%. 
 
Finally, trying to remove the JPEG compression attack 
having quality factors Q=25 and 40 together with other three 
filters, the reached recognition accuracy was  96%. 
 
Figure 5.24 shows FRR and (100-FRR) curves for 
fingerprint database after applying different attacks on their 
watermarked versions. 
 
So, we can conclude that to reach recognition accuracy 
near the one without any applied attacks (which was 98%), 
the watermarking algorithm is robust only against Gaussian 
noise addition and JPEG compression with high and 
moderate quality factors. 
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Figure 5.24. FRR and (100-FRR) for fingerprint database after applying 
attacks on their watermarked versions.
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
6.1. Conclusions 
 
During the development of this thesis, several issues 
were identified that will yield contributions to the field of 
AFIS. Among these issues, the following conclusions can be 
enumerated: 
 
1. All steps of Fingerprint Identification System FIS and 
all its components are studied. 
2. Thinning is a critical pre-processing step in fingerprint 
identification system. 
3. A new thinning algorithm for fingerprints is proposed 
which is proved to be fast and more accurate. 
4. Different matching algorithms are studied and a new 
minutiae-based matching algorithm is proposed. 
5. The proposed matching algorithm is proved to be: 
 rotation and translation invariant, 
 more fast, and  
 less need for storage. 
6. Recognition accuracy is 98% with enrollment time of 6 
sec and matching time of 0.001 sec. 
7. Many attacks can threat the FIS, so data must be 
secured all the way from the scanner to the 
application. 
8. Watermarking is applied to secure FIS. It is proved to 
be invisible and robust against Gaussian noise 
addition, and JPEG compression with high and 
moderate quality factors. 
9. After watermarking and without attacks, recognition 
accuracy does not change and still is 98%. 
10. After applying above attacks, recognition accuracy 
decreases slightly to reach 96%. 
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6.2. Future work 
 
The following points are some suggestions for further 
study: 
 
1. To search for a more accurate and fast thinning 
algorithm. 
2. Trying to achieve higher values of recognition 
accuracy in proposed matching algorithm.  
3. Searching for a more fast and effective enhancement 
method for fingerprints to lessen the overall 
enrollment time. 
4. Trying to enhance the robustness requirement of 
watermarking against other classes of attacks. 
5. Studying how to make the watermark embedding 
algorithm faster. 
6. Implementing and realizing the proposed algorithms, 
thinning, matching, and watermarking, using FPGA 
port. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
Core point detection Matlab source code 
 
This appendix is the MATLAB source code of the core point 
detection in fingerprints.  
 
function [XofCenter,YofCenter] = get_core(fingerprint) 
x=[-16:1:16]; 
y=[-16:1:16]; 
dimx=size(x,2); 
dimy=size(y,2); 
%gaussian variance, order of complex filter 
variance=sqrt(55); 
order=1; 
filter_core=zeros(dimx,dimy); 
filter_delta=zeros(dimx,dimy); 
for ii=1:dimx 
    for jj=1:dimy 
        exponent=exp(-(x(ii)^2+y(jj)^2)/(2*variance^2)); 
        % filter core 
        factor=x(ii)+i*y(jj); 
        filter_core(ii,jj)=exponent*factor^order; 
        % filter delta         
        factor=x(ii)-i*y(jj); 
        filter_delta(ii,jj)=exponent*factor^order; 
    end 
end 
% Gaussian Low Pass Filter ---------- 
%------------------------------------ 
x=[-16:1:16]; 
y=[-16:1:16]; 
dimx=size(x,2); 
dimy=size(y,2); 
variance=sqrt(1.2); 
filter=zeros(dimx,dimy); 
for ii=1:dimx 
    for jj=1:dimy 
        exponent=exp(-(x(ii)^2+y(jj)^2)/(2*variance^2)); 
        filter(ii,jj)=exponent; 
    end 
end 
%------------------------------------ 
img=fingerprint; 
img=double(img); 
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%---------------------------------------------------------- 
% complex field at 0 level 
[gx,gy]=gradient(img); 
num=(gx+i*gy).^2; 
den=abs((gx+i*gy).^2); 
pos=find(den); 
num(pos)=num(pos)./den(pos); 
z=zeros(size(img,1),size(img,2)); 
z(pos)=num(pos); 
pos=find(den==0); 
z(pos)=1; 
%********************************** 
% ------------------- parameters --------------------------
bxv=8;          % size of block of variance 
byv=8; 
threshold_var=20;  % threshold of variance 
dimseclose=10;  % dimension of closing operation 
dimseerode=44;  % dimension of erosion operation 
[dimx,dimy]=size(fingerprint); 
%----------------------------------------------------------
temp=z; 
[temp,dimxt,dimyt]=mirror(temp); 
z_f=conv2fft(temp,filter_core,'same'); 
z_f=recrop(z_f,dimxt,dimyt); 
z_f=abs(z_f); 
% resize--------------------  
imgd=double(fingerprint); 
dimxr=dimx-mod(dimx,bxv); 
dimyr=dimy-mod(dimy,byv); 
imgr=imgd(1:dimxr,1:dimyr); 
%--------------------------- 
nbx=dimxr/bxv; 
nby=dimyr/byv; 
mat_var=zeros(dimxr,dimyr); 
for ii=1:nbx 
    for jj=1:nby 
        block=imgr((ii-1)*bxv+1:ii*bxv,(jj-
1)*byv+1:jj*byv); 
        media=sum(sum(block))/(bxv*byv); 
        variance=1/(bxv*byv)*sum(sum(abs(media.^2-
block.^2))); 
        mat_var((ii-1)*bxv+1:ii*bxv,(jj-
1)*byv+1:jj*byv)=sqrt(variance); 
    end 
end 
mat_ok=zeros(dimxr,dimyr); 
pos= mat_var>threshold_var; 
mat_ok(pos)=1; 
mat_ok(dimx,dimy)=0; 
mat_ok=imclose(mat_ok,ones(dimseclose)); 
 172 
mat_ok=imerode(mat_ok,ones(dimseerode)); 
%----------------------------------------------------------
% now calculate core point of each block 
matrix_final=z_f.*mat_ok; 
  
[max_vector,position_vector]=max(matrix_final); 
[~,position]=max(max_vector); 
y_max=position; 
x_max=position_vector(position); 
  
XofCenter=y_max; 
YofCenter=x_max; 
 
 
The following partial functions are used by the get_core 
function: 
 
function [out,dimxt,dimyt]=mirror(in) 
% mirroring 
[dimxt,dimyt]=size(in); 
  
in_memo=in; 
  
extx=20; 
exty=20; 
  
out=zeros(dimxt+2*extx,dimyt+2*exty); 
out(extx+1:extx+dimxt,exty+1:exty+dimyt)=in_memo; 
  
for ii=1:extx 
    out(extx-ii+1,:)=out(extx+ii,:); 
    out(extx+dimxt+ii,:)=out(extx+dimxt-ii+1,:); 
end 
  
for ii=1:exty 
    out(:,exty-ii+1)=out(:,exty+ii); 
    out(:,exty+dimyt+ii)=out(:,exty+dimyt-ii+1); 
end 
 
 
function [out] = conv2fft(z1,z2,shape,shape2) 
if ((nargin==3)&&(isa(shape,'char')))  
    if strcmp(shape,'same') 
        z1x=size(z1,1); 
        z1y=size(z1,2); 
        z2x=size(z2,1); 
        z2y=size(z2,2); 
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        if any(any(imag(z1)))||any(any(imag(z2))) 
            out=(ifft2(fft2(z1,z1x+z2x-1,z1y+z2y-
1).*fft2(z2,z1x+z2x-1,z1y+z2y-1))); 
        else 
            out=real(ifft2(fft2(z1,z1x+z2x-1,z1y+z2y-
1).*fft2(z2,z1x+z2x-1,z1y+z2y-1))); 
        end 
 
        px=((z2x-1)+mod((z2x-1),2))/2; 
        py=((z2y-1)+mod((z2y-1),2))/2; 
         
        out=out(px+1:px+z1x,py+1:py+z1y); 
        return; 
    end 
…end 
 
function [out]=recrop(in,dimxt,dimyt) 
% recroppping 
  
extx=20; 
exty=20; 
  
out=in(extx+1:extx+dimxt,exty+1:exty+dimyt); 
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Appendix B 
Minutiae extraction and matching 
algorithm Matlab source codes 
 
This appendix is the MATLAB source code of the minutiae 
extraction from fingerprints together with the proposed 
minutiae table construction which corresponds to that 
fingerprint. Also, the performance evaluation m-file is 
shown. 
 
 f={    '..\db\101_1.tif' 
        '..\db\101_2.tif' 
        '..\db\101_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\102_1.tif' 
        '..\db\102_2.tif' 
        '..\db\102_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\103_1.tif' 
        '..\db\103_2.tif' 
        '..\db\103_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\104_1.tif' 
        '..\db\104_2.tif' 
        '..\db\104_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\105_1.tif' 
        '..\db\105_2.tif' 
        '..\db\105_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\106_1.tif' 
        '..\db\106_2.tif' 
        '..\db\106_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\107_1.tif' 
        '..\db\107_2.tif' 
        '..\db\107_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\108_1.tif' 
        '..\db\108_2.tif' 
        '..\db\108_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\109_1.tif' 
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        '..\db\109_2.tif' 
        '..\db\109_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\110_1.tif' 
        '..\db\110_2.tif' 
        '..\db\110_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\111_1.tif' 
        '..\db\111_2.tif' 
        '..\db\111_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\112_1.tif' 
        '..\db\112_2.tif' 
        '..\db\112_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\113_1.tif' 
        '..\db\113_2.tif' 
        '..\db\113_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\114_1.tif' 
        '..\db\114_2.tif' 
        '..\db\114_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\115_1.tif' 
        '..\db\115_2.tif' 
        '..\db\115_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\116_1.tif' 
        '..\db\116_2.tif' 
        '..\db\116_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\117_1.tif' 
        '..\db\117_2.tif' 
        '..\db\117_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\118_1.tif' 
        '..\db\118_2.tif' 
        '..\db\118_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\119_1.tif' 
        '..\db\119_2.tif' 
        '..\db\119_3.tif' 
         
        '..\db\120_1.tif' 
        '..\db\120_2.tif' 
        '..\db\120_3.tif' 
       }; 
M=[]; 
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my_tracks=zeros(length(f),1); 
for fi=1:length(f) 
    I=imread(f{fi}); 
    [~,~,~,~,enh_img]=fft_enhance_cubs(I); 
    %figure,imshow(enh_img) 
      
    [x_core,y_core]=get_core(enh_img); 
    I=enh_img; 
    I=adaptiveThres(double(I),32,0);%figure,imshow(I) 
    I=im2double(bwmorph(I,'thin',Inf));%figure,imshow(I) 
    I=im2double(bwmorph(I,'clean'));%figure,imshow(I) 
    I=im2double(bwmorph(I,'hbreak'));%figure,imshow(I) 
    I1=im2double(bwmorph(I,'spur')); 
    I2=MinutiaPointExtraction(I1); 
    I3=RemoveFalseTermination(I1,I2); 
    I3=MinutiaPointExtraction(I3); 
    I3=RemoveFalseBifurcation(I3); 
    tic;Index=or((I3==1),(I3==3)); 
    [Y,X]=find(Index==1); 
    Type = zeros(length(X),1); 
    dist_from_core = zeros(length(X),1); 
    FpPlot(I3,X,Y,x_core,y_core); 
    for i=1:length(X) 
        dx=X(i)-x_core; 
        dy=Y(i)-y_core; 
        dist_from_core(i)=sqrt((dx^2)+(dy^2)); 
        Type(i)=I3(Y(i),X(i)); 
    end 
    max_dist=max(dist_from_core); 
    track=0;step=10; 
    no_tracks=ceil(max_dist/step); 
    my_tracks(fi)=no_tracks; 
    table=zeros(no_tracks,2); 
    for i=1:step:step*no_tracks 
        track=track+1; 
        for j=1:length(X) 
            if (dist_from_core(j)>=i) && 
(dist_from_core(j)<i+step) 
                if Type(j)==1 
                    table(track,1)=table(track,1)+1; 
                else 
                    table(track,2)=table(track,2)+1; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    M{fi}=table; 
end 
min(my_tracks) 
save('Minutia.mat','M'); 
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clear M 
 
 
The following functions are used by the get_min function: 
 
The "fft_enhance_cubs" function is available at [58] 
The "get_core function" is available at appendix A. 
Functions MinutiaPointExtraction, 
RemoveFalseTermination, RemoveFalseBifurcation, 
getLength (used in function RemoveFalseTermination), and 
FpPlot are as shown below: 
 
function Im=RemoveFalseTermination(Im,Imp) 
[a,b]=size(Imp); 
for i=1:a 
    for j=1:b 
        if (Imp(i,j)==1) 
            [L,Im]=getLength(i,j,Im,1); 
            if (L<22) 
                [~,Im]=getLength(i,j,Im,0); 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
function ret=MinutiaPointExtraction(I) 
[a,b]=size(I); 
hj=b/2; 
hi=a/2; 
ioff=[-1   -1  -1   0  1  1   1  0]; 
joff=[-1   0    1   1  1  0  -1 -1]; 
P=zeros(1,9); 
for i=1:a 
    for j=1:b 
        if I(i,j)==1 
            for k=1:8 
                try 
                    P(k)=I(i+ioff(k),j+joff(k)); 
                catch 
                    P(k)=0; 
                end 
            end 
            P(9)=P(1);C=0; 
            for k=1: 8 
                C=C+abs(P(k+1)-P(k)); 
            end 
            ret(i,j)=C/2; 
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            if (ret(i,j)==1)% || (ret(i,j)==3) 
                ok=0; 
                if (j<=hj) 
                    for jj=1:j-1 
                        if I(i,jj)==1,ok=1;break;end 
                    end 
                else 
                    for jj=j+1:b 
                        if I(i,jj)==1,ok=1;break;end 
                    end 
                end 
                if (ok==0) 
                    ret(i,j)=0; 
                else 
                    ok=0; 
                    if (i<=hi) 
                        for ii=1:i-1 
                            if I(ii,j)==1,ok=1;break;end 
                        end 
                    else 
                        for ii=i+1:a 
                            if I(ii,j)==1,ok=1;break;end 
                        end 
                    end 
                end 
                if (ok==0),ret(i,j)=0;end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
function [ret,x]=getLength(i,j,x,newval) 
if x(i,j)==0 
    ret=0; 
    return; 
end 
x=double(x); 
ret=0; 
v=inf; 
x(i,j)=2; 
ioff=[-1   -1  -1   0  1  1   1  0  ]; 
joff=[-1   0    1   1  1  0  -1 -1  ]; 
while not(or(v==0,v==2)) 
    x(i,j)=2; 
    kb=0; 
    for k=1:8 
        try 
            P(k)=(x(i+ioff(k),j+joff(k))==1); 
        catch 
            P(k)=0; 
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        end 
        if (P(k)==1) 
            kb=k; 
        end 
    end 
    v=sum(P); 
    ret=ret+v; 
    if (kb==0) 
        break; 
    else 
        i=i+ioff(kb); 
        j=j+joff(kb); 
    end 
end 
try 
    i=i-ioff(kb); 
    j=j-joff(kb); 
    x(i,j)=1; 
end 
x(x==2)=newval; 
x=logical(x); 
 
function Imp=RemoveFalseBifurcation(Imp) 
[a,b]=size(Imp); 
s=10; 
for i=s:a-s 
    for j=s:b-s 
        if (Imp(i,j)==3) 
            try 
                x=Imp(i-s:i+s,j-s:j+s); 
                c=sum(sum(x==3)); 
                if c>1 
                    x(x==3)=0; 
                    Imp(i-s:i+s,j-s:j+s)=x; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
function FpPlot(mint,x,y,xc,yc) 
hold off; 
imshow(mint) 
hold on; 
plot(xc,yc,'o','MarkerEdgeColor','m','MarkerFaceColor','y',
'MarkerSize',10); 
for i=1:length(x) 
    if mint(y(i),x(i))==1 
        plot(x(i),y(i),'wo','linewidth',1); 
    else 
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        plot(x(i),y(i),'wd','linewidth',1); 
    end 
end 
hold off 
 
The following M-file is used to evaluate the performance of 
the proposed matching algorithm (FAR, FRR, EER, ZeroFAR, 
ZeroFRR, ROC): 
 
close all 
clc 
clear all 
load('MinutiaDB'); %tracks=13 salts=4 fingers=20 
no_prints=3 
% load('MinutiaDB1_Afeb11');  %tracks=10 fingers 10,92 and 
all their copies 
% are deleted so fingers are 98 and length =784 salts=3 
% load('MinutiaDB1_Bfeb11');%tracks=14 finger 9 and all its 
copies are deleted so 
% fingers are 9 and length is 72 salts=4 
% load('MinutiaDB2_Afeb11');%tracks=11 salts=3 fingers=100 
no_prints=8 
% load('MinutiaDB2_Bfeb11');%tracks=15 salts=5 fingers=10 
no_prints=8 
% load('MinutiaDB3_Afeb11');%tracks=14 salts=4 fingers=100 
no_prints=8 
% load('MinutiaDB3_Bfeb11');%tracks=14 salts=4 fingers=10 
no_prints=8 
% load('MinutiaDB4_Afeb11');%tracks=8 salts=2 fingers=100 
no_prints=8 
% load('MinutiaDB4_Bfeb11');%tracks=11 salts=3 fingers=10 
no_prints=8 
  
%defining the constant representing the fingerprints 
database for 
%MinutiaeDB1_Bfeb11 
fingers=20; 
no_prints=3; 
length=fingers*no_prints; 
%No of tracks to identify the print 
mins=13; 
  
%No of random points to introduce noise 
salts=4;%for db1_A 
  
%maximum minatues to change 
maxsalts=1; 
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%thresholds of matching 
thmax=70; 
  
%Now in 2D space 
rand('state',0101487403) 
% defaultStream.State = savedState; 
far=zeros(thmax,thmax); 
frr=zeros(thmax,thmax); 
for i=1:length 
    temp=M{i}(1:mins,1:2); 
    for r=1:salts 
        mintype=randi(2); 
        mintrack=randi(mins); 
        salt=randi(maxsalts+1)-1; 
        temp(mintrack,mintype)=temp(mintrack,mintype)+salt; 
        if temp(mintrack,mintype)<0 
            temp(mintrack,mintype)=0; 
        end 
        mintype=3-mintype; 
        temp(mintrack,mintype)=temp(mintrack,mintype)-salt; 
        if temp(mintrack,mintype)<0 
            temp(mintrack,mintype)=0; 
        end 
    end 
    for k=0:fingers-1 
        temp21=M{no_prints*k+1}(1:mins,1:2); 
        temp22=M{no_prints*k+2}(1:mins,1:2); 
        temp23=M{no_prints*k+3}(1:mins,1:2); 
        %         temp24=M{no_prints*k+4}(1:mins,1:2); 
        %         temp25=M{no_prints*k+5}(1:mins,1:2); 
        %         temp26=M{no_prints*k+6}(1:mins,1:2); 
        %         temp27=M{no_prints*k+7}(1:mins,1:2); 
        %         temp28=M{no_prints*k+8}(1:mins,1:2); 
        same=0; 
        if floor((i-1)/no_prints)==k 
            same=1; 
        end 
        match=0; 
        d11 = sum(abs(temp-temp21)); 
        d12 = sum(abs(temp-temp22)); 
        d13 = sum(abs(temp-temp23)); 
        %         d14 = sum(abs(temp-temp24)); 
        %         d15 = sum(abs(temp-temp25)); 
        %         d16 = sum(abs(temp-temp26)); 
        %         d17 = sum(abs(temp-temp27)); 
        %         d18 = sum(abs(temp-temp28)); 
         
        d2=floor(nthroot(d11.*d12.*d13,no_prints)); 
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        %         
d2=floor(nthroot(d11.*d12.*d13.*d14.*d15.*d16.*d17.*d18,no_
prints)); 
         
        if d2(1,1)==0||d2(1,1)==1 
            d2(1,1)=2; 
        end 
        if d2(1,2)==0||d2(1,2)==1 
            d2(1,2)=2; 
        end 
         
        for thx=1:thmax, 
            for thy=1:thmax 
                if same==1 
                    if d2(1,1)>thx || d2(1,2) > thy 
                        frr(thx,thy)=frr(thx,thy)+1; 
                    end 
                else 
                    if d2(1,1)<=thx && d2(1,2) <= thy 
                        far(thx,thy)=far(thx,thy)+1; 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
far=far /(length*(fingers-1)); 
frr=frr /length; 
% Finding the intersection of the 2 surfaces 
x=1:thmax; 
y=x; 
z1=far; 
z2=frr; 
  
figure; 
% Visualize the two surfaces 
surface(x, y, z1, 'FaceColor', [1 0 0], 'EdgeColor', 
'none'); 
surface(x, y, z2, 'FaceColor', [0 0 1], 'EdgeColor', 
'none'); 
view(3); camlight; axis vis3d 
xlabel('threshold2') 
ylabel('threshold1') 
zlabel('error rate') 
hold on 
  
% Take the difference between the two surface heights and 
find the contour 
% where that surface is zero. 
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zdiff = z1 - z2; 
C = contours(x, y, zdiff, [0 0]); 
  
% Extract the x- and y-locations from the contour matrix C. 
xL = C(1, 2:end); 
yL = C(2, 2:end); 
  
% Interpolate on the first surface to find z-locations for 
the intersection 
% line. 
zL = interp2(x, y, z1, xL, yL); 
  
% Visualize the line. 
line(xL, yL, zL, 'Color', 'k', 'LineWidth', 2); 
  
[m,idx]=min(zL); 
fprintf('EER=%f  at thx=%f and thy=%f and 
sumth=%f\n',m,yL(idx),xL(idx),yL(idx)+xL(idx)); 
  
thxi(1)=floor(xL(idx)); 
thyi(1)=floor(yL(idx)); 
farv(1)=far(thyi(1),thxi(1)); 
frrv(1)=frr(thyi(1),thxi(1)); 
differ(1)=abs(farv(1)-frrv(1)); 
 
thxi(2)=floor(xL(idx)); 
thyi(2)=floor(yL(idx))+1; 
farv(2)=far(thyi(2),thxi(2)); 
frrv(2)=frr(thyi(2),thxi(2)); 
differ(2)=abs(farv(2)-frrv(2)); 
 
thxi(3)=floor(xL(idx))+1; 
thyi(3)=floor(yL(idx)); 
farv(3)=far(thyi(3),thxi(3)); 
frrv(3)=frr(thyi(3),thxi(3)); 
differ(3)=abs(farv(3)-frrv(3)); 
 
thxi(4)=floor(xL(idx))+1; 
thyi(4)=floor(yL(idx))+1; 
farv(4)=far(thyi(4),thxi(4)); 
frrv(4)=frr(thyi(4),thxi(4)); 
differ(4)=abs(farv(4)-frrv(4)); 
maxv=1000; 
for i=1:4 
     
    if differ(i) <maxv 
        temp=i; 
        maxv=differ(i); 
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    end 
end 
  
fprintf('FAR=%f , FRR=%f and diff=%f at thx=%d and 
thy=%d\n',farv(temp),frrv(temp),differ(temp),thyi(temp),thx
i(temp)); 
  
% surf(yL(idx),xL(idx),m) 
hold off 
  
%find the zeroFAR 
zero_loc_far=find(far==0); 
temp_frr=frr(zero_loc_far); 
zero_far=min(temp_frr); 
[zfar_th1 zfar_th2]=find(frr==zero_far) 
  
%find the zeroFRR 
zero_loc_frr=find(frr==0); 
temp_far=far(zero_loc_frr); 
zero_frr=min(temp_far); 
[zfrr_th1 zfrr_th2]=find(far==zero_frr) 
  
plot(log(100*far(:,35)),log(100*frr(:,35))) 
xlabel('log 100*FAR') 
ylabel('log 100*FRR') 
axis([-1 3 0.5 4]) 
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Appendix C 
Thinning algorithm Matlab source code 
 
This appendix is the MATLAB source code of the proposed 
thinning algorithm for fingerprints. 
 
close all 
clear all 
t1 = cputime; 
CrnFgp=imread('70_1.tif'); 
% CrnFgp=imread('101_3.tif'); 
% imshow(CrnFgp) 
th=245; %to suppress noise 
% imshow(CrnFgp) 
N=size(CrnFgp); 
blksize=8; 
N(1)=floor(N(1)/blksize)*blksize; 
N(2)=floor(N(2)/blksize)*blksize; 
  
% determine horizontal and diagonal ridges 
newarray=zeros(N(1)/blksize,N(2)/blksize);%where each block 
in the fingerprint corresponds to a cell in this array 
% if it contains zero means no ridge at all, 
% 1 means a horizontal ridge, 
% 2 means a vertical ridge 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Determine the type of each block before 
thinning(horizontal or vertical ridge) 
for i=1:blksize:N(1) 
    for j=1:blksize:N(2) 
        test=CrnFgp(i:i+blksize-1,j:j+blksize-1);%obtain a 
block 
        if (find(test<=th))%to be sure not background 
            sumblkcols=sum(test,1);%calculate the sum of 
columns of block 
            sumblkrows=sum(test,2);%calculate the sum of 
rows of block 
            [min1,mat1]=min(sumblkcols); 
            [min2,mat2]=min(sumblkrows); 
            if min1>min2%horz 
                
newarray(ceil(i/blksize),ceil(j/blksize))=1; 
            else        %vert 
                
newarray(ceil(i/blksize),ceil(j/blksize))=2; 
            end 
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        end 
    end 
end 
  
%correcting errors of ridge type results 
for type_row=2:N(1)/blksize-1 
    for type_col=2:N(2)/blksize-1 
        type=newarray(type_row,type_col); 
        left_type=newarray(type_row,type_col-1); 
        right_type=newarray(type_row,type_col+1); 
        top_type=newarray(type_row-1,type_col); 
        bottom_type=newarray(type_row+1,type_col); 
        if type==2%detect error of a wrongly detected vert 
ridge between two horz ridges 
            %             detect error of a wrongly 
detected vert ridge whereas it is a horz edge 
            if 
(left_type==1&&right_type==1)||(top_type==1&&bottom_type==1
)||... 
                    
(left_type==0&&right_type==1)||(left_type==1&&right_type==0
) 
                newarray(type_row,type_col)=1;%update the 
value 
                %remove a noisy block 
            elseif 
left_type==0&&right_type==0&&top_type==0&&bottom_type==0 
                newarray(type_row,type_col)=0; 
            end 
        elseif type==1%detect error of a wrongly detected 
horz ridge between two vert ridges 
            %             detect error of a wrongly 
detected horz ridge whereas it is a vert edge 
            if 
(top_type==2&&bottom_type==2)||(left_type==2&&right_type==2
)||... 
                    
(top_type==0&&bottom_type==2)||(left_type==2&&right_type==0
) 
                newarray(type_row,type_col)=2;%update the 
value 
                %remove a noisy block 
            elseif 
left_type==0&&right_type==0&&top_type==0&&bottom_type==0 
                newarray(type_row,type_col)=0; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
newarray_lab = bwlabel(newarray,4); 
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newarray_close = bwmorph(newarray_lab,'close'); 
newarray_open = bwmorph(newarray_close,'open'); 
inBound = bwperim(newarray_open); 
inArea=newarray_open-inBound; 
[CrnFgp,newarray] = 
SegmImg(CrnFgp,newarray,inBound,inArea,blksize,0); 
N=size(CrnFgp); 
N(1)=floor(N(1)/blksize)*blksize; 
N(2)=floor(N(2)/blksize)*blksize; 
ThinFgp=ones(N);%initialize Thin fingerprint image 
%get the indices of blk_type1 alone 
[k,l]=find(newarray==1); 
i=1;count=1; 
first=l(i); 
x(count)=k(i);y(count)=l(i); 
for i=2:length(k) 
    count=count+1; 
    if (l(i)==first)&&(k(i)==k(i-1)+1) 
        x(count)=k(i); 
        y(count)=l(i); 
    else 
        x(count)=0;y(count)=0; 
        count=count+1; 
        x(count)=k(i);y(count)=l(i); 
        first=l(i); 
    end 
end 
count=count+1; 
x(count)=0;y(count)=0; 
x_type1=x;y_type1=y; 
  
%get the indices of blk_type2 alone 
clear k l x y 
[k,l]=find(newarray==2); 
count=0;x=0; 
for i=1:length(k) 
    first=k(i); 
    mat=find(x==first);%not to repeat the search of this 
index 
    if isempty(mat) 
        count=count+1; 
        x(count)=k(i);y(count)=l(i); 
        loc=find(k==first); 
        for w=2:length(loc) 
            count=count+1; 
            if l(loc(w))==l(loc(w-1))+1 
                x(count)=k(loc(w)); 
                y(count)=l(loc(w)); 
            else 
                x(count)=0;y(count)=0; 
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                count=count+1; 
                x(count)=k(loc(w));y(count)=l(loc(w)); 
            end 
        end 
        count=count+1; 
        x(count)=0;y(count)=0; 
    end 
end 
x_type2=x;y_type2=y; 
%search for the local minimum in each group of consecutive 
blocks of type1 
w=1; 
zeroloc=find(x_type1==0); 
count0=length(zeroloc); 
for h=1:count0 
    for i=(x_type1(w)-1)*blksize+1:x_type1(zeroloc(h)-
1)*blksize 
        if i+2<=N(1) 
            for j=(y_type1(w)-
1)*blksize+1:y_type1(w)*blksize 
                if 
(CrnFgp(i,j)>CrnFgp(i+1,j))&&(CrnFgp(i+1,j)<CrnFgp(i+2,j)) 
                    ThinFgp(i+1,j)=0; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    w=zeroloc(h)+1; 
end 
%search for the local minimum in each group of consecutive 
blocks of type2 
w=1;where0=0; 
zeroloc=find(x_type2==0); 
count0=length(zeroloc); 
for h=1:count0 
    for i=(x_type2(w)-1)*blksize+1:x_type2(w)*blksize 
        for j=(y_type2(w)-1)*blksize+1:y_type2(zeroloc(h)-
1)*blksize 
            if j+2<=N(2) 
                if 
(CrnFgp(i,j)>CrnFgp(i,j+1))&&(CrnFgp(i,j+1)<CrnFgp(i,j+2)) 
                    ThinFgp(i,j+1)=0; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    w=zeroloc(h)+1; 
end 
% figure,imshow(ThinFgp) 
ThinFgp=~ThinFgp; 
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% figure,imshow(ThinFgp) 
ThinFgp=bwmorph(ThinFgp,'clean'); 
% figure,imshow(ThinFgp) 
%handling bifurcation problem 
for i=4:N(1)-4 
    for j=4:N(2)-4 
        if ThinFgp(i,j)==1 
            tempT1=(ThinFgp(i-1:i+1,j-1:j+1)); 
            if (sum(sum(tempT1))==2)                
temp=double(CrnFgp(i-1:i+1,j-1:j+1)); 
                temp(2,2)=260;%to exclude it from 
comparison 
                [m,nr]=min(temp); 
                [m,nc]=min(m); 
                minr=nr(nc);minc=nc; 
                if ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-2)==0 
                    tmp=ThinFgp(i+minr-2-1:i+minr-
2+1,j+minc-2-1:j+minc-2+1); 
                    if sum(sum(tmp))>=3 
                        ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-2)=1; 
if (ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-2-
1)==1)&&(ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-2-
2)==0)%wrong left duplicate 
                            
ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-2-1)=0; 
elseif (ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-
2+1)==1)&&(ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-
2+2)==0)%wrong right duplicate 
                            
ThinFgp(i+minr-2,j+minc-2+1)=0; 
end 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
figure,imshow(ThinFgp) 
t2 = cputime; 
sprintf('execution time is %2.2d sec',t2-t1) 
 
 
The following function is used by the thinning function 
function [roiImg,roiarray] = 
SegmImg(in,newarray,inBound,inArea,blksize,noShow) 
%  construct a ROI rectangle for the input fingerprint 
image and return the 
%  segmented fingerprint 
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%  With the assumption that only one ROI region for each 
fingerprint image 
[iw,ih]=size(in); 
tmplate = zeros(iw,ih); 
[w,h] = size(inArea); 
tmp=zeros(iw,ih); 
 
left = 1; 
right = h; 
upper = 1; 
bottom = w; 
  
le2ri = sum(inBound); 
roiColumn = find(le2ri>0); 
left = min(roiColumn); 
right = max(roiColumn); 
  
up2dw=sum(inBound,2); 
roiRow = find(up2dw>0); 
upper = min(roiRow); 
bottom = max(roiRow); 
 
roiImg   = in(blksize*upper-(blksize-
1):blksize*bottom,blksize*left-(blksize-1):blksize*right); 
roiarray = newarray(upper:bottom,left:right); 
  
% figure,imshow(roiImg) 
 
if nargin == 4 
    colormap(gray); 
    imagesc(tmplate); 
end; 
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Appendix D 
Cryptographic methods 
 
Encryption and digital signatures  
 
There are two types of key-based encryption algorithms: 
symmetric and public key. A key is typically a string of bits 
and the longer the length of the string, the harder it is to 
break the encrypted message, but the longer it takes to 
encrypt and decrypt a message. Symmetric cryptography 
uses a single secret key for both encrypting and decrypting a 
message. The advantage of this type of encryption is that a 
large number of fast and effective algorithms are available 
and the secrecy of the key guarantees a high level of 
security. The disadvantage of symmetric encryption lies in 
the difficulty of key distribution. Public-key cryptography 
uses a pair of keys for each entity that takes part in the 
communication. Here the key that is used to encrypt a 
message is different from the key used to decrypt the 
message (and hence the key pair is called "asymmetric"). 
Furthermore, the encryption and decryption keys cannot be 
derived from each other, even if a large amount of messages 
encrypted from a public or a private key is available. One of 
the keys of the pair is called the private key that is held by a 
specific person and kept secret. The other key is called the 
public key and is made known to everybody who wants to 
communicate with this specific person. 
 
The advantage of public-key cryptography over 
symmetric cryptography is that key management becomes 
easier. The main disadvantage is that it is several orders of 
magnitude slower than symmetric cryptography [80]. Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [81] is the most popular public-key 
algorithm. These symmetric and asymmetric encryption 
techniques can be used to secure a communication link for 
data integrity. However, they do not solve the non-
repudiation problem. Digital signature is the technology that 
can ensure/certify that a message has been sent by a 
specific person who cannot deny having sent the message. 
 192 
The popular RSA public-key algorithm itself is a 
straightforward way to digitally sign and encrypt a message. 
Timestamp and challenge-response  
 
Encryption solves the problem of data integrity and 
digital signatures solve the problem of non-repudiation. 
However, a digitally signed encrypted message from A to В 
can still be "sniffed" from a communication channel and 
replayed at a later time. The receiver, B, will not be able to 
know that this replayed message did not come from A or 
was not intended for В. А simple solution to this problem 
requires that the recipient store all the previous messages it 
has received and compare a new message against them to 
ascertain that the new message is not a copy of a previously 
received message. This approach requires the recipient to 
have a very large amount of storage space and a fast 
comparison algorithm. An optimization of this approach may 
involve storing hashes of the messages instead of the entire 
messages and comparing the hash of a new message with 
them. However, the storage and comparison time required in 
this solution are still prohibitive. Therefore the most popular 
solutions to the replay attacks involve building either a 
timestamp or a challenge-response mechanism in the 
communication link.  
 
In a timestamp-based scheme, when A wants to 
communicate with B, she sends В an encrypted and signed 
request message that includes a timestamp taken from her 
internal clock. When В receives the request, he decrypts it 
and checks the timestamp and compares it with his internal 
clock. If the difference in time is within a threshold (typically 
computed based on the expected time of message transfer), 
В responds to A by sending her the requested data and his 
timestamp in an encrypted form. Upon receiving the 
response from B, A decrypts the message and checks the 
timestamp. This solution requires that the clocks of the 
sender and receiver be synchronized, which is difficult to 
achieve in practice.  
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The popular challenge-response schemes are based 
either on nonce or session keys. These schemes do not 
require the use of timestamps. In the nonce-based scheme, 
if A wants to communicate with B, she sends В an 
encrypted and signed request message that includes a 
random number (called the nonce). В responds to A by 
sending her the requested data and the nonce in an 
encrypted form. Upon receiving the response from B, A 
decrypts the message and the nonce and compares the 
received nonce with the one she had sent. 
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Appendix E 
Watermark embedding and extraction 
algorithms Matlab source codes 
 
This appendix is the MATLAB source code of the proposed 
watermark embedding and extraction algorithms for 
fingerprints. 
 
Function [org_wat]=emb_fgp(img_file,fgpno) 
close all 
load Minutia 
%%%%%%compose the binary watermark from minutiae table 
% max no. of minutiae in all database was 12 so 4 binary 
digits are enough 
map=M{fgpno}; 
s=size(map); 
no_of_bin=4; 
bitmap=zeros(s(1),no_of_bin*s(2)); 
for i=1:s(1) 
    for j=1:s(2) 
        decnum=map(i,j); 
        rem=zeros(1,no_of_bin); 
        quo=10; 
        t=no_of_bin+1; 
        while quo>0 
            t=t-1; 
            decnum=double(decnum)/2; 
            quo=floor(decnum); 
            if(decnum-quo)==0.5 
                rem(t)=1; 
            else 
                rem(t)=0; 
            end 
            decnum=quo; 
        end 
        binnum=rem; 
        incol=(j-1)*no_of_bin;%to adjust the index in 
bitmap matrix 
        for inj=1:no_of_bin 
            bitmap(i,incol+inj)=rem(inj); 
        end 
    end 
end 
org_wat=bitmap(:); 
q=0.1;A=100;B=1000; 
org_img=imread(img_file); 
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s=size(org_img); 
%augmenting 0 and 1 to the first of the watermark 
org_wat=[0 1 org_wat']; 
wat_len=length(org_wat); 
rand('state',23021979); 
perm_sig=org_wat(randperm(wat_len));%permute signature 
%get the locations of embedding in the host image 
c=2;raw=0.18;n=0; 
rand('state',0101487403) 
for i=1:s(1) 
    for j=1:s(2) 
        %     change the background to make it not white to 
make watermarking invisible 
        if(org_img(i,j)>=245)&&(org_img(i,j)<=255) 
            org_img(i,j)=org_img(i,j)-20; 
        end 
        if rand<raw && (i>c && i<=s(1)-c) && (j>c && 
j<=s(2)-c) 
            n=n+1; 
            iz(n)=i; 
            jz(n)=j; 
        end 
    end 
end 
% figure,imshow(org_img); 
%n is no. of pixels that will be changed 
n_rep=floor(n/wat_len);%no. of repititions 
w_pix=0;%initializing the no. of watermarked pixels 
ind_perm_sig=1; 
org_img=double(org_img); 
%%%%from paper hiding fingerprint minutiae in images 
%compute the average and standard deviation at each pixel 
avg_img=org_img; 
std_img=org_img;c=2; 
for i=c+1:s(1)-c 
    for j=c+1:s(2)-c 
        temp1=org_img(i-c:i+c,j-c:j+c); 
        avg_img(i,j)=mean(mean(temp1)); 
        temp2=[org_img(i-c:i+c,j)',org_img(i,j-c:j-
1),org_img(i,j+1:j+c)]; 
        std_img(i,j)=std(temp2); 
    end 
end 
%compute the gradient magnitude image 
%from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sobel_operator 
filt=fspecial('sobel'); 
Gy=filter2(filt,org_img); 
Gx=filter2(filt',org_img); 
grad_img=sqrt(Gx.^2+Gy.^2); 
%initialize wat image 
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ind=1; 
bit_rep=n_rep;%initialize bit_rep 
wat_img=org_img; 
while w_pix<(n_rep*wat_len) 
    if bit_rep==n_rep 
        bit_rep=0; 
        sig_bit=perm_sig(ind_perm_sig); 
        ind_perm_sig=ind_perm_sig+1; 
    end 
    
wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind))=wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind))+(2*sig_bi
t-1)*avg_img(iz(ind),jz(ind))*q*... 
        
(1+(1/A)*std_img(iz(ind),jz(ind)))*(1+(1/B)*grad_img(iz(ind
),jz(ind))); 
    w_pix=w_pix+1; 
    bit_rep=bit_rep+1; 
    ind=ind+1; 
end 
s=Similar(double(wat_img(:)),double(org_img(:))) 
  
wat_img=uint8(wat_img); 
% figure,imshow(wat_img); 
imwrite(wat_img,'wat_fgp.tif','tif'); %writing the result 
watermarked fingerprint image 
 
function 
dec_wat=ext_fgp_kut(wat_img,sec_key1,sec_key2,org_wat,raw,c
,fgpno) 
s=size(wat_img); 
sig_len=length(org_wat); 
%get the locations of embedding in the host image 
rand('state',sec_key1) 
n=0; 
for i=1:s(1)%c+1:s(1)-c 
    for j=1:s(2)%c+1:s(2)-c 
        if rand<raw && (i>c && i<=s(1)-c) && (j>c && 
j<=s(2)-c) 
            n=n+1; 
            iz(n)=i; 
            jz(n)=j; 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
%n is no. of pixels that are changed 
n_rep=floor(n/sig_len);%no. of repititions 
%computing threshold value 
rand('state',sec_key2); 
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perm_ind=randperm(sig_len); 
ind_0=find(perm_ind==1);%to access first bit (0) of 
signature 
ind_1=find(perm_ind==2);%to access second bit (1) of 
signature 
bit_0_place=n_rep*(ind_0-1)+1; 
bit_1_place=n_rep*(ind_1-1)+1; 
wat_img=double(wat_img); 
%computing delta_k of bit 0 
i=1; 
for ind=bit_0_place:bit_0_place+(n_rep-1) 
    cur_val=wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind)); 
    pred_val=(1/(4*c))*(sum(wat_img(iz(ind)-
c:iz(ind)+c,jz(ind)))+... 
        sum(wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind)-c:jz(ind)+c))-
2*cur_val); 
    delta_k(i)=cur_val-pred_val; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
delta_0=(1/(raw*s(1)*s(2)))*sum(delta_k); 
%computing delta_k of bit 1 
i=1; 
for ind=bit_1_place:bit_1_place+(n_rep-1) 
    cur_val=wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind)); 
    pred_val=(1/(4*c))*(sum(wat_img(iz(ind)-
c:iz(ind)+c,jz(ind)))+... 
        sum(wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind)-c:jz(ind)+c))-
2*cur_val); 
    delta_k(i)=cur_val-pred_val; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
delta_1=(1/(raw*s(1)*s(2)))*sum(delta_k); 
%computing threshold 
thr=(delta_0+delta_1)/2; 
  
sig_ind=1; 
for i=1:n_rep:n-n_rep 
    bit_rep=0; 
    if sig_ind<=sig_len 
        for ind=i:i+(n_rep-1) 
            bit_rep=bit_rep+1; 
            cur_val=wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind)); 
            pred_val=(1/(4*c))*(sum(wat_img(iz(ind)-
c:iz(ind)+c,jz(ind)))+... 
                sum(wat_img(iz(ind),jz(ind)-c:jz(ind)+c))-
2*cur_val); 
            delta_k(bit_rep)=cur_val-pred_val; 
        end 
        
delta_bar(sig_ind)=(1/(raw*s(1)*s(2)))*sum(delta_k); 
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        if delta_bar(sig_ind)>thr 
            perm_sig(sig_ind)=1; 
        else 
            perm_sig(sig_ind)=0; 
        end 
    end 
    sig_ind=sig_ind+1; 
end 
rand('state',sec_key2); 
real_ind=randperm(sig_len); 
ext_sig(real_ind)=perm_sig;%inverse permute signature 
s=Similar(org_wat,ext_sig(:)) 
%remove the first 0,1 
ext_sig=ext_sig(3:end); 
tracks=length(ext_sig)/8; 
ext_sig=reshape(ext_sig,tracks,8); 
% figure, imshow(ext_sig) 
dec_wat=zeros(tracks,2); 
for i=1:tracks 
    no1=num2str(ext_sig(i,1:4)); 
    no2=num2str(ext_sig(i,5:8)); 
    dec_wat(i,1)=bin2dec(no1); 
    dec_wat(i,2)=bin2dec(no2); 
end 
fid=fopen('amira1.txt','at') 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\n',s*100) 
fclose(fid) 
 
delta_bar(real_ind)=delta_bar; 
figure,plot(delta_bar,'k*'),hold 
on,plot(thr*ones(sig_len),'k') 
xlabel('bit index'),ylabel('delta bar') 
text(15,thr+0.01,'threshold value') 
  
to reconstruct the fingerprint image 
initialize the pred wat image 
pred_wat_img=wat_img; 
for i=c+1:size(wat_img,1)-c 
    for j=c+1:size(wat_img,2)-c 
        pred_wat_img(i,j)=(1/(4*c))*(sum(wat_img(i-
c:i+c,j))+... 
            sum(wat_img(i,j-c:j+c))-2*wat_img(i,j)); 
    end 
end 
  
s=Similar(wat_img(:),pred_wat_img(:)) 
figure,imshow(uint8(pred_wat_img)) 
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لإةرراعح نخ ةرربحارردحا سرر خ  رح ف رر لي حسرر،يي حنزيرر  اح لأ رر  .حنحيل رر مح ن ن رر،وحفررلحاةرر بح 
خن ،زرحل ، مح نعم بح ن  حيبحلنىحةن،اح ناة بح لأةويبحنس خ، مح نعم بح ن  حيب.ح ررح ، سربح
  ايني ح  ح  اين  ح لأ   حنوعم بح ن  حيبح ن لحي   ح س ع  نا حنض   حانر ح  ر حنةرن،حاةر بح
سرر خا ،  حنل ررىحج ترر اح ناي ارر  ح ن ، زيرربحنوةررن،حن سرر ع  نا ح ررذن ح لإةرراعح رر حن رر ن ح ن
 ن اا ح نع ي ح  حأان عح ناانرحتوىحأاظ بح ن ن ييسح نلينيب.
ح
أ ح نعم بح ن  حيبحغي،ح ،حيبحنج  ،احتوىح ن ن ربحلضر فبححأظا، حا  حجح ن ا ، ح نع ويب
 نضنضر اح نا نسري ايبحن نضرا حا عر  م حارن احت نيربحن  نسر ب.حنار ح رذن حأ حاعر حل ، مح
 نعم بح ن  حيبحنا ن ح  ايرقحأ حهارنرحتورىح نةرن،صحنررح  اير،ح جربح ن عر، حار حظور ح سر انا ح
تورىحضرا حا عر  م حارن احت نيربحن  نسر بح.حأ  حاع حلض فبح نضنض اح نا نسري ايبحن ن%89
 لإةراعحاعر حل ، مح نعم ربح ن  حيربحفيار صح اخفضر ح جربح ن عر، ح اخف ضر حاسري  حةر بحةرن،حا
ح.%69لييحنةو حلنىح
ح
 كلمات مفتاحية:
ح
 ن ن ييسح نلينيبصحاة   ح لأة اعصح ن ن يرعصح ع ناربح نةرن،اصح ن عر، حتورىحاةر بح لإةراعصح
اعر ح نةرن،احاا حيربح نورن صحخن ،ز ر  ح ن ،جيرقصح ناي ر صحلإةاعصحا ان،حفو ،صح لسي حاة بح 
ان ربح ن   ير حنو ل ير ح نا سر خ  رح ن ف ةري صحح ن ن ،ارب لوي ح ا  ح ن ار ،صح سر خ، مح نسر   صح
ف،ير اصحان ربح نور صح  ييرزحاةر بح لإةراعصحلاار  حةرلبحاةر بح لإةراعصحلاار  حةرلبح نانيربح ن
 .  صحلخف اح ناي ا   بح ن  حيبصحأ   ح ن عون  نعمحا ،يقح  ابصحا نذمح ن ا ي ص
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أةاحح ن ع، حتوىح لأشرخ صحا سر خ  رحخةر حصح ن نر ييسح نلينيربحظر ه،اح ولربحفرلح
م ح نسان  ح ن  ضيبصحأ  ح نل اربحلنرىح لأ ر  حفرلحا ر  حن سرعح ر ح ن  اينر  حلنرىح ا  عا .حخ
 نه   رح ن  ز ي حااذ ح لأ ،.حاي ح نع ي ح  حهذ،ح ن ن ييسح نلينيبح ل ور حاةر بح لإةراعح ن   اربح
 لأ ار،حت ويرب.حهرذ ح لأ ر،ح ر  حاسرا حأ ح ن عر، حتورىحاةر بح لإةراعحي  ور حأ ارىحاار ح ر ح
تورىحاةر بح لإةراعصح نحيأخذح عون   حأ ا،ح   حهنحض،ن، حنع ويربح ن عر،  ن س خ رصح ذن ح
نأيضرر ح  رر ا حاسرراي حاررأ  احايرر .ح نسررا ح صخرر،حنا شرر ،حاةرر بح لإةرراعحهررنح نسررع،ح نرر،خيصح
نلس س  حاة بح لإةاعح ن ىحيس، حل   اا حفلحننل  ح ف  يحح نل سرا  ح نشخةريبحن ن ر،ن ح
ح نذ يبحن ن ع   ح نمسو يب.
ح
،لوبح ،جيقحةرن،احاةر بح لإةراعح ن  خوربحناظر رح ن عر، حتورىحاةر بح لإةراعح ع ا،ح 
خ ناحل،ابحلييحيع   حأ  اح نخن ،زرح ن سؤن حت ح س خ، مح ف ةي حاة بح لإةراعح ت  ر   ح
 اي، حتوىحان اح نخن ،زرح ن س ع  حفلح ن ،جيق.حنذن ح رح ج ، وحخن ،زرحس،يعحن ،جيرقحةرن،اح
ع  ح ا ش،احتوىح نةن،احذ  ح ن  ،يجح ن،    حناة بح لإةراعحاة بح لإةاع.حهذ ح نخن ،زرحي
ا نح  ح نةن،اح لأايضحن لأسن حنا حلأ ح لني حاة بح لإةاعحنلأايضحن لأسرن حيسرا ح ن اير،ح
 ر ح ن ف ةري ح نز حفربحنأيضر حيزير ح ن اير،ح ر ح نسر   ح ن ا رب.ح ررح نيريرحأ  اححخرن ،زرح ن ،جيرقح
حخن ،زرح ن ،جيقح ن ن ،وحس،يعحن جيق.نأنضل حا  حجح ن ا ، ح نع ويبحأ ح
ح
 نخ رناح ن  نيربحنو ،جيرقحهرلح سر خ، محخةر حصحةرن،احاةر بح لإةراع.ح سر ع  حهررذ،ح
 نخة حصح عح نا نذمح نذ حالة حتويدح  حج ت اح ناي ا  حفلح ،لوبح   انربحاةر بح لإةراع.ح
خةر حصح ن  يرزاحفلحهذ،ح ن ، سبصح رح ج ، وح ،ينبحا ي احن   انبحاة بح لإةاعح ع   حتوىح ن
ناذ،ح ناة ب.ح نف ،اح ن،حيسيبحهلحأ ح  حاة بحلةراعح  ار حاار ن ح  رن ح ر حت رن ي ح ل ير  ح
فلحج ت اح ناي ا  .حفلحهذ ح نا ن صحي رح ساي حتر  ح نخةر حصح ن  يرزاحن ناا ير  حن ن ف،يعر   ح
 حناذ،ح ناة بح ن نان احفلح س ،  حذ  حت،ضح عري حلرن حان ربح ن ا ةر حنارذ،ح ناةر ب.ح ر
ة حفلحهرذ ح نار ن حي ار ح سر ،ح لر  صحفرلح نع رن ح لأن صحير رح سراي حتر  ح ناا ير  حفرلح ر ح
 س ،صحفلح نع ن ح نا الصحي رح ساي حت  ح ن ف،يع  حفلح  ح س ،.حا  حأ ح نا ن ح ن  ا حناةر بح
 لإةراعحفرلحج تر اح ناي ار  حنحيل رن حتورىحأ ح ل ير حلإلر  اي  حأنحز نيربحخةر حصح ناةر بصح
نحي رأا،حار ن،  حأنح ل،ير حاةر بح لإةراعحن رذن حنحيل ر مح سر لبح اير،احنو خرزي .حح نخن ،زر
ا ع  حخ أح  س نحح%89أنضل حا  حجح ن ا ، ح نع ويبحأ ح جبح ن ع، حنوخن ،زرح ن ن ،وحهلح
ح.%2حجي  د
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